Political violence in Sri Lanka - Part Three

Previous Parts: Part One| Part Two

By Lionel Bopage

Radicalisation of Youth

(August 06, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) Lack of appropriate political and economic development, equitable distribution of economic benefits, and equitable opportunities provided the essential ingredients for young peoples' radicalisation. The universal franchise and the lowering of the voting age allowed young people to take part in active electoral politics. Free education was introduced in 1945, and the medium of instruction was changed to local languages, which created an expansion of higher educational opportunities. This was seen as a welcome relief to the rural youth, and a palliative to their high and increasing unemployment.

Lack of opportunities to actively take part in social, economic and political life led to extremely tense situations, which in turn led to discontent amongst the youth, who started questioning the existing socio, political and ideological status quo and its value systems. This objectivity led them to subjectively perceive the necessity for revolutionary change. The failure of the ruling elite to introduce social, economic and political change and make them inclusive alienated the majority of young people. All governments regardless of their political hue failed to see the underlying socio-political, economic and psychological causes of these revolts. The more repressive the state apparatus became the more the youth rebelled.

Since 1948 Sri Lanka has witnessed three major insurrections involving political violence mainly by its youth. Many socio-economic and political conditions that underpinned and contributed to these insurrections reflected the diverse, but significant and unfulfilled aspirations of the younger generations of Sri Lanka. Since the 1970s, younger generations of Sinhalese and Tamils from similar socio-economic backgrounds have revolted against the erosion of their economic, political and cultural rights.

This political violence represented the anti-establishment sentiments of the country’s younger generations. The JVP militancy predominantly represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Sinhala Buddhist constituency (Samaranayake 2008). The Tamil militancy represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Tamil constituency from Hindu and Christian religious backgrounds.

Growth of the JVP and the LTTE underscored the role played by these socio-economic, political and cultural factors. As political violence became manifested in the north and east, the responses of the state and the Tamil militants caused an extension of this radicalisation and alienation within and among the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala communities in Sri Lanka. Since July 1983 riots, the Tamil militants, in particular the LTTE, came to represent most Tamils, with the exception of the Malaiyaha Tamils and the Muslims.

Both the JVP and the LTTE have been the products of the failures of economic and political development in Sri Lanka (Samaranayake 2008). The state repressed both the JVP and the LTTE using brutal force. Both fought back separately and uncompromisingly. Later, the JVP and the LTTE again separately, but simultaneously fought against the establishment and the presence of Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in the island. The ideologies of both the JVP and the LTTE are not based on current realities but rather on the commitment to their own brands of nationalism.

Malaiyaha youth, who had left plantations due to communal violence in the South and settled down in the LTTE-controlled areas, are at the receiving end of the parties to the conflict. The coming decades will be critical for Malaiyaha Tamils because without significant government intervention, ‘the growing number of over-educated and under-employed Malaiyaha Tamil youths may turn to militant protests and violence, as the JVP and LTTE did before them’ (Bass 2001).

Despite their diverse ethnic origins, Islam unites the Muslims in Sri Lanka. Some of the Tamil leaders branded Muslims as ‘Tamils by ethnic origin’, which apparently affected the relations between them (Ali 2001). Nevertheless, in the eighties some of the Muslim youth joined
hands with Tamil militants. As Muslims opposed the merger of the North and East under the

1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, significant differences surfaced between Tamil militants and Muslims (Guruge 2006). Later on as the Tamil political violence also turned against the Muslims, some of the Muslim groups allegedly sided with the government. This situation led
to massacres and eviction of Muslims by the LTTE (Ameerdeen 2006).14

During the time of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and the LTTE in 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress. The LTTE during the peace talks apologised for its acts against the Muslims, recognised that the Muslims are a separate community with their own identity, and accepted their right to represent their interests at any future negotiations (The Sunday Times 2002). Since then, this agreement also collapsed. Muslims now are seeking constitutional safeguards and power sharing to protect their interests. This situation has radicalised the Muslim youth who also seems to have taken to political violence.

The militant youth movements expressed their dissatisfaction with the state and their desire for change through political violence. Both the JVP and the LTTE adhered to a mixed ideology of socialism and nationalism. The state was their common enemy; however, succumbing to their nationalistic politics of the glories of their respective feudal past, they saw each other as enemies; not allies.

Radicalisation in the south

Origins of the JVP can be traced back to the mid sixties. The constituents of the LSSP-CP- MEP United Left Front (ULF) joined the bourgeois political parties in 1964. The new
‘movement’, JVP, came forward to fill the vacuum left by the ULF. The JVP worked semi- clandestinely by publishing newspapers, conducting political classes and debates, contesting student council elections, and leading student strikes to shore up its support base. The movement launched an island wide publicity campaign and extended its support to the SLFP- LSSP-CP United Front (UF) coalition at the parliamentary elections of 1970.

The JVP represents a mixture of Sinhala nationalism and Marxist ideology. Its nationalistic element rested on the historic glory of the past Sinhala Kingdoms. It wants to achieve a unitary state by defending the ‘motherland’, where Sinhala Buddhist cultural identity could flourish and western cultural decadence could be negated. Yet, their idea of socialism has been subsumed by its commitment to safeguard the unitary state, which is ironically a colonial construct.

The JVP was able to successfully mobilize the southern youth, but committed strategic and tactical errors. It was brutally suppressed twice, but was able to regroup and rejuvenate changing its focus from class to nationalism. The first JVP insurrection in 1971 occurred predominantly in the South, because the economic and social changes they expected from the UF government they helped to elect in 1970 were not forthcoming. The political aim of the JVP was to violently replace the establishment with a fairer one. Whatever the limitations of the insurrection the reasons for the conflict points to major flaws in democratic institutions.

In the seventies, the JVP took up the policy of the right to self determination of Tamil people (Bopage 1977) and recognised Sinhala, Tamil and English as the national languages of the island (JVP 1978). It also pledged “true egalitarianism and autonomous rule” for Tamils and Muslims. However, it discarded these policies just prior to the Black July riots of 1983. Their campaign in the late 1980s against the Indo Lanka Accord led to the assassination of dozens of workers and political opponents for refusing to take part in ‘patriotic’ protests and strikes.

The JVP had now degenerated into a Sinhala nationalist party that continues to vehemently oppose any devolution of power.

Radicalisation in the north

Since 1948, the Tamils in the island have been systematically denied their legitimate rights, mainly relating to equal opportunities in areas of language, education and employment.15
Disenfranchisement of Malaiyaha Tamils and the Sinhala only language policy led Tamil political parties to demand a federal framework.

The abrogation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of 1958 and the Dudley- Chelvanayagam Pact of 1968 created a lot of anger, frustration and disillusionment among Tamils that eventually led to the birth of separatist militant movements. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) adopted the Vaddukoddai Resolution in 1976, demanding Tamil Eelam, which had a massive impact on the political landscape of the island (Nesiah 2001).

The politics of the Tamil youth groups in the 1980s were a mixture of Tamil nationalism and Marxist ideology. The nationalistic element rested on the historic glories of the Tamil Kingdom. They wanted to achieve a separate state in their ‘traditional homeland’, where Tamil cultural identity could flourish and western cultural decadence could be negated. Differences between diverse Tamil political groups were based on different interpretations of
Marxism-Leninism16, but the idea of achieving a separate state subsumed their commitment to
socialism.

The post-1948 government policies on language, colonisation, university admission, and employment led to discontent of the Tamil youth. The state used violence to suppress peaceful protests by the Tamil movements. Their parliamentary representatives could not achieve any positive outcomes for their constituents. Thus Tamil youth demanded autonomy, which later on became one of secession. This situation led to cycles of political violence and counter violence. The LTTE received material, financial and moral support from the Tamil Diaspora. The LTTE has continued to carry out its violent campaign, though currently it seems to be on the defensive.

Today the continuation of the conflict has created in the North East of Sri Lanka, the worst humanitarian disaster only second to the disaster in Darfur in Sudan.
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14 Muslims saw the percentage of Muslim population would drop after the merger from nearly 35 per cent in the East to about 17 per cent in a combined
North and East.

15 It is worth noting that such policies even affected Sinhala speaking Sinhalese in the south and led to discriminatory outcomes against them. However, this paper does not focus on how such discriminatory practices affected the Sinhala working people.

16 The EPRLF was more orthodox; the EROS was also Marxist; the PLOTE adhered to a socialist revolution; and the TELO did not adhere to any ideology except for achieving a separate state. The LTTE adhered to socialism combined with Tamil Eelam.

-Sri Lanka Guardian