Defeat of the LTTE and the future of Tamil Militancy

The better educated northern ‘Jaffna’ Tamils, living in a majority Tamil ambience have been spearheading the Tamil Cause as leaders; on the other hand the easterners, who share the province with nearly equal strength of Sinhalas and Muslims, have been providing the foot soldiers for Tamil militancy. However, this equation was destroyed when Karuna, the LTTE leader of Batticaloa broke away from the parent body in 2002, alleging the exploitation of easterners within the LTTE.
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By Col R Hariharan
Courtesy: World Focus

INTRODUCTION

(August 10, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the charismatic founder-leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), along with almost the entire first and second line leadership in the last lap of the Eelam War IV in May 2009 represents a milestone in the history of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka’s war against Tamil extremism in all its forms had been going on for the last three decades.1 Out of the 38 insurgent groups that came into being in this period barring the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the Sinhala Marxist insurgency, all others were of Tamil origin fighting against what they perceived as Sinhala oppression.2 Almost all Tamil groups considered the carving out of an independent Tamil nation – the Tamil Eelam – out of Sri Lanka’s traditional Tamil inhabited areas as the only path of redemption for Tamils to preserve their language, culture and identity.

Only the LTTE had managed to survive the military onslaught of Sri Lanka state against Tamil insurgent groups from 1983 on wards till 2009. It had also weathered the active Indian political and military intervention in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 1990. In its bid to emerge as the sole standard bearer of the cause of Tamil Eelam, the LTTE did not hesitate to eliminate thousands of militants and leaders of rival Tamil groups.3 In his bid to emerge as the unchallenged leader of Tamils, Prabhakaran eliminated important Tamil political leaders including Appapillai Amirthalingam and Dr Nilan Thiruchelvam of the Tamil United Liberation to emerge as the only viable Tamil organisation with political and military clout.

Sri Lanka Security Forces (SLSF) could not achieve decisive results against the LTTE in the three rounds of war from 1983 to 2002. However, in their victorious Eelam War IV, the SLSF had killed as many as 15,000 LTTE cadres and destroyed or captured millions of rupees worth military and civil assets of the insurgent group. In addition to this the SLSF is holding 9000 cadres in captivity.

It is going to be extremely difficult for the LTTE to stage a comeback as a viable force in the near future. The financial, material and political support from sections of the 800,000-strong Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates had been an important factor in the LTTE’s growth and sustenance all these years. With their support the LTTE had built a strong logistic support network abroad to sustain the organisation in Sri Lanka in both peace and war. This support network, though disrupted, is by and large in tact, though leaderless at the moment.

The SLSF which had built the armed forces to about 200,000 to fight the war is acutely aware of the possibility of the LTTE staging a comeback in the near future. In order to prevent such an eventuality, the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka plans to build a strong force of 300,000. And he proposes to ensure continued presence of the security forces in the Tamil predominant north and east to nip any resurgence of Tamil militancy in the bud.

The exit of the LTTE from the Sri Lanka scene as a power centre has raised a question mark over not only the future of Tamil militancy, but also the durability of the Tamil struggle for an independent state of Tamil Eelam.

The possibility of LTTE’s revival and the future of Tamil militancy are closely interlinked issues.

Revival of Tamil militancy requires a few favourable factors: strong motivation for the Tamil Eelam cause, a committed leadership, an environment that provides for the growth of militancy, and external support. These have to be sustained in the face of Sri Lanka state’s response to its resurgence, and coordinated action of international community which is now united in its action against organisations listed terrorist bodies.

THE CAUSE

The cause of an independent Tamil Eelam state had provided the motive force Tamil youth to take up arms. It was the culmination of Tamil minority’s political quest to protect their identity, culture, and integrity of areas considered as its homeland. This process took at least two decades of traverse through the establishment of Tamil identity and another two decades for its transformation into Tamil nationalism.

Sri Lanka despite sharing a lot of cultural, religious and ethnic traditions with the Indian subcontinent has slightly different socio-political history. Unlike India, there had been no major caste, communal or ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) during the British colonial days barring the anti Muslim riots of 1911. The broad division of identities of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala speaking, largely Buddhist majority, Tamil speaking Hindu and Christian communities identified as Tamils, and Muslims (mostly Tamil speaking and referred to as Moors) came about with the introduction of universal franchise in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) in 1931.4

While Indian polity fought the British and struggled to gain independence, Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948 without any serious struggle. In the words of Dr Devanesan Nesiah, “Unlike other South Asian leaders, those of pre-independence Sri Lanka remained in good standing with the colonial rulers.”5 While India’s struggle for independence fostered a national identity despite the differences within the community, Sri Lanka did not undergo this process of melding its divided identities into a single Sri Lankan national identity at the time of independence.

During the British colonial rule, Tamils had played a dominant role in Sri Lanka. Unlike the Sinhalas, Tamils adapted to English education and became useful to the colonial administration. The progressive alienation of the Tamil minority population from Sri Lanka’s national mainstream started only after the country attained independence in 1948.

From then onwards, the assertion of Tamil identity had been a factor in national politics. However, the process of transformation of Tamil identity and its crystallization into Tamil nationalism took nearly two decades from 1956 onwards. In this period resurgent Sinhala nationalism made its appearance as a political force with the Sinhala majority asserting its distinct linguistic, religious and ethnic identity as true national identity.

Four watershed events pushed the Tamils from uniting in their struggle against the Sinhala state and taking up arms to fight it. These were the introduction of 'Sinhala only' policy making it the national language, adoption of a new Constitution of 1972, the 1977 parliamentary elections and the 1980 anti Tamil pogrom.

The introduction of Sinhala as the sole national language and the state sponsorship of Buddhism and its symbols did not enhance the feeling of nationhood among the Tamils and other minorities.

The 1972 Constitution gave a Sinhala character to Sri Lanka triggering minorities’ fear of marginalisation under the new dispensation. This made the Tamils to change their earlier demand for balanced representation into a demand for a Federal State. The state driven by its new found Sinhala nationalism, did not politically respond to meet the minority demands.

This caused disillusionment among moderate Tamil 'Federal' leaders like Dr Chelvanayagam. They began to talk aloud about the creation of an independent state of Tamil Eelam in 1975.6 By 1976 Tamil demand for Federalism gave way for creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. The overwhelming success of the TULF, a political omnibus of many shades of Tamil opinion, in the 1977 elections with a demand for an independent 'Tamil Eelam' gave it credence. The state showed singular lack of sensitivity to the strong Tamil sentiments and responded with brute force against political agitations on the issue. As Tamil politicians were rendered helpless against the highhandedness of the government, small extremist groups of Tamils started indulging in minor acts of militancy.

The ethnic estrangement, growing with its historical grievances, nurtured by Sinhala and Tamil political vested interests grew. It became a conflict after the LTTE militants led by Prabhakaran killed 13 soldiers in an ambush of two military vehicles at Tirunelveli in Jaffna on July 23, 1983. The public outrage in the rest of Sri Lanka at the killing of the Sinhala soldiers was used by Sinhala politicians to let loose a pogrom against Tamil population in Colombo and other places. The government failed to take any action even as a few thousand Tamils were killed and their properties destroyed.

Overnight the Tamil struggle gained global sympathy when thousands of Tamil refugees fled the country. Nearly 100,000 of them sought refuge in Tamil Nadu, in South India, which has traditional links with Sri Lanka Tamils. The pogrom in Sri Lanka created such a terror that over the years 700,000 Tamils are estimated to have immigrated to other countries The widespread public anger in Tamil Nadu grew as more and more Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka arrived there. Tamil insurgent groups fleeing the island were welcomed to the shores of Tamil Nadu. They were given arms and shelter.

Then onwards the Tamil issue became a critical one in Indian political scene as well. Inevitably India actively intervened in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 1990 politically, diplomatically and militarily to bring about ethnic peace. Indian efforts at mediation also crystallised the critical demands of Tamil nationalism at the Thimphu conference convened in July 1985 to reconcile the differences between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamils.

A united delegation of Tamil militant groups and politicians summed up the Tamil demands in the ‘Thimphu Declaration.’ The four Tamils demands were: recognition of Sri Lanka Tamils as a nation, recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils of Sri Lanka, recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation, and recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils of Sri Lanka.

At the initiative of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lanka President JR Jayawardane showed his readiness to build bridges with India and the two countries signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) in 1987. As per the Agreement, Sri Lanka State agreed to devolve limited autonomy to a united northeast province - the traditional Tamil region considered as their homeland, provided India helped to end Tamil militancy and disarm the militants. The demand for right to citizenship for all Tamils was also accepted. Thus barring the demand for recognition of Tamils as a nation, the Agreement met all the demands of Tamils made in the Thimpu.

The 13th amendment of Sri Lanka constitution enacted in 1988 has given a limited amount of autonomy to the provincial councils including the Tamil-predominant northern and eastern provinces. The 14th amendment has given Tamil the status of national language, though it may not be on par with Sinhala. Thus the Tamil demands which articulated the cause of Tamil Eelam stand partly dissipated.

The post 1983 events – wars and peace efforts – and the abortive Indian direct military intervention from 1987 to 1990 have changed not only the demographics of Sri Lanka but the mindset of the next generation of Sinhalas and Tamils as well. It is more than two decades since Black July, and a whole new generation of Tamils has been brought up overseas in diverse surroundings – many of them in different countries with different languages and cultures.

Many of the Tamils have moved out of traditional areas of habitation into many parts of Central and Southern Sri Lanka and settled in the midst of Sinhala population due to the unending insurgency wars of LTTE in the north and east during the last two decades. The moot point is whether the cause of Tamil Eelam for the Tamils at home and abroad still holds the same attraction as in 1983?

THE ENVIRONMENT

South Asian environment

The international environment in the 80s and early 90s was the golden era of insurgency movements. The Cold War confrontation found the use of non-state actors a convenient handle to slow bleed the opponent. Soviet Union helped a pro Communist regime to seize power in Afghanistan after monarchy was toppled, much to the discomfort of the U.S. The Americans found a willing ally in Pakistan to support Islamist insurgents fight the communist regime in Afghanistan. The spill over of this confrontation into South Asia was limited to the introduction of Cold War power play with Pakistan and India drawn on opposite sides. Pakistan and to a certain extent China had been providing support and sanctuary to insurgents movements from India’s northeast.

Given this background, India was wary of increasing in American influence in its neighbourhood particularly after the strategic convergence of the U.S. and Pakistan in Afghanistan. So India found a strategic reason to keep Sri Lanka free from the increasing U.S. influence in the region.

The 1980 anti-Tamil pogrom created a strong wave of political sympathy for Tamils in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi was sympathetic to the Tamil struggle for equity, though she did not support the idea of an independent Tamil Eelam. She also offered covert support to Tamil militants. When Sri Lanka President JR Jaywardane tried to gain the support of the U.S. and Pakistan to counter Indian pressure, India intervened actively from 1983 to 90 both politically and militarily. The ISLA was the outcome of this phase of India-Sri Lanka relations. India had to pull out its troops rather ignominiously in 1990 when Sri Lanka President Premadasa and Prabhakaran colluded to send them out of the island.

Since India's last active intervention in Sri Lanka, global power equation has changed. India and the U.S. enjoy a close relationship due to the convergence of their strategic security interests in the Indian Ocean region and Sri Lanka. India's trading interests are now global as its economy is galloping at a fast clip. These changes have created subtle shifts in India's perceptions. Now India's security perceptions of Sri Lanka are no more local. They are now global as Sri Lanka is viewed as the vanguard of India in the South, dominating the Indian Ocean.

As the biggest regional power in South Asia, India has the ability to alter the balance of power in Sri Lanka just as it did in 1987-90. India is the only country capable of underwriting any long-term solution to Sri Lanka's problem. However, this will be constrained by internal political considerations discussed earlier, and tie down its freedom of action in Sri Lanka.

India was the first country to ban the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. It had been consistent in taking action against any LTTE activity in its soil. So India had no hesitation in supplying non-lethal weapons and extending intelligence support to Sri Lanka in its conflict with the LTTE. Unlike the 80s India-Sri Lanka relations are multifaceted involving trade, commerce, economic relations and international cooperation. India has large investments in Sri Lanka and both countries have entered into a Free Trade Agreement and India-Sri Lanka trade is likely to clock $ 4 billion. Indian political and material support for the Tamil cause had been an important for growth of Tamil militancy during 1983-87. India is unlikely to extend that kind of support now for the revival of Tamil militancy.

The global war on terror orchestrated by the U.S. after the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the U.S have changed international perceptions on insurgency movements using terror tactics. As the LTTE has been included in the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organisations, it has become quite easy and legitimate for Sri Lanka to draw upon the support of the U.S. for its war against the LTTE. This support is likely to continue in case Tamil militancy revives.

A number of international protocols in shipping, money transfer and movement of people have been introduced to curb terrorists from using international networks. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the U.S. President Bush in 2003 has paved the way for greater international cooperation and action to prevent proliferation of weapons to or from nation states and non-state actors. Though the PSI is accepted only by 11 countries, 49 other nations have agreed to adhere to PSI principles. The PSI protocols provide for interdiction of WMD shipments in international waters.

Despite their differences over the poor human rights record of Sri Lanka, the European Union understands the compulsions which had forced Sri Lanka to wage war against the LTTE, banned as a terrorist organisation in among its member countries. So the EU is also unlikely to permit the LTTE or any other Tamil militant organisational activity on their soil.

The Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates had been a major source of support for Tamil militancy particularly the LTTE. The LTTE had established a strong global supply and logistic support network to keep its war machines going. This organization helped in sustaining the insurgency operations in three ways: financial support, international lobbying and public relations, and procurement of arms and military equipment. LTTE representatives at key centers located in Canada, Norway, U.K., Australia, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Thailand, USA, and South Africa coordinate the worldwide network. It has created a lot of hidden assets overseas and runs a number of front organisations of Tamils.

The LTTE is a banned organisation in 32 countries including Canada, the European Union, India, Malaysia and U.S.A. Though not banned, its activities are curbed in few other countries. Even during the Eelam War IV (2006-09) the governments in most of these countries had come down heavily on LTTE activists. They had also cooperated with the Sri Lanka government and with each other in busting the LTTE’s fund collection and arms procurement activities and made a number of arrests.7 Given these constraints revival of the LTTE or promotion of any other Tamil militant group is not going to be easy.

Internal environment

Initially, during their political struggle the Federal party leaders and subsequently the TULF were able to forge unity among Tamil speaking people including Muslims for the cause of Tamil identity. However, the increasing awareness of eastern Muslims and the differences over the perception of an independent Tamil Eelam paved the way for Muslims going their own way. The LTTE’s anti-Muslim policies including the eviction of nearly 100,000 Muslims from the north as well its massacre of Muslims a number of times in the east have alienated Muslims from supporting Tamil militants, perhaps forever, though they speak Tamil and have similar problems as a minority.

There are subtle differences in culture and perception between the Tamil populations living in north and east. From 1976 onwards the Tamils of north and east were united in their political stand and support to militancy. This was further strengthened with the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987 which saw the formation of a united north-eastern province. However, the LTTE’s opposition to the ISLA divided Tamil polity and militancy. It left the LTTE as the only armed militant group as the other militant groups had surrendered their weapons in terms of ISLA. The LTTE’s war against the Indian troops further divided the Tamils.

After the exit of Indian troops in 1990, the LTTE started the process of consolidation with the snuffing out other Tamil groups and marginalising Tamil political leaders. The rise of the LTTE made anti-LTTE Tamil groups to seek the protection of the Sri Lanka government. As a result the Thimphu declaration remains largely a political propaganda tool with the divided and weakened Tamil polity.

The better educated northern ‘Jaffna’ Tamils, living in a majority Tamil ambience have been spearheading the Tamil Cause as leaders; on the other hand the easterners, who share the province with nearly equal strength of Sinhalas and Muslims, have been providing the foot soldiers for Tamil militancy. However, this equation was destroyed when Karuna, the LTTE leader of Batticaloa broke away from the parent body in 2002, alleging the exploitation of easterners within the LTTE.

This had destroyed the homogeneity within the militant ranks. This had been one of the major reasons for the defeat of the LTTE in the Eelam War IV. Now new political alignments have emerged among eastern Tamils. Karuna’s position was strengthened when the Supreme Court set aside in 2006 the merger of northern and eastern provinces as one united entity. After the defeat of the LTTE, a Tamil chief minister is in office in the east. Karuna is now a minister in the Rajapaksa regime and has become a vocal supporter of a united Sri Lanka.

Sinhala’s lack of sensitivity to the Tamil aspirations had been an important trigger for the Tamils to unite in their fight against the government. However, after India’s massive intervention and the introduction of 13th amendment giving limited autonomy to Tamils, there had been generally a growing awareness of the Tamil problem among Sinhala intelligentsia. It is significant that during the three years of Eelam War IV there had been very few acts of retaliatory Sinhala public anger against Tamil population in their midst despite a number of LTTE bombs attacks killed a few hundred civilians.

Though the government had been slow in enforcing many of its policies like the introduction Tamil in the government and recruitment of Tamils in police etc., it has made a beginning and over a period of time these efforts are likely to make some headway. Cumulatively, the Sinhala chauvinist image of the 80s has been improved; this is unlikely to go unnoticed by Tamils.

Given these changes in the environment, it is doubtful whether the cause of Tamil Eelam will evoke the same enthusiastic response as in 1983, particularly after the total defeat of the LTTE in the latest Eelam War after sacrificing atleast 30,000 cadres in the wars. There is a general weariness of the war among Tamils in Sri Lanka. Even though sections of Tamil Diaspora might be enthusiastic about supporting another war against the Sri Lanka state, the foot soldiers for it had to be found among Sri Lankan Tamils in the country.

LEADERSHIP

While many Tamil militant organizations emerged in the early 90s, only the LTTE had kept the Tamil armed struggle alive. This was solely due to its leader Prabhakaran’s single minded orientation to the goal of fighting for an independent Tamil Eelam. He introduced a number of innovations in tactical warfare fully using the real time advantage given by modern technology innovations. He showed remarkable ability motivate his followers to die for the cause. It manifested in the form of Black Tiger suicide warriors. Their tactics were used imaginatively by Sea Tigers to launch attacks in the high seas against the navy. The LTTE also refined the use propaganda as force multiplier and built up a global support network among the Tamil Diaspora that came in handy to prosecute the war. No doubt he had a number of flaws including his inability to understand political strategy and cleverly use it for furthering military objectives. He was anti intellectual and did not believe in collective leadership. He had a ruthless streak in his personality that clouded balanced judgement.

Any leader now trying to revive the LTTE or start a new Tamil militant movement has to live up to the larger than life image of Prabhakaran created in public mind. Otherwise he will not be able to motivate his followers and build up the organization. Secondly, Prabhakaran’s strength of conviction enabled him to build one of the strongest insurgent organisation in the world in a span of two decades. So any leader undertaking the task now will have to sustain his conviction for at least one to two decades.

Though he understood tactical operations better, Prabhakaran’s major shortcoming had been his inability to respond to political demands with finesse. The chances of success of any potential leader to revive militancy will increase only if he is politically savvy.

It is not only the potential of the leader that is important. It was largely the environment that shaped Prabhakaran’s mind to become a committed leader to his cause and build a strong organization. And both the internal and international environments have become more unfriendly than ever before to the idea of secession.

So a charismatic and responsive leader to revive Tamil militancy is like to emerge only when the environment turns extremely repressive and hostile to Tamil population at large. With greater awareness among the population and India acting as a subtle but continuous pressure point on Sri Lanka on the issue of devolution of equitable rights to Tamils, such “pressure cooker” situation is unlikely to develop. Thus even in a decadal time frame, the opportunity for emergence of such a leader may never come through.

CONCLUSION

The defeat of the LTTE in the just concluded Eelam War IV represents a major setback for the cause of an independent Tamil Eelam. The LTTE under V Prabhakaran had built one of the strongest insurgency organizations in the world with military capability in land, air and sea.

In spite of building such a powerful organization, supported by a global network of Tamil Diaspora to further its capability, the LTTE failed due to a number of reasons. The local and international environments that enabled the LTTE insurgency to thrive have changed since 1983. A new generation of Tamil youth driven from their homes in the north and east due to prolonged war has been exposed to different cultures and environment. It is doubtful whether they could be motivated to take up arms once again for the cause of Tamil Eelam.

India as a powerful neighbour with a large Tamil population can wield a strong influence in Sri Lanka including the future of Tamil militancy. India as a regional power is unlikely to allow easy passage for the rise of Tamil militancy afresh for reasons of strategic security. The changed international environment with low tolerance limits for the activities of non-state actors will make it difficult for the use of overseas soil for the growth of Tamil militancy. International protocols introduced to curb terrorism have come in handy to curb LTTE’s international activity. These are likely to inhibit the revival or resurgence of Tamil militancy.

However, Tamil militancy can stage a comeback if there is a strong support from another nation for its own reasons. Even then to flourish in Sri Lanka, it will require a strong anti-Tamil regime to create an environment of hostility to Sinhalas. With a powerful Sri Lanka army in place, even if the environment is suitable for militancy it will require strong and motivated leadership with committed followers who can sustain their presence for at least a decade.

Under the circumstances, Tamil militancy is likely to be restricted to acts of sabotage, occasional shoot outs and acts of assassinations by small bands. As and when Tamil population joins the mainstream of Sri Lanka through enlightened national leadership, such small group activities also might become extinct. And it would be up to Sri Lanka leadership to decide on how quickly and how comfortably they can give the feeling security and trust back to the Tamil population.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Blog: www.colhariharan.org E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com)

-Sri Lanka Guardian