The strange decline of the JVP vote base

"Outside the Government, the JVP inevitably went down the slippery slope of outright, some would say vicious, opposition to the President and Government just at the time the JVP should have shared the glow of military successes."
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By Atticus

(October 26, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) At crucial moments in the past five years, the JVP was instrumental in changing the course of the country’s history. The question is why has it ended today seemingly as a minor, though vociferous, player in the political scene?

The day after the 2004 general election the country woke up to a realization that with nearly 40 members of parliament the JVP had phoenix-like risen from the ashes of a bloody past. The feelings of young, underprivileged voters who had made this possible can best be described in the words of Wordsworth "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, But to be young was very Heaven!"

At first everything went right for the JVP. It punched far above its weight of support in the country. Foremost was the fact that it was the JVP, by delivering its vote base, that made the difference between victory and defeat in the close run election victory of President Rajapakse. It is futile to speculate too much of the consequences if the election had gone the other way. It is certain however that Prabhakaran would today be alive, and with bagfuls of money of the Tamil Diaspora and the Western international community, ruling the roost with an iron fist in the merged North and the East of the country. Eelam would be a reality de facto if not de jure.

Likewise it was the JVP that sustained the Government during a crucial phase of the war against the LTTE when defeat of the Government was imminent in a parliamentary vote on the Budget. By any criteria, deciding finally to abstain from voting on the Budget just minutes before the division bells were called, despite pressures from within its parliamentary group and without, changed the course of events. War to crush the LTTE, or peace in our time Munich style, went right down to the wire.

There are two other areas where the actions of the JVP have had lasting consequences. It was not the Government nor the official Opposition that challenged the legality of the merger of the Northern and the Eastern Provinces. It was an initiative of the JVP. The decision of the Supreme Court killed the idea of a merger stone dead. People now forget that the merger was considered by westernized elitist locals and foreign circles as irreversible. Leading politicians of both the Government and the official Opposition at the time supported the merger, explicitly or implicitly, as a sine qua non to reconcile the Tamils and the LTTE to one nation. Even the APRC circuit conducted its business on that assumption. If there are plaudits for the demerger, they must go primarily to the JVP.

The other issue was the JVP`s advocacy of a military solution to defeat the LTTE when the country was floundering for direction and leadership. It was the JVP that set up the front organization, the Patriotic National Front, to mobilize public opinion to and fight and fight again to a finish to save the nation". The impact of the JVP campaign in all its manifestations in changing the public mood towards a military solution, in inspiring foot soldiers, in encouraging rural youth to join the armed forces, and in the assertiveness of the home grown intelligentsia on the questions of war and peace should not be underestimated. The JVP paved the way for the military solution that followed.

What went wrong when the march of events seemed to be going the JVP way? There is no easy answer of the failure of the JVP to break the mould of politics though explanations are legion. Interesting to the observer is to examine the shortcomings of judgments and actions that blunted or rather reversed its appeal to the voters when the JVP in many ways embodied the popular mood. Far from doubling its vote base in the past five years to about a fifth of the electorate it has collapsed by half or more.

How was it that large sections of the underprivileged workers and peasants have been voting for bourgeois parties than one of their own?

One factor was perhaps the refusal to accept ministerial portfolios immediately after the election of President Rajapakse. It may well have prevented the necessity to persuade a large number of UNP members of Parliament to join the Government. The JVP was in a strong position to ask for important portfolios. The JVP Ministers could have shown their mettle as progressive, efficient, incorruptible and non-ideological in running their ministries. The exercise of power in a highly visible fashion, experience and efficiency in office, may well have triggered a great leap forward in national support.

Outside the Government, the JVP inevitably went down the slippery slope of outright, some would say vicious, opposition to the President and Government just at the time the JVP should have shared the glow of military successes.

A second setback to its electoral fortunes was the split in the Party, seeds of which first appeared when the majority vetoed the JVP accepting ministerial posts. Insiders claim that the split arose from basic policy differences between emollient "reformers" seeking to transform the country in the framework of the prevailing capitalist system and more militant "revolutionaries" who wished a more robust challenge to the system and were unable to renounce, if in power, the use of force if necessary to bring about change.

There can be no doubt that the clash also related to bitter personal rivalry at the top. All these factors came to a head when the ideologically light, heavy weight parliamentary leader was made to jump before he could be pushed by a charge sheet for straying from majoritarian views. This seemingly smart move ended as an own goal. Ten MPs exited. The JVP base was eroded. The Government parliamentary majority was consolidated. The JVP was left in limbo politically.

There are perhaps deeper reasons why the masses have not flocked to vote JVP. Most people have a vague idea of the quasi-religious beliefs, myths, legends and symbols of the JVP. They are not too bothered by those. What holds them back is that the JVP has conspicuously failed to define itself in changed circumstances. Are the JVP leaders convinced democrats wedded to a parliamentary system or do they hanker after a JVP run authoritarian system of governance? Are they essentially a class-based party (workers and peasants) with class identities reflected in militancy of labour unions and university students or a "broad tent" with room for the home-grown intelligentsia of all communities as well as others who do not belong to the working class?

Likewise the JVP has been policy free on the basic issues affecting the day to day lives of the masses. Nobody knows its road map on macro economic management, particularly on controlling inflation, on economic growth, on issues of social and economic equality, on specifics relating to "embracing the minorities", on details on the devolution of administration, on its concept of a socialist market economy (Chinese/Vietnamese models?). No JVP-oriented think tanks, book clubs, "summer schools" exist to enable the JVP oriented intelligentsia (the road map-makers) to flesh out the ideas and policies of, and for, the leadership.

The JVP leaders have instead focused not without panache the abolition of the executive presidency, the damage of the IMF loan, the resettlement of IDPs, outing corruption and mismanagement, demands for higher wages, and individual wrong doings in various ministries such as education and health.

There may well be a case for all of them. But do they bring the JVP any additional votes? Does the hard and soft JVP vote care a "tinker`s cuss " about matters far removed from their everyday lives? Or votes best mined by community (grass roots) politics? Is the lesson to be learned from the recent election in Hambantota district (where the JVP received 11% of the vote), is the success of community or grass roots politics—- politicians and activists being close to the people, being engaged in their pressing problems, and agitating to solve them locally?

The JVP is caught up today in a classic Catch 22 situation. They cannot be a part of a UNP led group at the next General Election lest the blood of "martyrs" be forgotten. If it contests on its own, a wipe out in Parliament is certain as in the provincial elections. Hence the attempt to clutch at straws, or rather the coat tails of a War Hero to bring about regime change with all the known consequences.

Whatever happens to the present messy manoeuvres, the present low point of the JVP electorally does not mean it cannot have a Third Resurrection. The next General Election might provide the catharsis for just that. Can the Leader, a consensual chairman who seems to have taken Trappist vows in the current political maelstrom, become an authoritarian boss in Parliament and outside and lead the Party in a new voter friendly socialist direction? Only time would tell.

-Sri Lanka Guardian