Familial Rule and its Discontents

By Tisaranee Gunasekara
Courtesy: The Sunday Island

‘Nepotism: favouritism shown to relatives or friends, especially by giving them jobs; origin Italian nepotismo from nipote – nephew’ -Oxford Dictionary

(September 14, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) In Sri Lanka, nepotistic governance is the norm. When a provision in the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance impeded Presidential nephew Shasheendra Rajapakse from holding the posts of the Chief Minister of Uva and the Basnayake Nilame (Chief Custodian) of Kataramagama Devale simultaneously, the President exempted the Kataragama Devale from the obstructive provision via a Gazette Extraordinary. Though the LTTE is defeated and its megalomaniac leader is dead, whenever a ruling Rajapakse ventures out, roads are closed and Sri Lankans are reduced to twiddling their thumbs, some in air conditioned comfort, most in the sweltering heat of jam packed buses. Having become a privileged caste, a troop of super citizens endowed with unlimited power and untold luxuries, the Family has too much to lose, if President Rajapakse retires at the end of his second term, as his predecessor did, as he is constitutionally bound to do.

Mahinda Rajapakse can win the upcoming Presidential poll with ease, but obtaining a two thirds majority at a parliamentary election for the UPFA would be a much harder task, given the political and ethnic divisions in the country. And a two thirds majority in parliament, together with a simple majority at a referendum, is necessary, for a new constitution or for a constitutional amendment to remove Presidential term limits. If a constitutional change does not materialise and Mahinda Rajapakse is fated to retire at the end of his second term, he might find it much harder to ride roughshod over party seniors, elevate his family and friends at every turn, and, most importantly, pass his Presidential sceptre to a successor of his choice, be it brother or son. Winning the next parliamentary election with a massive majority is thus a sine-qua-non for the success of the Rajapakse dynastic project.

The presence of an opposition leader with a proven penchant for losing elections has stood and will continue to stand the Rajapakses in good stead. But to win a two thirds majority in parliament other measures may be needed – from keeping displaced Tamils in internment camps (in order to get their votes, en bloc) to browbeating the media into a state of total supineness. Preventing media criticism and exposures may become a particular necessity, given the non-appearance of the peace dividend and the consequent emergence of economic discontent in the South. The end of the war will not bring about more democracy and greater openness even in the South; on the contrary, there will be less tolerance and more repression, of both judicial (via the PTA and the Emergency) and extra-judicial varieties.

Freedom of Expression and the GSP+

The Tigers are no more. But the PTA, enacted to combat the LTTE threat, and the Emergency, are very much in use, in particular to limit freedom of expression by creating a climate of fear. The recent arrest of three journalists attached to the para-JVP paper Irida Lanka is an excellent case in point. The three scribes were reportedly investigating the irregular use of state owned facilities (belonging to Maga Neguma) in constructing a mammoth abode in a land owned by a Presidential relative. What should have been a simple offence of trespassing was transformed into a conspiracy to assassinate the President; the journalists were handed over to the TID and ministers and police spokesmen began hinting at webs of deadly intrigue. Fortunately a concerted protest campaign by the JVP compelled the regime to do a volte face; all talk of plots was abandoned and the three journalists were charged under normal law rather than the PTA. Unfortunately there was no party in the Sinhala South to campaign for senior journalist JS Tissainayagam. Given the prevailing commonsense in Sri Lanka, his Tamil ethnicity may have become a disqualification, in more ways than one (deep rooted ethno-religious or racial prejudices, when they become ideologically and psychologically predominant in a society, can affect every institution, including even the judiciary).

Mr. Tissainayagam was sentenced to 20 years rigorous imprisonment under the PTA for creating communal disharmony and helping the LTTE. Yet, the governing coalition consists of the JHU, which fosters communal disharmony by advocating an aggressive and intolerant brand of Sinhala Buddhist supremacism; and in the Cabinet of Ministers are gentlemen who were at the forefront of the pro-Tiger Third Peace Process (notably GL Pieris and Milinda Moragoda). Is the manner in which the Tissainayagam case was handled by the authorities a function of his opposition to the government rather than any sympathy he may have felt towards the LTTE? Can one get away with helping the LTTE or causing communal disharmony, if one is allied with the rulers? How will history judge a legal system which fails to take decisive action against vandals attacking Christian churches but prosecutes journalists for causing communal disharmony?

The LTTE is defeated. Vellupillai Pirapaharan and his top lieutenants are dead. These are incontrovertible, immutable facts. Why, then, is Sri Lanka acting as if the Tiger is still around, in all its strength, and the war far from being over? Why the unremitting search for enemies, the pathological proclivity to see threats and conspiracies and the structural inability to resist the lure of extremism, even in peace time? Why is the government reacting with a total disregard for proportionality? For instance, does it make sense to accuse the spokesman for the UNICEF of making statements helpful to the LTTE and expel him almost three months after the Tigers were decimated? Is it intelligent to pick a fight with the UN at this juncture? Would not this act be particularly foolhardy when the fate of the GSP+ (and thus millions of dollars in foreign exchange as well as thousands of jobs) hangs in balance?

The retention of the GSP+ facility was an achievable goal; yet the indications are that we are about to lose it – thanks, in the main, to our own idiocy and ineptness. After all, the EU did extend the GSP+ facility to Sri Lanka last year, over the protests of the human rights lobby. Extending the GSP+ facility when the war was on (not to mention the banning of the LTTE) was hardly the action of an irredeemably pro-Tiger or anti-Sri Lankan entity. Assuming patriotic or anti-imperialist poses and calling the EU names is easy; but such juvenile conduct will neither help us to regain the GSP+ nor make us understand why we lost it. The GSP+ is not a right Sri Lanka and other developing nations are entitled to; it is a special treatment we need to earn and the observance of human rights is a standard condition for winning it. If the regime understood this simple fact, it may not have banned entry to the EU team tasked with preparing a report on the human rights conditions in Sri Lanka. That inanely belligerent act would have reduced our chances of retaining the GSP+ far more than all the anti-Lankan propaganda of Diaspora Tigers.

One of the reasons the EU deems it impossible to extend the GSP facility is the presence of ‘complete or virtually complete immunity in Sri Lanka’, a function of ‘widespread police torture, abductions of journalists, politicised courts, and uninvestigated disappearances’ (The Economist – 3.9.2009). As we know well, police torture does exist (according to the government, 32 suspects died in police custody in the last eight months alone), journalists are abducted and disappearances happen, even in the South. The Northern internment camps seem to be another factor impeding our chances of retaining the GSP+ facility. Last week the government promised to permit camp inmates to seek refuge with family members living outside the camps. Is this a serious undertaking meant to be implemented? Or is it one more time buying exercise? Is the government nurturing a plan to balkanise the existing camps into smaller, more controllable ones, scattered all over the North? "A senior government official told The Island that authorities in charge of camps had been unable to run overcrowded camps effectively. ``Responding to our queries, he asserted that it would be ideal if only a few thousand could be held at one camp. He said that setting up of additional camps would be a heavy burden on the government but it could greatly help their efforts to identify terrorists taking cover among ordinary civilians" (The Island – 31.8.2009; emphasis mine). UNICEF spokesman James Elder’s crimes included helping the LTTE by criticising the conditions in the Northern camps. Will that be a charge made against the next Tissainayagam?

Enemies

The Northern internment camps are symbolic of the Rajapakse administration’s approach to the ‘Tamil issue’. A purpose of the camp system, according to the regime, is preventing the rejuvenation of the LTTE, by weeding out the Tigers hiding amongst civilians. The camps thus embody the modus operandi favoured by the regime to prevent another Tamil uprising – force rather than political or even humanitarian concessions. The war will thus continue, albeit at a much lower intensity, in the North, with every Tamil being considered a real or a potential enemy. "Don’t forget Prabhakaran’s parents, too, took refuge among ordinary people", warns the ‘government official’ quoted in the above ‘The Island’ report, in his bid to justify the incarceration of civilian Tamils. Does this mean that Vellupillai Pirapaharan’s parents are guilty of the crime of terrorism because they are the parents of Vellupillai Pirapaharan? If Mr. Pirapaharan’s parents who never belonged to the LTTE and never took up arms are not considered as civilians, by the same token the parents, siblings, spouses and offspring of Tiger cadres will not be considered as civilians either, simply because they are the parents, siblings, spouses and offspring of Tiger cadres. Such a criterion would make ‘sense’ of the Northern internment camps, because every civilian incarcerated in these barbed wire enclosures cannot but be closely related to a Tiger cadre and thus ‘guilty’ of the crime of terrorism. This approach is identical to that archaic and inhumane law which enabled King Sri Wickrama Rajapasingha to execute the wife, children and sister of Ehalepola Nilame, because they happened to be the wife, children and sister of a man accused of betraying his Sovereign by consorting with the British.

Discrimination and nepotism are the twin pillars of the Rajapakse mode of governance. Sinhala supremacism is cleverly manipulated and presented as ‘patriotism’ to win the backing of the Sinhala majority for rampant Rajapakse nepotism and its disastrous economic consequences. There is a go slow campaign in the estate sector and the JVP is threatening to go for a general strike. 22 Presidential advisors were paid 11.7 million last year. Cost of living is sky rocketing but this (together with media freedom) is a ‘minor issue’ according to Minister Champika Ranawaka. Cost of living and media freedom are minor issues because the major issue is local and international conspiracies; as Minister Dulles Alahapperuma stated, "Why are people like Miliband and Solheim silent now? They are silent but act behind the scenes" (Daily Mirror – 10.9.2009). Condemning Western democracies as the enemy, we nevertheless expect them to treat us as a friend, and a favoured friend at that. When they do not, we get angrier and shriller, and seek refuge in anti-imperialism. When Southern workers begin to express their economic discontent in strikes and demonstrations, they too will be accused of being part of this Western conspiracy to undermine the patriotic government of Sri Lanka. The fate of Tamils today can well become the fate of anti-government Sinhalese tomorrow – if they are seen as impediments to the dynastic longings of the Ruling Family.

-Sri Lanka Guardian