After KP, what?

"The ‘Tamil voice’, otherwise, is confused. It continues to reflect the nature of the Tamil politics all along. The LTTE made a difference, but only when it wielded the guns."
_______________

By N Sathiya Moorthy

(August 12, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) By whisking away post-Prabhakaran LTTE leader Kumaran Pathmanathan alias ‘KP’, the Sri Lankan Government may have served notice not only on peripheral militancy but also on the moderates – to choose the ‘right path’ to a political solution. Yet, the political capital accruing to President Mahinda Rajapaksa may have been blunted a little already by the ‘mixed results’ that his ruling UPFA received in the municipal polls in the North.

KP’s downfall had begun even towards the end of the war. He had to risk constant exposure to stat-phone talks, if only to negotiate a ‘honourable way out’ for the besieged LTTE leadership. If that confirmed his presence in South-East Asia, as had always been suspected, the death of Prabhakaran threw up both opportunities and challenges that he could not let go by – or, risk, either.

The rump LTTE, now reverting back to the leadership of US-based Tamil lawyer, Viswanathan Rudrakumaran, may have sought an inquiry into the way KP was taken in, and onto Sri Lanka. If the nation(s) of South-East Asia had cooperated with the Sri Lankan State, there is a message for would-be Tamil militants, particularly in the immediate neighbourhood. If not, any ‘Israeli-like act’ on the part of the Sri Lankan agencies would require commendation of a different kind.

The fact remains that under the Rajapaksa political leadership, the Sri Lankan Government did a thorough job of coordination with the global community, in wiping out the LTTE military prowess. Intelligence-sharing by nations like India and the US, and counter-funding operations in South-East Asia, Canada and the US – though not extending always to Europe – have been documented.

In the case of South-East Asia, the Rajapaksa dispensation had specifically designated Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremenayake to handle the coordination efforts. He may have visited South-East Asia on official visits more times than many of his predecessors put together. On most such occasions, terrorism, particularly of the LTTE funding and arming variety, were believed to have been the focus of bilateral and multi-lateral discourses and understanding. That the rapport may have paid off, even belatedly, is what needs to be understood.

Either way, the surprise detention of KP has shaken the already-shaken LTTE leadership. Maybe, he was not the best of choice, but by holding perceived control of the unlimited / undisclosed financial resources of the LTTE, KP the demoralised outfit needed him as much as he needed the organisation. There could now be starts and upstarts in the future LTTE leadership, with fears and anxieties of a counter-terror op of the kind lurking in the background and the foreground, as well.

In the immediate future, other LTTE fund-managers reporting to KP may see red-lights and hear sirens across their windows – in whichever part of the world they reside in. The more legitimate associates of theirs too may want to distance themselves from the outfit more than ever, whether or not KP spills any beans. If he were to ‘sing’, then host-governments cannot but act on information that could have been dismissed as intuition, in the past.

In a way, KP now has the power and potential to re-define Sri Lanka’s relationship with various nations, their leaders and leaderships than may be acknowledged at the moment. Given the continuing aggression that the Sri Lankan Government continues to practice towards the West since the commencement of the ‘Eelam War IV’, his revelations could upset the interim patch-up that may have been effected in more recent days.

While KP’s ‘arrest’ – if it has been legally recorded already – could set the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora thinking of newer and fewer options, it may not rework the political reality nearer home as much as the Government may have liked. The results of the local government polls in Jaffna and Vavuniya may hold the key. There is nothing to suggest that the ‘KP detention’ did influence the Tamil voters in the North, either way.

Despite the shortcomings – of which dated electoral rolls was only one -- the poll has proved to be a defining moment for post-Prabhakaran, post-LTTE Tamil politics in the country. It is more so for the Tamil society as a whole. Like in the East earlier, it has proved that the poll could usher in limited democracy of a less controversial variety than during the hay days of the LTTE is still possible in the North.

Having initiated the process, the Government has had the grace to accept the results. At least, there is nothing as yet to suggest that the Government would have other ideas, particularly in Vavuniya, where alliance-making of some kind may still be required and is thus possible. It is now up to the TNA as the leading party and other Tamil players to patch up their past differences and seek to work towards a cooperative future. If still the Government tries its hand at wooing some – and also succeeds in doing so -- it is only in the nature of politics that it would do so. Ethnic and chauvinist motives should not be attributed, off-hand. Yet, the Government, in the fitness of things and more so of circumstances, should gracefully pave the way for the TNA to run a Vavuniya Urban Council, with the UPFA extending ‘outside support’.

The ‘Tamil voice’, otherwise, is confused. It continues to reflect the nature of the Tamil politics all along. The LTTE made a difference, but only when it wielded the guns. It has not unified the Tamils as was sought to be made out when Prabhakaran was around. Having won the Vavuniya Council and come a respectable second in Jaffna, the TNA only need to recall the way in which its 22 MPs got elected before they revive any criticism of the Government on the poll front.

The question would now remain if President Rajapaksa would want to call Provincial Council elections in the North, as he had promised earlier. He may also need to review the wisdom of forcing parties like the EPDP of Minister Douglas Devananda to contest under the UPFA ticket. Maybe, things are changing in Sri Lanka too – as in neighbouring India.

In India, for instance, mainline parties at the national-level have ceased efforts to rope in regional allies under their larger wings. Instead, they are going out of the way to provide adequate political space for allies to operate on their own steam, and playing second-fiddle to them in respective States of relative influence. This is a pattern that President Rajapaksa should not overlook – and not just in the context of the Tamil parties or the Tamil Provinces.

Should the Government still go ahead and order Provincial Council polls in the North, then the TNA would be forced to decide on the future course of the ‘re-merger demand’. The combine had boycotted the Provincial Council polls in the East last year, citing de-merger as the cause. That was when the LTTE and Prabhakaran were around. Different circumstances demand differential approaches, and the TNA leadership is not unaware of the complexities.

For now, however, the Northern poll results may have helped the TNA consolidate its societal base on the one hand and also diffuse the leadership crisis that was beginning to build up. It would be torn between the two constituencies as and when it begins addressing the issue of contesting the Provincial Council polls – and the future of a political solution, in circumstances sans not only Prabhakaran but also KP.

(The article originally carried by the Daily Mirror, daily news paper based in Colombo, Sri Lnaka)

-Sri Lanka Guardian