Lanka’s clinical approach won the war

By R S Vasan

(June 04, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Rajapaksa regime succeeded in gaining international favour and capitalised on the mistakes the Tigers committed Sri Lanka had the support of China that opposed any formal resolution by the UNSC.

Most of the agencies limited their role to making appeals to the government with no serious intent to follow up with sanctions of any kind. If the LTTE expected the international community to come to their rescue, they were disappointed

The world including some of the hardcore LTTE supporters have grudgingly but slowly learned to accept the death of Prabhakaran and the defeat of the LTTE as a guerrilla force. With the defeat of the LTTE almost synchronous with the killing of the leader, the aura of invincibility that the leader and the organisation carried was shattered. What exactly did president Mahinda Rajapaksa do differently to bring this end to the insurgency movement would remain the focus of Sri Lanka observers. The war claimed more than 80,000 lives in the last quarter century and has left bitter open festering wounds that would take long to heal. There were also changed circumstances that aided the process of the LTTE defeat. Some of the factors that sealed the fate of the LTTE are: Global War on Terror. Many reasons have been assigned for the success of Rajapaksa against what his regime labelled as the ‘war on terror’ (taken straight from the US lexicon post 9/11).

The stern measures taken by the global community, notably the West had indirectly affected the freedom of the LTTE operatives which included many from its diaspora in US, Canada, Australia, UK and EU countries. The stricter supervision of the money laundering, illegal arms acquisition and monitoring of the activities of the front end/char ity organisations came in the way of unfettered freedom enjoyed by the LTTE that heavily depended on it.

The 2005 election. This perhaps is a turning point in the history of the ethnic conflict in the Island. Prabhakaran by boycotting the elections and preventing the Tamils from voting indirectly helped Rajapaksa, a hardliner, to be elected. From the very first day in office, Rajapaksa was clear in his mission to destroy the LTTE, which he believed was to be prevented militarily before engaging the Tamils in the Island.

Rajapaksa and his ministers left no stone unturned to ensure that the LTTE was proscribed in many nations around the world.

The Karuna factor. While it was expected initially that the breaking away of Karuna, LTTE’s eastern commander, was not a factor, this proved to be the nemesis for Prabhakaran in the long run. Having served Prabhakaran and with rare insights into the LTTE modus operandi, Karuna was an extremely useful ally for the Lankan forces.

Destruction of the logistic chain.

The LTTE had assiduously built up a mercantile marine force for serving its logistic requirements. The Flags of Convenience (FoC) ships numbering more than a dozen had been the mainstay of all imports for the group. The cargo included arms, ammunition, spares and also drugs. The possible threat through the seas post 9/11 had sensitised the maritime nations to the possible dangers and had made them adopt newer regimes such as the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code.

The intelligence sharing with India and Western countries facilitated the Lankan navy to challenge these ships and sink them. The LTTE progressively lost the capability to bring essential cargo both due to stricter monitoring at port of origin and sophisticated surveillance.

The increased surveillance forced the LTTE to scout for its essential supplies in the southern states of India. Even if some supplies did reach the LTTE, it was never going to be enough to take on the rejuvenated Lankan war machine.

Dependence on diaspora and TN.

There are no doubts about the role of the diaspora that sustained the momentum of the efforts for creation of an Eelam.

The community did acquire a potent lobbying power and was able to sensitise the host nations. It continued to provide support, but was limited in its ability to change the way the world looked at LTTE as a terrorist organisation.

The final stages of the war did see demonstrations in the West that at times angered the host nations as it crossed the limits of civilised behaviour in many cities.

The LTTE also pinned the hopes on the Tamil regional parties to be bailed out, little realising that it had lost substantial ground post the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The lack of any major protests after the killing of Prabhakaran proved that this was never a major issue for the people of Tamil Nadu.

Lack of anti-aircraft missiles. The LTTE was not able to procure any antiaircraft missiles due to the increased surveillance by Interpol. All efforts to procure sophisticated weaponry were nipped in the bud. This dealt a severe blowto the LTTE in countering the air attacks by helicopter gunship, MiGs and Kfirs. The Lankan air force was able to engage sea and land targets at will with immunity. The LTTE did try to neutralise this advantage by attacking Lankan air bases by Black Tigers.

Except for giving it some sensational coverage, these attacks did not dent the capability of the SLAF.

Military support from external players. Sri Lanka’s leadership needs to be credited for their successes with the global community that sided with the government in its ‘war on terror’.

Military hardware and training came their way from China, Pakistan, India, Israel and other nations. Sri Lanka played their cards well in the Indian neighbourhood. If it played the Pakistan and China card in India, it played the India card in Pakistan and China to get the best of the deals.

Lost opportunities. The LTTE had ample opportunities for laying down arms and returning to the negotiating table. Regrettably, the leader did not see the writing on the wall and persisted with the impossible idea of defeating the army. The human shield theory did not work, as there was enormous loss even in no fire zones, which were freely used by both sides despite the presence of the civilians.

Lack of international action. Except for paying lip service, the UN and other aid agencies/nations were quite happy to let the LTTE lose. Sri Lanka had the support of China (and even Russia) that opposed any formal discussion/resolution by the UNSC. Most of the agencies limited their role to making appeals to the government with no serious intent to follow up with sanctions of any kind. If the LTTE expected the international community to come to their rescue, they were disappointed.

In conclusion, it is clear that the LTTE’s leadership failed to come to grips with the ground realities and had lost the support base around the world.

The lack of action by the international community and India only hastened the LTTE’s disintegration. While the root causes for the creation of the LTTE remain unresolved, the outfit that tried to create a separate Tamil state has been confined to history.

(The author is Head, Strategy and Security Studies, Centre for Asian Studies, Chennai)

-Sri Lanka Guardian