The electoral competition to be statesmanlike

By Jehan Perera

(December 01, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) One of the ironies of the end of the war was the escalation in some aspects of security, with the number of checkpoints on the roads connecting Colombo to the north and east, and within Colombo itself, seeming to increase. The government appeared to be quite content with having the security apparatus spread into every area of governance, with even appointments to civilian administrative posts being given to former military officers. There was anxiety especially amongst the ethnic minorities that the government was giving too much deference to the military and over-militarising the state apparatus. But with Presidential elections to be held on January 26, 2010, the government has been moving swiftly to appeal to all sections of the population, especially the Tamil minority.

It was not more than a month ago that the continued incarceration of over a quarter of a million displaced Tamils in the welfare was seen in the light of national security. The prospect of LTTE cadre being amongst the displaced population was made a justification for further time to ensure more careful screening of them. The closure of roads ranging from the northern A9 highway to various roads within Colombo, and security checkpoints, were justified on the same basis. Those who considered these restrictions to be excessive whether Tamil or not, were intimidated into silence by the prospect of being called traitors and LTTE sympathizers.

But now virtually overnight the government has given the displaced Tamil people the right to move freely and has opened the roads and reduced the checking of people at security checkpoints. The same government that defied Tamil opinion and international criticism has started to undo the structures of war with amazing speed. The government has changed the nature of those welfare camps from being closed ones to open ones and displaced persons who were once confined to them can now leave the camps if they wish. By doing so, the government has brought itself in line with Tamil and international sentiment that saw the confinement of the displaced people to be grossly in violation of their human rights.

The government’s ability to suddenly change its policies with regard to issues that concern national security raises several questions. The first is whether the government is convinced that the threat to national security from the LTTE is really over, or whether it is now gambling with the country’s security merely to woo the Tamil electorate in view of the forthcoming Presidential elections. By relaxing its security measures that are unpopular with the ethnic minorities, the government may be seeking to demonstrate a break with the past that can appeal to the ethnic minority electorate. The government appears to be reaching out to the ethnic minority electorate even at the cost of disregarding security related concerns in its once solid Sinhalese voter base.

Government strategy

It is perhaps no coincidence that the relaxation of the government’s security measures has accompanied the government’s decision to call for early Presidential elections. The government is facing a formidable challenge posed by the candidacy of General Fonseka, and the support to him given by the major opposition parties. However, the decision to call for early Presidential elections was not totally unexpected. There was anticipation from the time of the government’s dramatic military victory over the LTTE in May 2009 that the President would call for early Presidential elections to capitalize on his popularity. What made the government’s electoral calculations go completely and surprisingly awry was the breakdown in relations between the President and the former Army Commander who could appeal to the same Sinhalese voter base that the President appealed to.

Through its liberalization of policies after the departure of General Fonseka from the positions of Army Commander and Chief of Defence Staff, the government may be hoping to convey the impression that he was the reason for the continuation of stringent policies on national security even after the end of the war. As Army Commander, General Fonseka made it clear that security considerations came first. After the war ended, it was reasonable to expect the government to start considering the partial demobilization of the armed forces, which had grown in numbers. However, General Fonseka declared the reverse. He said that the Sri Lankan army should by a further 50 percent to a total strength of 300,000 to ensure the country’s security in the future.

The enlargement of the military would have meant the requisitioning of more economic resources for defence purposes rather than for economic development and social welfare. As a result these security measures would not have been popular with the general population, but might have been acquiesced in by them on the grounds of national security. On the other hand, the Tamil people could not acquiesce in these security measures as they feared that the former battle zones of the north and east would never return to what they had once been. Their worst fear was that their traditional villages and farms would become sites for army cantonments and high security zones, with the possibility of Sinhalese colonies also, as practiced by the Israeli government in the Gaza Strip in Palestine.

General’s appeal

The government may be hoping to obtain the electoral support of the Tamil people due to its recent shifts in policy following the departure of General Fonseka and his emergence as an opposition leader. The government may even begin to lay the blame for the overly restrictive security measures in the post-war period on him. The government’s worst fear would be that apart from splitting the Sinhalese vote, the General will also be able to attract ethnic minority voters by virtue of being the candidate of the joint opposition, which includes strong ethnic minority parties.

So far the entry of General Fonseka into politics has proved to be positive to the ethnic minorities in terms of the policy changes it seems to have prompted in the government. His media debut as a presidential candidate was also positive in the message he sought to convey to the ethnic minorities. He stated that he respected all ethnic communities and religions, and believed in equal rights for all citizens and equal protection for them. He even said that the 13th Amendment which devolved political power to provincial councils was twenty years old and needed to change to suit the present situation. He explained his oft quoted statement regarding Sri Lanka being the country of the Sinhalese, and said that the journalist who quoted him had left out the sentence in which he said that the Sinhalese should treat all other communities as their own.

In his first public appearance as a contestant for the presidency, General Fonseka came across as a sober and rational personality who spoke in a matter-of-fact way. He said that the army was a professional one, and did not engage in the numerous abductions and extra judicial killings that terrified the Tamil minority and other dissenters during the time of war. He said he had kept his promise to finish the war in a given time frame and accomplished his task. Likewise he said he would keep his political pledges. The question is whether the electorate will believe his statesmanlike intentions. During the period of the war, General Fonseka was associated with its climate of impunity as the most powerful of the service commanders, and few dared to criticize him.

However, there is a possibility that the yearning for a change in the political culture of thuggery, violence and corruption is so strong in today’s post-war society that the electorate will give him the benefit of the doubt. The problem for the government is that its own shift in policy comes several months later than it should have. The change in approach that is happening now may seem too little and too late and may be rejected by Tamil voters as a political ploy to obtain their electoral support. If the government had liberalized its security-centred approach and adopted a more reconciliatory and statesmanlike approach at an earlier point in time, it could have more easily obtained the support of the ethnic minority electorate. There would have been a greater possibility of them feeling that the government genuinely cared for their well being.

-Sri Lanka Guardian