[Extracts of this article were included in a presentation the author had made at a panel discussion on “Sri Lanka after LTTE reverses” organised by the Centre for Asian Studies, Chennai and the Dept. of Political Science, Madras University, Chennai on May 26, 2009.]
Macro issues
(June 02, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Undoubtedly Sri Lanka, under the leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, has scored an unprecedented military victory in the Eelam War IV with the near total elimination of the entire leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). After that the LTTE’s military struggle has been turned into an existential struggle. It will be a long haul for the LTTE to get back into some shape as the Sri Lanka war machine grinds on relentlessly in the name of taming the Tamil Tigers.
The Sri Lankan victory, tarnished by the death of 20,000 civilians, has thrown afresh the question ‘what happens after the war?’ Many analysts have focused on issues like devolution of powers to Tamils, rehabilitation of displaced population, and development of north and east as some of the instruments to ‘resolve’ the vexing ethnic issue.
The fundamental truth is Sri Lanka society is divided along ethnic lines between Sinhalas and Tamils as never before. The Sinhala-Tamil divide took over 50 years to become a fact of life from the Tamil point of view. In the last three decades or so, Tamil militancy and the state’s response to it had frustrated the chances of healing processes attempted by well meaning souls. The huge show of power in the aftermath of military victory has made minority Tamils confident of their future as their past experience tells them not to expect the rulers to keep their promises.
There are no magic potions that would erase overnight the sense of mistrust and insecurity pervading all sections of Tamil society in Sri Lanka. No amount of speeches in parliament or promises in international podiums is going to convince Tamils unless deeds match the words. As it is a state of mind, it requires much more than the statistical figures of number of Tamil ministers and members in parliament unless they produce worthwhile actions to restore confidence among the minorities. Unfortunately, such actions, beyond political expediency, have not been paid adequate attention by the stakeholders including Sinhala and Tamil intelligentsia.
The situation has become more complex now than ever before because the LTTE is no more there as an extra legal power centre. There is a strong external constituency now as the world is increasingly networked than it was in 1983 when Tamil militancy blossomed.. So old solutions, including military actions, by either side are not going to resolve the issues. Any process to succeed now will have to be inclusive rather than exclusive or ‘home grown’ as President Rajapaksa likes to call it.
To make Sri Lanka’s path to permanent peace a smooth one, the people and rulers of Sri Lanka as well as India and the international community should address a cluster of issues that may be grouped under five heads. These are: the LTTE and its future, rise of Rajapaksa and its impact, Tamil minority politics, the India-Tamil Nadu-Sri Lanka triangular relations, and international response to Sri Lanka.
Future of LTTE
Prabhakaran was the life and soul of the LTTE. Prabhakaran had the ability to control the two vital segments of the organisation – the external resources segment and the internal operational segment. Like many other insurgent groups, LTTE was an autocracy and Prabhakaran’s writ ran the LTTE and decided the life and death of its rank and file. So the leadership hierarchy was in the form of pecking order based on a crony system. The wiping out of the entire leadership has not left a leader of proven ability or remnant of a central leadership that can marshal the cadres scurrying within Sri Lanka to save their lives from the security forces, and motivate them to continue the struggle.
On the other hand, the LTTE’s huge overseas assets, held under cover names of front men and organisations, are under the control of minutemen. Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the LTTE international affairs representative and only senior leader left alive, has sufficient experience in handling the links of LTTE’s external segment. He is a smooth and wily operator who could manage gain control of most of the overseas tentacles. However, the ambitions of some local satraps guarding the LTTE pie with their muscle power might interfere with Pahmanathan’s moves. Moreover, Pathmanathan’s financial integrity in handling party funds was suspect even in Prabhakaran’s time. So even if he controls the external segment, it is doubtful whether he can control and motivate the operational segment inside Sri Lanka. Considering these issues, it might take sometime before a new leadership with control over both the external and internal segments emerges.
President Rajapaksa’s ascendancy
President Rajapaksa has delivered what he promised the voters in the run up to the election – victory over the LTTE. LTTE has been given a body blow from which it would be difficult to regain its former glory. Thus Rajapksa has become the unchallenged leader of the country – a modern day Dutta Gamunu; if all goes well he would be victorious in his quest for presidency for a second term as well. Thus he is likely to be in power till 2028. If he could plan and eliminate LTTE from a position of political and military power in three years, he has the potential to resolve the ethnic divide between the two major communities. But can he and will he do it?
Rajapaksa’s military success has swept lot shortcomings in his style of governance under the carpet. There has been scant respect for rule of law in the high handed conduct of senior officials and ministers; well meaning measures that would improve governance (like the 17th amendment of the Constitution) have been deferred; free media has been hounded by both legal and extra legal methods; NGOs have come under pressure to toe the government line, indirect measures are being adopted to control INGOs, and many Tamils are uncertain of their security as the ‘while van’ syndrome has not vanished.
The devolution of powers to Tamils has been used as a political ploy to keep the Tamil lobbies at bay as the Tissa Vitharana commission’s recommendations have not seen the light of the day. Similarly the much heralded ushering in of 13th amendment of the Constitution to devolve powers to the provincial council still remains a cruel joke than a reality.
The President appears to be ruling the country with the assistance of a triumvirate of his two brothers Basil and Gotabaya along with the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka. In fact he is more dependent upon them to carry out his agenda than his unwieldy cabinet of ministers. This style of personalised governance focuses on results rather than accountability and suits war situations. However, the style comes with a cost because it inevitably gives rise to many acts of omission and commission. This is what is happening in Sri Lanka.
Though the war is over, the Army Commander General Fonseka has said that armed forces strength would be increased by 50 percent to 300,000 (nearly one fourth the size of Indian armed forces’ strength of 1.13 million). This is ostensibly to eliminate the last vestige of LTTE from the Sri Lanka soil. While the intentions appear logical, the question arises whether such a huge army is required for counter insurgency after armed forces of a much smaller strength had defeated the LTTE and regained territorial control of insurgent-controlled territory.
Oversized armies tend to grow into power centres that influence political decision making either indirectly or directly for decades. Turkey and Indonesia are good examples of this phenomenon. Big armies usually find issues and rationale to justify their existence. Pakistan is a shining example of this home truth. And in counter insurgency operations they tend to cloud political judgement because military option is more easily exercised than protracted peace parleys. Though Sri Lanka armed forces have excelled in warfare, they and the civil society will have to ensure that militarism does not become part of national life.
On the current line of thinking the counter insurgency operations in the coming years in Sri Lanka would probably be based on a network of garrison towns established in major communication centres and towns in north and east. They would probably make endless forays of patrols on search and destroy missions in the interior. There are two problems with this process. Sri Lanka armed forces are manned by the Sinhala community. Unless the armed forces take pains to induct sufficient Tamil speaking recruits and employ them for operations in north and east it will not gain the trust and confidence of demoralised Tamil people. If Sri Lanka attempts to rush through the operation, without undergoing the painful process of turning the armed forces truly national in character and composition, it would only hasten the birth and growth of another Prabhakaran. Secondly, does the Sri Lanka government expect Tamil militancy as a permanent feature of Sri Lanka life?
(To be continued)
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Blog: www.colhariharan.org E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com)
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. Blog: www.colhariharan.org E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com)
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