The revolt of the privileged Vellahlas

"The Vellahla strategy to unite divided Jaffna Tamils on casteism was to fly the flag of communalism. Producing an external bogey in the south was the way to paper over the internal divisions in the north."
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Part II

By HLD Mahindapala

(August 05, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) The dominant role played by the Vellahlas in post-independence politics has been either downplayed or brushed under the carpet by analysts and commentators in academia and NGOs because it undermined their thesis that only the Sinhala-Buddhists are responsible for the north-south crisis. If they accepted the body of evidence pointing a finger directly at the Vellahla forces that played the tempting tunes of communalism, like the Pied Piper of Hamelin, to drag the unsuspecting Tamils of Jaffna straight into the cold waters of Nanthi Kadal Lagoon, they wouldn’t have had a leg to stand on. They had a field day during Velupillai Prabhakaran’s time primarily by demonizing the Sinhala-Buddhists and exonerating the Vellahlas of the north who initiated, launched, directed and financed the Vadukoddai War.

The responsibility for the 33-year-old Vadukoddai War lies entirely with the Vellahlas. As pointed out earlier (in Part I—Sri Lanka Guardian, August 3, 2009) the Vellahlas held power in the commanding heights of Jaffna politics. Their control over 1) land, 2) the Vellahla-casteist ideology, elevated and sanctified by Arumuka Navalar, 3) the Hindu temples, 4) the priests who came only from the Vellala caste as there was no Brahaminical caste in Jaffna, 5) the ruling Tesawalamai law, 6) the public service and finally 7) the leading political party, the Federal/TULF made them the dominant political force going beyond the peninsula into national and international arenas.

Prof. A. J. Wilson, son-in-law of the father of Tamil separatism, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, confirmed the last point when he wrote: “The TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front) and, earlier, the FP (Federal Party) were Vellala-dominated but were generally benevolent towards the non-Vellalas (this was a bourgeois attitude not based on the radical or socialist tradition.) Chelvanayakam’s world was of that texture.” (p.139 – S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 1947 – 1977). These were all instruments of power and the Vellahlas had them all, using every quarter of it to maximize their separatist politics.

In short, the Vellahlas, who owned/managed/directed the socio-economic forces of Jaffna had total control of practically every aspect of Jaffna. As masters who controlled the spiritual, secular, legal, economic and political forces – the commanding heights of peninsular polity – they had no rivals. From feudal times they suppressed any opposition coming from the lower-castes with an iron fist. Any low-caste individual who dared to rise above them were hammered, killed or burnt.

The brutal fascism of the Vellahlas was not different from that of their successor, Velupillai Prabhakaran. The oppressive fascism of both regimes ran on parallel lines with the difference of Prabhakaran imposing his Pol Potist fascism on political considerations rather than on casteist imperatives of the Vellahlas. Up until the eighties the Vellahlas had the upper hand. They used power concentrated in their hands to protect and preserve their feudal and colonial privileges, positions power and status. This became the primary driving force of Jaffna-centric politics. Any opposition to their privileged position, with from within or from external sources, were resisted. The Vadukoddai Resolution and the Vadukoddai War were the ultimate political resistance put up the Vellahalas to retain their grip on power.

But by 1931 when the forces of modernity – including the universal franchise – came marching in to Jaffna the Vellahlas shifted from casteist politics to communal politics. Jane Russell has analysed the communal politics from 1937 to 1947 in her study titled Communal Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution, 1931 – 1947. She reveals how casteism, though still a dominant force, was changing into communalism as the new political force. Casteism, which was the ruling ideology that held Jaffna together from feudal times, was losing its pristine power. It was fast becoming a divisive force threatening to fragment Jaffna. Vellahlas could not fight the low-castes in Jaffna and the Sinhalese of the south simultaneously. And as divisive casteism could not bring about unity in the north the Vellahlas turned to communalism in the thirties and forties by demonizing the Sinhalese.

Besides, fragmented Vellahlas elite of the north could not fight the south on peninsular power alone. Chelvanayakam, in fact, went beyond the borders of Jaffna to incorporate Tamil-speaking peoples of the east and the central hills to boost the numbers needed to present a formidable front against the Sinhalese. His objective was to broaden the anti-Sinhala front by forming a “movement” of the Tamil-speaking people. He master plan was to bring together the Muslims, the Indians of the central hills and the Batticolao Tamils of the east under “the iyakkum (“movement”) of the Tamil Paysoom Makkal (the Tamil-speaking people) and thus not of the Thamil Makkal (the Tamil people) only. He was thus trying to create a unity of all Tamil-speaking people in the whole island inclusive of the Tamil-speaking Muslims.” (p..70 -- Wilson).

But this “iyakkum” didn’t take off as envisaged by the Vellahla leadership. It had no relevance to those outside the Vellahla framework in Jaffna and hence had no appeal to the other Tamil-speaking communities. Tamil separatism began in Jaffna and remained only in Jaffna making it a parochial issue confined essentially to the north. This critical factor gives the lie to the common perception that Sri Lanka is facing a national crisis. The fact that the Vadukoddai War affected all communities and the nation as a whole does not make it a “national crisis”. The ground realities make it clear that it has been primarily a north-south conflict and not a national crisis in which all minority communities ganged up against the Sinhalese on the language and other issues raised by the Vellahlas.

Jaffna alone was the fertile ground for separatist politics on all the issues raised by the Vellahlas for the simple reason that it was the traditional base of the upstart Vellahlas. Their main “grievances” – language, colonisation, jobs and discrimination – were relevant and peculiar only to the Jaffna elite and not even to the average Jaffnatic. For instance, the Vellahla elite was bent on retaining the English language because it was the language of the privileged – and there wasn’t a more privileged class than the rising Vellahla bourgeoisie. They were joined in this by the privileged elite of the south. They jointly demonized S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike as the father of all political evils because he dethroned the power they held through the English language known only to 6% of the population. The elitist minority of English-educated professionals and public servants resisted the change. In addition, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam who was riding high by exploiting mono-ethnic extremism, went round the kachcheris (the regional government centers of administration) urging the Tamil public servants not to learn Sinhala.

The English language was the gateway to move upward socially. Better jobs, better living conditions and the higher social status were available only to the English–educated. Even the non-Vellahla, underprivileged low-castes would not have benefited if they didn’t have the power of the English language to advance socially. In any case, the average Tamil plied their lucrative trade in the south by mixing with the Sinhala traders and consumers using the Sinhala language. The common thosai kadai or the grocers didn’t run their trade in Tamil in the south. The Tamil Sea Street jewelers have thrived for decades, running a monopoly virtually in the city, without any objections or difficulties in using the Sinhala language. Language was not a problem to commerce. The problem of the Sinhala language was only for the Vellahala elite in professions and public service.

Even their broad political objectives of gaining (1) power and (2) territory arose from the internal socio-economic imperatives of peninsular politics driven by Vellahla casteism. When Ponnambalam Arunachalam pushed for the extra seat in the Legislative Council in 1920s it was to grab power at the Legislature and not on the basis of Tamil nationalism. When G. G. Ponnambalam argued for 50 -50 before the Soulbury Commissioners it was to grab an undue share of power to the Tamils of Jaffna though it was disguised as an issue common to all minorities. In any case, 50-50 was a fallacious argument because even if the Muslims and other minorities were put together it would not have added up only to 24 per cent. This is typical of the Vellahlas. They consistently went for a disproportionate share of power – a highly explosive and provocative issue that drove both Sinhalese and Jaffna Tamils into extreme communalism. It is this grab for power and territory at the expense of other communities that provoked the Sinhala electorate to confront the Jaffna Tamils ONLY and not the other Tamil-speaking communities.

The Vellahla strategy to unite divided Jaffna Tamils on casteism was to fly the flag of communalism. Producing an external bogey in the south was the way to paper over the internal divisions in the north. The low-castes (ironically the Vellahlas called them the “minorities” in a pejorative sense) who had suffered the indignities of slavery and basic denial of human rights by the Vellahla oppressors were ready to break away from the feudal Vellahla regime. The Vellahlas were the most feared persecutors of the non-Vellahlas in the north. The low-castes could be kept in line only if a bogey was produced overriding casteist differences.. This political necessity was presented pithily by H. L. Mencken, the American journalist who wrote: “The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary.” The main platform of the Vellahlas was to produce the imaginary bogeyman in the south to keep the whole of Jaffna ‘alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety).”

The art of manipulating public minds with external bogeys was made into a fine art by Hitler. In his Mein Kampf he wrote: “…and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods.” The Jaffna Tamils were made to believe in the big lie when G. G. Ponnambalam went before the Soulbury demanding a new constitutional arrangement in which 12% of the Jaffna Tamil population demanded 50% of power at the centre.

Oddly enough, G.G. Ponambalam went before the Soulbury Commissioners not to argue for a separate state (there goes the theory of Tamil nationalism!) but to press for 50-50 power sharing arrangement to protect the undue share of jobs allotted to the Tamils in the public service (12% had nearly 32 per cent). After examining critically the charges of “discrimination” and the demand for 50 -50 power sharing the Soulbury Commissioners dismissed both. Nothing has changed since then. Jaffna-centric leadership of al hues have been recycled these two accusations over and over again under various political labels.

An objective study of the north-south crisis will confirm that it was the fear of the Vellahla elite losing their feudal and colonial privileges that led them inexorably from casteism to communalism and from communalism Illankai Thamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK -- Tamil State Party) and from ITAK to the declaration of war in the Vadukoddai Resolution. By and large, neither the non-Vellahla Tamils in Jaffna nor the Tamil-speaking Tamils outside Jaffna were concerned about the “grievances” and “aspirations” of the Vellahlas. However, the myths surrounding the north-south crisis have taken the critical Vellahla factor out and packaged it as a collective conflict of Tamils vs. Sinhalese.

The Vellahla-managed war ran on a campaign that marketed their “grievances” and “aspirations” as common issues shared by Tamils in general. But it is evident that if not for the Vellahlas neither their “grievances” nor their “aspirations” would have reached the final stage of the Vadukoddai Resolution. This makes the north-south crisis essentially a revolt of the most privileged Vellahlas. When their “grievances” were resolved they shifted their demands to the next level of political “aspirations” leading to a separate state. The basic “grievances” among all communities could have been resolved through the non-violent parliamentary processes as seen in the cases of the Muslims and the Indian Tamils. But the Vellahla “aspirations” went beyond the borders of peaceful co-existence. They were playing for higher stakes which could have been pursued only through violence. Hence their Vadukoddai Resolution leading to the Vadukoddai War.

Besides, if all the Tamil-speaking minorities ganged up with the Vellahlas, the conflict could not have been contained at all. It was possible to contain the militarism of the Vellahlas, even though with great difficulty, because the crisis was confined to a narrow social stratum within the northern boundaries. The Vellahlas were the most educated, English-speaking, privileged community who knew their way in and out of national and international politics. Their influence and politics was far in excess to their numbers. Their skills in turning their complaints into sophisticated political theories were excellent. Their basic political philosophy and strategy was based entirely on victimology. They succeeded in making the world the world believe that the most privileged community in Sri Lanka was the underdog oppressed by the Sinhala majority.

They are also masters of dissembling and going into catatonic states of denial. No colonial or Sinhala state has ever oppressed and persecuted the Tamils as the Vellahlas and Prabhakaran. He Vellahlas tortured, suppressed and persecuted the low-castes for nearly five centuries. Prabhakaran took up from the point they left off and “persecuted and killed more Tamils that all the other forces put together”. (V. Anandasangaree of S. Chandrahasan, son of Chelvanayakam). But they held the power until 1976 to manipulate peninsular politics that dragged Jaffna into a war which no one wanted. They dragged Jaffna to the lowest depths of political degradation. The violence that came out of it shocked the conscience of the most sensitive Jaffna intellectuals. Prof. Rajan Hoole, the first professor of mathematics, who was chased out of the campus and Jaffna by the Tamil Tigers, asked how could such evil come out of the womb of Jaffna?

Reconciliation, peace and stability depend on exploring this searing question honestly and with courage. The time the intellectuals took the easy way out by blaming the Sinhala-Buddhists has failed to explain the complexities and the twists and turns of the Vadukoddai War and its futile violence. The worsening of the north-south inter-ethnic relations cannot be explained by a mono-casual theory that blames only the Sinhala-Buddhists. The Yal Devi that went up north also came down south bringing its own ideological, political and socio-economic baggage. In reality, they brought with them the Pandora’s Box packed with Vellahla “grievances” and “aspirations”. When it was opened no one could escape the furies that came out of it.

The living and the 70,000 dead have been long-suffering passengers who came down south with the Vellahalas in the Yal Devi..

-Sri Lanka Guardian