Indo Pak: Beyond Sharm El Sheikh

"The main problem was the Joint Statement where mention of Balochistan and delinking talks with control of terror by Pakistan has not been politically accepted in India, thereby isolating Mr Man Mohan Singh."
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By Col. Rahul Bhonsle

(September 04, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) Looking beyond Sharm El Sheikh India’s commitment to a dialogue with Pakistan has been reiterated from time to time. Engaging and normalizing relations with Islamabad is accepted as vital to India’s interests, however despite the same, when that happens will depends on two factors -

Factor 1- The political situation in Pakistan with confrontation between Pakistan People’s Party and the principal opposition, Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League has come out in the open with Saudi mediation preventing a conflagration. The so called Minus One formula to remove Mr Zardari and charging former President Musharraf with treason is engaging the political space. Thus any major foreign policy initiative is not likely and dialogue with India may not be on the top priority. Till the situation stabilizes it is unlikely that we see positive momentum in this sphere.

Factor 2 – Action against perpetrators and conspirators of the terror strike in Mumbai by Islamabad is essential. A public perception that Pakistan is not to allowing its territory to be used in any manner for terrorist activities against India alone can lead to further improvement in communications between the two countries.

Thus despite an open invitation, Indian Foreign Secretary Ms Nirupama Rao is not likely to go to Islamabad as it is her turn now to visit the Pakistani capital and the first time she meets her counterpart, Salman Bashir may be in New York. This meeting is likely to be dry and not much is likely to emerge between Ms Rao and Mr Bashir, as the latter is seen in India as a hard liner supporting the ISI-Army line of confrontation.

On the other hand Pakistan Foreign Minister Mr Qureshi is generally inclined for a rapprochement and is in the Zardari faction which favours dialogue with India. This group is marginalized at present within the Pakistani establishment. Thus while the two foreign ministers, Mr S.M. Krishna and Shah Mahmood Qureshi may meet on the side lines of the UN General Assembly, nothing substantial is likely to emerge particularly as the Indian External Affairs Minister is yet to form his own views on Indo Pakistan relations and therefore is expected to toe the line of the Prime Minister.

The earliest opportunity for a summit level dialogue now appears to be during the Commonwealth summit in Trinidad in end November when Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh could meet the President or the Prime Minister of Pakistan. This time around no, “Joint Statement” would be expected given the faux pas of Sharm el Sheik which is now seen as a “discontinuity” in dialogue.

The main problem was the Joint Statement where mention of Balochistan and delinking talks with control of terror by Pakistan has not been politically accepted in India, thereby isolating Mr Man Mohan Singh. The Balochistan entry surprised many but should not have, most likely the subject would have been broached by Mr Zardari when he met Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh at Yekaterinburg on 16 June but that time as we all know there was no breakthrough. Possibly the Indian Prime Minister led himself to believe that India could call the bluff that it was not directly involved in Balochistan. This was a serious miscalculation and has had a number of major political setbacks for the Congress in general and the Prime Minister in particular apart from setting back the process of talks with Pakistan

There is increasingly a feeling in some quarters that scuttling Indo Pakistan dialogue was the principal objective of the Pakistani interlocutors in Sharm el Sheikh. They knew very well the mood in India and shifting the blame for not talking to New Delhi was necessary to give them adequate space not to act against Hafeez Saeed and other LeT operatives. They seem to have achieved this aim with India placed on the defensive.

Dr Man Mohan Singh seems to have realized that unless he is able to force Pakistan to deliver on terror he will not be able to build the atmosphere at home for a possible compromise. It also appears that while redefining Indo US relations was his principal focus in his first tenure, Indo Pakistan rapprochement may be the lynch pin for the second and all Prime Minister’s want to leave behind a legacy howsoever faulted it may be later, thus for Narsimha Rao it was opening of the economy, for Vajpayee the nuke tests for Manmohan Singh I – the Indo US nuclear deal and Manmohan Singh II may be now aiming at Indo Pak détente.

Progress in the Mumbai probe and trial will be the key metrics for the same. Demonstration of Pakistani willingness to act against those still seeking to target India is another and finally action against terror infrastructure the third. When translated in concrete objectives, action by Pakistan against Hafeez Saeed, LeT chief, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Retired Colonel R. Saadat Ullah, Zarar Shah and Abu Al Qama will be the first steps in this direction.

However given the internal problems in Pakistan any government which acts against Hafeez Saeed in particular is not likely to survive so India may have to downgrade the demand to action against others, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Saadat Ullah, Zarar Shah and Abu Al Qama

Until then expect other secondary fields as Climate change and trade to be some notable exceptions of Indo Pakistan congruence.

-Sri Lanka Guardian