Lest we lose the great game in Sri Lanka

By Col. R. Hariharan

(June 23, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Sri Lanka’s security forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, eliminating its leader and guiding spirit Velupillai Prabhakaran and almost the entire leadership. Their success comes after a failure to achieve decisive results in three earlier episodes of war, spread over more than two decades.

Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s result-oriented national leadership was the single major factor that helped Sri Lanka eliminate the LTTE as a power centre threatening national integrity. His Government’s shortcomings on human rights and rule of law appear to have been forgotten in the afterglow of victory. Riding the crest of unprecedented popularity, Rajapaksa is emerging as an unchallenged monolithic power centre in his country.

War and its aftermath have changed the strategic environment in Sri Lanka. The military has emerged as a modern, professionally competent, battle-tested fighting force. The army is poised to grow into a force of 300,000, roughly one fourth the size of the Indian Army and bigger than the armies of Europe — Germany, Italy and France. Oversized armed forces in small countries usually become an additional power centre, and Sri Lanka might prove to be no exception.

A significant feature of the war was the minimal Indian influence exerted on Sri Lanka, in sharp contrast to India’s high profile involvement in Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Tamil confrontation from the time of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. She had woven the Tamil problem into the overall matrix of India’s strategic security construct on Sri Lanka in the 1980s at the height of the Cold War. But in keeping with its new equations with Sri Lanka, India not only did not interfere in the operations against the LTTE, but also did not contribute much to the peace process that preceded it.

India’s vanilla influence on Sri Lanka started waning after Rajiv Gandhi failed in his well-intentioned, but ill-conceived, military intervention to enforce the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987. India was particularly bitter after it had to ignominiously recall its troops when the LTTE and Sri Lanka colluded to throw the Indians out. LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi later dissipated the goodwill and sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils that existed in 1987.

DURING THE LAST TWO DECADES, India’s strategic priorities have changed in the Indian Ocean Region, in keeping with the strategic changes taking place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. India and the United States are building a strategic relationship in the region. China is increasing its presence in all countries in India’s neighbourhood. Terrorism has become a universal problem.

India’s agenda for Sri Lanka has mainly focused on strategic security cooperation and building of trade linkages. In spite of this, New Delhi was reluctant to participate in the Norwegian mediated peace process in 2002. In fact, India declined to accept President Rajapaksa’s invitation to join the peace process earlier. China stepped in to supply the bulk of armaments Sri Lanka required for its operations against the LTTE. It also made financial aid available. Sri Lanka found the Chinese weapons to be attractively priced and readily available, particularly as India could not help because of stiff opposition from political parties in Tamil Nadu. This enabled China to strengthen its strategic linkages with Sri Lanka. Pakistan also contributed with a supply of weapons, though on a more modest scale than China. As a result, China has gained considerable strategic space and credibility in Sri Lanka, filling the vacuum created by India’s reluctance to participate actively in Sri Lanka’s war effort. The Chinese are also constructing a commercial port complex in Hambantota in the south, and when completed this will make China’s presence in Sri Lanka more assertive.

The US too has been playing an active role in Sri Lanka, participating in the peace process of 2002 and later supporting its war effort. At the same time, the US has been in close touch with India on issues relating to Sri Lanka. This tacit cooperation had continued all through the operations against the LTTE, even on key issues where the two countries had differing views. This consultative relationship is likely to continue because India has a unique geographic and strategic advantage in Sri Lanka unmatched by any other power.

However, US presence is probably also linked to its larger global security concerns over the increasing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. So it would be strategically prudent for the US to keep a toehold in Sri Lanka, where China is enlarging its influence. The US is also probably wary of Iran’s moves to cultivate Sri Lanka with the extension of a billion dollars in aid.

The recent US actions in Af-Pak region have not increased India’s confidence in the US. There are indications of the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement losing its momentum. Thus, when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits New Delhi these two issues are likely to dominate the agenda. Sri Lanka might figure only as appreciation of India’s positive influence on the island.

Sri Lanka is slowly being drawn into a global power play and India will feel its impact. India has to evolve a new strategic paradigm to handle it. A peaceful, stable and prosperous Sri Lanka is a strategic asset for India. So fundamentally, India will have to help Sri Lanka get out of the 30-year-old ravages of war to become peaceful and stable.

THE GOVERNMENT will have to focus on its critical strengths conferred by Sri Lanka’s geographic proximity, cultural similarity, religious identity and economic linkages to make India more relevant to the island nation than other distant nations. Already, India-Sri Lanka trade is burgeoning thanks to the Free Trade Agreement in place. But to add to bilateral strategic strength there has to be greater India-Sri Lanka convergence in defence and security perceptions. Both countries have a long history of military cooperation. Sri Lanka, like other smaller neighbours, has a latent fear of India’s overwhelming influence. This has to be addressed to create greater confidence, which will lead to better strategic understanding. India should formalise the defence treaty, which is held in suspended animation.

India will have to help Sri Lanka’s healing process. Sri Lankans should be enabled to travel to India freely. Indian investments can create job opportunities in the troubled north and wean away the youth from possible militancy. Technical-education institutions are a plenty in the South and should be thrown open to Sri Lankan students. War-torn Sri Lanka needs a massive reconstruction and rehabilitation effort. India can help on this front immediately. Contentious issues that had been dogging relations between the two countries will take longer to resolve. All that is required is political will and tenacity of purpose.

Col. R. Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as Head of Intelligence. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies. This analysis has been an originally carried by the Covert.

-Sri Lanka Guardian