Sri Lanka after the LTTE

Can India play a role in power-sharing accord?

By Maj-Gen Ashok K. Mehta (retd)

(June 22, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) Strange was India’s sphinx-like silence over the plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils and violation of human rights and humanitarian law of warfare during the last phase of the military offensive when the fight to finish the LTTE overrode the concern over the safety and security of civilians. This after Delhi had obtained from Colombo a commitment to ending combat operations and non-use of heavy weapons. The rescue mission to liberate 100,000 civilians from the no-fire zone was achieved at an enormous human cost, figures varying from 5000 to 30,000 to “unacceptably high” dead and one million displaced.

Sifting through the Sri Lankan media, one can detect admissions of use of government artillery and mortars by a sailor in LTTE captivity, government doctors in the NFZ, since taken into custody, anonymous Lankan and Western journalists and Mr Rajiva Wijesinha of the Human Rights Secretariat. He said mortars, an infantry weapon, were used against the LTTE’s heavy weapons, including tanks. He conceded that 3,000 to 5,000 civilians could have been killed.

The Chief Justice of Sri Lanka, Mr Sarath N Silva, is reported to have warned of another uprising, though not an armed struggle. He said IDPs (internally displaced persons) sheltered at transit centres in Cheddikulam cannot expect justice under Sri Lankan law. He then added: “I cannot explain their suffering and grief in words. It is an utter lie if we continue to say that there is only one race and no majority-minority in the country.” President Mahinda Rajapakse told an Indian TV channel that there was no humanitarian crisis and that at the most, 100 civilians had been killed.

For the world’s biggest rescue mission, the “delete LTTE” button was pressed after the Indian election results on May 16. What really happened in the following 48 hours, only history will tell as the speed to finish the Tigers clouded other considerations. The government blocked all access to the NFZ, prompting Director of Policy Alternatives Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu to say: “Surely, they must have something to hide.” He has since received threats to close CPA from a group calling itself the “Sri Lankans Affectionate to Motherland”.

The calls for an independent enquiry were rejected though a Lankan Tamil Minister, Mr Douglas Devananda, said he would request the President for an internal enquiry to clear the air over alleged human rights violations in the last phase of the war. A former minister, Mr Mangala Samaraweera, has reminded the Lankans about the “white van culture” absence of transparency and lack of accountability.

India has a relatively impeccable record in the use of force and upholding human rights against militancy in its conflict zones. It did not permit the use of heavy weapons by the IPKF against the LTTE nor has it ever allowed the use of tanks, air and artillery in the North-East and J&K even if this meant several-fold more military casualties. Protection of civilian lives and avoiding collateral damage is the top priority even at the cost of letting terrorists escape from the encounter site.

The Indian Army scrupulously follows the Ten Commandments and the do’s and don’ts of counter-insurgency. Given this historical ethos of minimum force and good faith, why did India not caution Colombo instead of supporting it outright during the offensive and in the two resolutions at the United Nations Human Rights Council at Geneva last month? The name of the game is realpolitik.

The most asked question today is having won the war, can Mr Mahinda Rajapakse win the peace and does India have a role in securing a power-sharing agreement? For years India has repeated its abiding commitment towards upholding Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in lieu of a just settlement for the Tamils. “It is Sri Lanka’s internal affair” that became the new diplomatic refrain signalling India’s reduced leverage and reluctance to restrain Colombo over the conduct of war.

Not once since the start of the Northern offensive did New Delhi ask for ending the military campaign even after the war had been won. All it would say was that a political, not a military, solution would work. Ironically, it is the military solution that succeeded for which Colombo had India’s full backing though it would have been more ethical to have asked the Lankans to stop operations once the distinction between the Tigers and civilian non-combatants in the NFZ blurred fatally.

The new UPA government demonstrated its fresh fire power on the plight of the Tamils and devolution in the debate on the Motion of Thanks to the President’s Address in the Rajya Sabha earlier this month. Mrs Jayanthi Natarajan of the Congress and also its spokesperson said: “We demand that Mr Rajapakse ensure proper devolution of authority to Tamils and discrimination must end. Nothing short of this will satisfy us”, she added. She further said that “20,000 Tamils were killed in the war….” This is the first time such strong language has been employed to project the Tamil question, including the killing of 20,000 civilians.

The Rajapakse government has held national victory parades, and at least three speeches by the President to celebrate the achievement. For most Sri Lankans it is the victory of the Sinhalese over the Tamils. Mr Rajapakse issued a statement about being magnanimous in victory and announced friendship for all. Yet, two clear strands of opinion are emerging: the first and the dominant is that with the LTTE eliminated and its leadership blanked out, the problem of terrorism is finished. The corollary? There is no ethnic conflict either.

The second and more liberal view advocates settling the national question and the root causes that led to the birth of the LTTE. Its votaries recommend some measure of power-sharing without diluting the unitary character of the state. On several occasions Mr Rajapakse has promised the implementation of the 13th Amendment plus — that is more than what was envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lanka accord. Sinhala chauvinism and military triumphalism are bound to constrain Mr Rajapakse from meeting this commitment.

Tamil political parties already allied with the ruling SLFP could merge with it as has former LTTE leader Karuna’s TMVP. The LTTE proxy, the TNA, which won 23 of the 24 seats in the North-East in 2004, has said it will not accept the 13th Amendment and will make its own proposal. It wants the demerged North and East to be remerged as per the ISLA and sought India’s intervention. The internal affair excuse has been used to reject this request.

Mr Rajapakse has not only eradicated the LTTE menace but also divided all the political parties — the CWC, the SLMC, the UNP, the JVP and now even the TNA. His party will soon have won all the Provincial Council elections. Parliamentary elections, likely in November this year, would also be won with an overwhelming majority. He is bound to be re-elected President for another six years in 2011. The Rajapakse wave is unstoppable.

The All-Party Representative Committee, formed by Mr Rajapakse to address the national question, consists of only the ruling party as other parties have boycotted it though the UNP has said it will support the 13th Amendment. In all probability, what the Tamils will get is 13th Amendment minus — a cross between what was given to the Varadaraj Perumal, first and only elected government in the North-East in 1988 and what has been given to Chief Minister Pillaiyan’s TVMP in the East -— nothing. Mr Karuna has said the Tamils don’t need devolution — they require development. He is now the Vice-President of the SLFP.

For India after 30 years of involvement in the Tamil question, sacrifice of 1200 IPKF men and helping eliminate the LTTE, obtaining a just and fair devolution package for the Tamils is not an internal affair of Sri Lanka.

-Sri Lanka Guardian