The meaning and the power of the Vadukoddai Resolution

“By 1976 Jaffna had gone to the extreme end of mono-ethnic politics from which the Tamil leaders could not backtrack. Besides, having promised to go down he path of finding a military solution they could remain in the democratic stream only nominally. They would have known that no democratically elected in the south would ever dream of giving them a separate state.”
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By H. L. D. Mahindapala

(Part 1)

(August 04, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) After Velupillai Prabhakaran went down in waters of Nanthi Kadal, between the night of 17th and the morning of 18th May, the Vadukoddai Resolution has lost its political rationale and its power to generate high-intensity violence. Nevertheless, historically it remains as the official starting point of Jaffna-centric violence. This Resolution was passed on May 14, 1976 in Vadukoddai, the electorate of S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, the father of Tamil separatism. The last paragraph in the Vadukoddai Resolution declared that the ruling elite of Jaffna (of course, led mainly by the Vellahlas) had given up the parliamentary path of non-violence and decided to seek a military solution. In short, in the Vadukoddai Resolution the Jaffna elite declared war on the nation on May 14, 1976.

Primarily, the Vadukoddai War was about capturing (1) territory and (2) power. The Vadukoddai War was launched by the mono-ethnic extremists of the north to impose their demand for establishing a mono-ethnic enclave with powers of a separate state. No elected state operating within internationally recognized borders could/would surrender to such extremist demands.

At the bottom of the Sri Lankan conflict is this demand for (1) exclusive territory for one minority, excluding all other communities and (2) powers of an autonomous state outside the legally established constitution. The Vadukoddai War and the public discourse have been mainly on these two issues with a band of theorists weighing in to delegitimize and dismantle the centre, particularly the constitution, with a view to legitimize and strengthen the periphery. The Vadukoddai War was to achieve these two objectives through military means.

Ever since the declaration of the Vadukoddai War the theorists in academia and NGOs ganged up and said that the only solution is to give in to the demands of power and territory claimed by the Jaffna-centric war-mongers who drafted the Vadukoddai Resolution. Then when the low-caste Prabhakaran overthrew the ancien regime of the high-caste Vellahla war-mongers who fathered the Vadukoddai Resolution, the theorists once again argued that the only solution to end the war is to give into their demands of power and territory. Now that the war-mongers drawn from the low-castes and the upper-castes have been defeated the theorists are still arguing that peace also can be won only by giving in to their demands of power and territory.

So where is the logic in all this? Debunking all the theories of the academic pundits and voodoo ideologues in the NGOs the war was won without giving an inch of territory or power to the Vadukoddai war-mongers. Refusing to give in to these extremist demands the state responded with superior force to preserve the right to live in a multi-ethnic democracy where all communities can share the 25,000 square miles of territory as trustees and not as mono-ethnic owners of any part of it.

To co-exist as equal partners in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural democracy where diverse communities of the 192 nations at the UN is a prime necessity in the 21st century for stability, peace and progress of the global polity as whole – just not for Sri Lanka alone. Long before multi-ethnic and multi-cultural partnership became fashionable in political parlance, particularly in the West, Sri Lanka has been living it, breathing it and sharing it without even knowing or acknowledging that such political concepts are necessary for peaceful co-existence. Despite all our differences, it was our way of life as we recall the days when we were young.

Even when G. G. Ponnambalam, Snr, was injecting communal politics in the forties with his outrageous 50-50 demand and even when S. J. V. Chelvanayakam was going round the kachcheries egging the Tamil public servants not to learn Sinhalese we never lost our “machang” touch. That spirit is not dead yet though there are fears and suspicions on both sides as a result of the Vadukoddai War. But once the fears of separatism and the horrors of terrorism die down the supra-ethnic spirit that bonded the communities will return with renewed vigour. That’s for sure. We were never meant to be separate. The disastrous and tragic end to the Vadukoddai War confirms it.

In case the Alzheimeric theorists have forgotten it, let me add that this is the fundamental doctrine laid down by the founders of this nation and no community or political leader willing to accept the inevitability and the necessity of peaceful co-existence as a way to the future has a right, or the legitimacy, to deviate from this sacred tenet. This concept of “trusteeship” as opposed to “ownership” was written down not only by Bhikku Mahanama in the Mahavamsa as the First Commandment of the nation but also laid down as a guiding principle in international law by Judge C. G. Weeramantry, Vice President of the International Court of Justice, who quoted Buddhist missionary Mahinda, son of King Asoka, in the landmark judgment on sharing the waters of river Danube.

Besides, if there is any lasting lesson to be learnt from Vadukoddai War it is that those who are bent on dividing the people are doomed. The Vadukoddai war-mongers – nationally and internationally -- threw in all their man-power, fire-power, propaganda-power and money-power to grab “ownership” of an exclusive mono-ethnic territory. But they failed. This leads to a serious question: if this nation won the war without giving into the extremist demands of the Vadukoddai war-mongers why can’t peace be won without giving into the extremist demands that sparked off this futile war in Vadukoddai? This again leads to another question: is the future in going back to the failed past of giving into divisive politics based on grabbing (1) power and (2) territory by one community alone, without due consideration to the needs and aspirations of the other communities?

When the Jaffna-centric leadership decided to launch the Vadukoddai War they were hoisted by their own petard. To change the metaphor, they painted themselves into the corner of mono-ethnic extremism. After they passed the Vadukoddai Resolution they could not go back into non-violent parliamentary politics though they remained nominally in parliament to use it as a platform to promote separatism, defend their violence and demonize the Sri Lankan governments. The Vadukoddai War was a tragedy brought upon themselves by their intransigent, self-defeating, short-sighted, Jaffna-centric extremism. Peninsular politics was never dominated or driven by any modern political ideology – liberalism, communism, socialism, multi-culturalism or even Gandhism which was a mere passing fad without any deep roots – other than primal communalism. No political party or individual could escape the over-determining force of Tamil tribalism ruling the peninsular. Even those Tamils participating in the centre were branded and condemned as “collaborationists” sleeping with the Sinhala enemy.

Rival Tamil parties survived in competitive electoral politics only by demonizing the Sinhala enemy. The Vellahla elite, the most privileged community in Sri Lanka, whipped up communalism to the hilt purely as a defensive mechanism to preserve their feudal fortress. They feared mostly the advancing external forces invading and undermining their feudal and colonial privileges. But they also knew that they could not survive on the superiority of casteism after the Donoughmore Commission had granted universal franchise. It meant that power held exclusively in the hands of the Vellahlas, during feudal and colonial times, was transferred to the low-castes. Ponnambalam Ramanathan, the devoted acolyte of Arumuka Navalar, the high priest of Vellahla casteism, opposed the introduction of universal franchise tooth and nail.

As documented by Jane Russell in her penetrating study of communalism, Communal Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution, 1931 – 1947, the Vellahla elite had to go down to the low-castes to get their votes. Vellahla dominance, sanctified by Hindu-casteism, was losing it political and social power. Besides, oppressive Vellahla casteism, enforced through brutal violence, was threatening to divide Jaffna as seen in the struggle to enter the Maviddipuram Temple, with N. Shanmugathasan of the Communist Party in particular backing the low-castes. The only available ideology to retain their power against the advance of modernity was communalism which the Vellahla elite pushed to extreme.

The Vellahlas (52%) succeeded in setting themselves apart as a superior breed partly because of Arumuka Navalar, who manufactured the ideology in the 1800s declaring the Vellahala supremacy over all other castes and partly because they held in their hands the five commanding centres of power in Jaffna: 1) they were the owner-managers of all the Hindu temples which gave them power over the entire Hindu Tamil community, including the right of excluding the low-castes from entering their sacred territory; 2) they owned the land which was the primary source of existence for all, particularly the lower-castes who depended on their slave labour for survival; 3) the Vellahla mudliyars who were assigned the task of codifying the customs of Jaffna by the Dutch colonial masters consolidated the prevailing Vellahla power in the Thesawalamai – thesai (land) + walamai (customs); 4) even when the missionaries opened schools – the new mode of social advancement – the Vellahlas used forced to retain the monopoly of education in their hands by obstructing the low-castes entering schools. Prof. K. Sivathamby of the University of Jaffna wrote: “Making full use of the eductional system which provided for English education within the denominational system, the upper caste Tamils – literally the emerging Tamil bourgeoisie – very often denied the same facility to the depressed classes and when admission was forced, equal seating was not given in classes.” (p.142 - Some Aspects of the Social Composition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka) and 5) the over-determining Hindu ideology which elevated the Vellahla from the lowest rank in classical Indian Hindu hierarchy, Sudras, to the highest in Jaffna. Over all, as stated by Prof Hoole: “It was a society managed by the Vellahals and all their prejudices assumed the force of moral law,” Prof. Hoole. (Ibid – p. 53).

There is an additional factor to their power. Under the British the Vellahlas dominated the public service Prof. A. J. Wilson states: “On the whole, the Tamil vellalas have dominated government service and the professions, with the occasional member from the minority castes.” (p.140 – S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri LankanTamil Nationalism 1947 -1977). These factors gave the Vellahlas the upper hand both in Jaffna and in the nation as a whole. The Vellahlas became the most privileged and powerful caste in Sri Lanka, As stated by Prof. Sivathamby, they were the new bourgeoisie but with all the trappings of the Vellahla caste. ‘Typical descriptions of Jaffna are not simply Vellahla-centric, but also self-adulating and upper-class Vellala-centric,” wrote Jeevan Hoole (footnote to Preface - Ibid). They overturned Marx on its head and proved that it was caste and not class that determined Sri Lankan politics.

Under British patronage the Vellahlas emerged as the most dominant caste/class in Sri Lankan politics. Jaffna became the most privileged society with a PQLI index higher than any other region, except the cosmopolitan Colombo. And the Jaffna-centric politics was driven forcefully by the power of the Vellahlas to hang on to the privileges at any cost. Communalism replaced castesim. Both were, in fact, two sides of the same coin. Any other ideology would have undermined the grip of the Vellahlas on Jaffna.

The Vellahlas were entrenched in every strategic point. Emphasizing this A. J. Wilson wrote :“The TULF and, earlier, the Federal Party were Vellahla-dominated but were generally benevolent towards the non-Vellahlas….” (p139 – Wilson). A sprinkling of non-Vellahlas like Appapillai Amirthalingam thrown in to hold Jaffna society together like the way they gave the Presidency of Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi to S. Rasamanickam from the east to keep the “Batticoloa Tamils”, as they were called to emphasize that they were not the pure Jaffna Tamils, under the hegemony of Jaffna Tamils.

Like any ruling elite they were not going to give up power without a fight. The northern reaction to the democratic changes coming from within and from the south was to launch the Vadukoddai War. It was a revolt of the privileged to retain their privileges. The Vadukoddai War was the last defensive mechanism of the Vellahlas to preserve Jaffna and contiguous areas running down to Batticoloa as a feudal fortress by the Vellahlas for the Vellahlas.

By 1976 Jaffna had gone to the extreme end of mono-ethnic politics from which the Tamil leaders could not backtrack. Besides, having promised to go down he path of finding a military solution they could remain in the democratic stream only nominally. They would have known that no democratically elected in the south would ever dream of giving them a separate state. If the Vellahlas were to reign supreme they could do so only under a separate state. Separatism and militarism are inseparable. Hence the Vadukoddai War.

Besides, for the first time the Vellahlas were facing the most devastating threat to its feudal casteist fortress from the south. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike’s most revolutionary act was not the introduction of Sinhala Only in 1956. The greatest threat to the Vellahla domination came from the noted Prevention of Social Disabilities Act of 1959 which challenged and threatened to dismantle, for the first time since the Vellahlas took command of Jaffna in feudal and colonial times, its casteist castle, ensconced behind cadjan fences. It was, according to sociologists, a masterpiece of legislation which took the Vellahla fortress apart, piece by piece. Bryan Pfaffenberger, the leading authority on the Jaffna caste system, had made a detailed analysis of how Bandaranaike’s legislation was resented and demonized by the “caste fanatics” like Prof. C. Suntheralingam,

The internal and external forces encircling the Vellahla regime signaled,, without any doubt, that the days of the Vellahlas were numbered. By 1976 they had to provide something more than anti-Sinhala slogans to retain their grip on Jaffna. By this time they had also come to the end of demonizing the Sinhala south. Their communalist cries which promised a mono-ethnic state (which was disguised as “federalism” intially) had to be given some concrete substance. They couldn’t survive on anti-Sinhala slogans forever. They had to provide a program of action and that came in the form of the Vadukoddai Resolution – the last gasp of the dying Vellahlas.

(To be continued).

-Sri Lanka Guardian