Return to competitive politics that includes minorities

By Jehan Perera

(November 17, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) President Mahinda Rajapaksa was expected to utilise the ruling party’s convention to announce the dates of both the general elections as well as presidential elections. The general speculation centred around whether he would declare that the presidential election would be held prior to or after the general election, or be held concurrently. It was widely held that as the President is more popular than the rest of his government that he would confidently go in first and notch up a big victory. He would then lead his team to another resounding victory at the general elections and possibly even obtain a 2/3 majority that would enable constitutional change to the government’s advantage.

The President has cut a popular figure not only due to the enormous hoardings showing him at major street corners, but also due to his government’s repeated election victories. At the Uva Provincial Council elections the government obtained a very high majority of 72 percent of the popular vote, and at the Southern Provincial Council elections last month it obtained a handsome 67 percent majority. The only comfort that the Opposition could take was to say that the government had been expecting more than 80 to 90 percent of the vote, and obtained much less.

The reasons for the President’s popularity was seen in his earthy style which encompassed hosting large numbers of supporters at various presidential abodes, the natural warmth demonstrated towards people, and most of all his extolling of the nation and its sovereignty. The President also had an immense achievement to substantiate the claims of his supporters that here was a true patriot, and possibly the greatest ever in the whole history of Sri Lanka. This was the defeat and virtual complete eradication of the dreaded LTTE that had plagued Sri Lanka with terror and warfare for nearly three decades. This victory was deemed to be all the greater because it was against the country’s past experiences.

At the convention the President made no categorical statement as to which election would take place first, but there was a hint that it would be a general election. Taking a statesmanlike approach, he said that he would not alter the election schedule as other political leaders had tried to do. As Parliament ends its six year term in April of 2010 and the next Presidential elections are not due until November 2011, it seems fairly certain that general elections are to come first. On the other hand, there was always an element of doubt about the holding of Presidential elections in the immediate future. This was due to the shortening of the President’s first term of office by two years.

Unforeseen Challenge

However, the circumstances under which President Rajapaksa has put off announcing early Presidential elections creates an impression that it is not simply the loss of two years that deterred the President from calling early Presidential polls. The predicament that is most likely to have determined President Rajapaksa’s decision not to face presidential polls at this time could scarcely have been foreseen even a month ago when the President seemed to be riding the crest of a wave that would last for years, if not decades.

The decisive factor behind the change in the government’s calculations would be the sudden emergence of former Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka as a potential challenger for the Presidency. So long as General Fonseka was seen as being a part of the government team that won the war, it was reasonable for the government as a whole, and the President in particular, to claim the credit for the victory over the LTTE. But with the breakdown in relations between the General and the government leadership, no longer does it seem reasonable that the credit for the military victory be taken exclusively by the President.

Once a negative cycle starts to operate it becomes difficult to stop it from gathering momentum. Other vulnerabilities in the government’s position have suddenly begun to emerge. One is the trade union action being taken by trade unions affiliated to the opposition. During the years of war, the trade union movement was notably dormant. People of all strata, including the working classes, understood the enormous economic and social costs associated with combating the LTTE, but decided to bear with those costs in the interests of finishing off the LTTE once and for all. However, six months after the war’s end, people find their patience running low. In addition there is resentment at the corruption and nepotism that is seen to be rife within the government.

Although General Fonseka has still not publicly declared his intention to enter into politics, the mere fact of this possibility appears to have rejuvenated the Opposition and boosted the morale of opposition party workers. A strong opposition is an essential ingredient of any functioning democracy. It is a well known axiom in politics, and indeed in all aspects of life, that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. During the last three years of war, and even after the end of the war, it appeared that the powers of the government and the centralisation of such powers was growing without the necessary checks and balances to keep the political system healthy and vibrant.

New Vulnerability

A sense of vulnerability in the government can induce the government to be more mindful of the concerns of the people it governs and to take action to meet those concerns. This increased sense of vulnerability may not only be due to internal causes but also due to external factors coming into play. The imminent withdrawal of the European Union’s GSP+ tariff concession which the government is making an effort to keep is perhaps the most compelling example. The US State Department’s report on alleged war crimes to which the government has appointed a distinguished Sri Lankan committee to inquire into, is another.

Ironically, one of the major beneficiaries of General Fonseka’s entry into politics could be the ethnic minorities. With the General who led the army to victory over the LTTE on the side of the Opposition, the government cannot any more rely on its own advocacy of Sinhalese nationalist positions to win the majority of the Sinhalese electorate. At previous elections the government was able to win by simply appealing to the Sinhalese majority to the point of disregarding and alienating the ethnic minorities. But now with General Fonseka being one of the leaders of the Opposition, the Sinhalese nationalist vote is bound to be divided. As a result the ethnic minority vote will become important for both the government and opposition to win over.

In recent days the government has been responding with more alacrity to the concerns of the Tamil people with regard to issues of resettlement and freedom of movement. Quite suddenly after more than six months of insisting that the Tamil population displaced from formerly LTTE-held areas need to be kept in confinement in government welfare camps, the government has suddenly started to release tens of thousands of them. More than one half of the IDP population is now out of the welfare camps. In addition the government has lifted many of the restrictions on the movement of traffic on the A9 highway that connects the northern capital of Jaffna to the south of the country and runs through the formerly LTTE-held areas.

Even General Fonseka, who during the war period spoke of Sri Lanka being a Sinhalese country, in which the minorities had to know their place and not make undue demands, appears to have moderated his position. He has also been requested by the Opposition alliance to reach an understanding with the major Tamil political party. It appears that the clash of the Sinhalese titans can pave the way to the politics of moderation. Prospective governments will have to seek the support of all ethnic communities, and be mindful of their grievances and aspirations, rather than relying solely on mobilising the nationalism of the ethnic majority.

-Sri Lanka Guardian