Ground realities in Sri Lanka expose colossal naivete

By Michael Roberts

(May 13, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) With the LTTE cornered and restricted to a tiny patch of isthmus beside Nanthi Kadal Lagoon ever since 6 April, the world has witnessed a menagerie of world leaders playing the game "throw egg on my face."

On 22 April Hilary Clinton told the world that "a terrible humanitarian tragedy" was taking place in Sri Lanka and demanded a halt in the fighting so that "we could secure a safe passage for as many of the trapped civilians as possible."

Remarkably, for a superpower leader with access to up-to-date information Clinton appears to have been some 48 hours behind breaking events: namely, the escape of some 107,000 Tamil "civilians" (doubtless including Tiger cadres who had given up the fight) from their hell-hole situation after a commando operation carried out by the Sri Lankan army on the night of 19/20th April. Alternatively, one must conclude that Clinton read this miraculous tale as something that spelt a humanitarian disaster — hence my use of the egg metaphor.

She was not alone. Various world leaders, the UN and its agencies and some human rights organizations reiterated the call for a ceasefire that they had been parroting for months as a solution to the hard realities around the LTTE’s end-game. It is this mantra that I challenge here.

Let me stress the marvelous character of the outcome. As I arrived in Sri Lanka on 17th April, I told Kumari Jayawardena that the ground situation facing the army was labyrinthine. I could not, I said, see how they could move forward without generating disastrous death rates. Yet, today, we know that the commando operation was one for the text-book: it resulted in relatively few non-combatant deaths and created a path for streams and streams of Tamils to cross lagoon and beach over the next 2-3 days, roughly 110,000 making this little epic journey. This, for me, was better than the tale of Moses crossing the Red Sea. It was both elevating and saddening.

It was distressing because of the condition some of these people displayed so starkly on camera, bespeaking the privation they had undergone in the immediate past. Indeed, as one or two died of dehydration or starvation while being bused or airlifted by the military to the nearest hospitals in Vavuniya, one knew, now, why the people of Thamilelam had turned their back on Eelam and the LTTE.

Reports from journalists such as Murali Reddy confirmed that this existential plight had been aggravated by the draconian measures taken by the LTTE during the last two months or so. Again, the facial expressions of those prepared to speak (in Sinhala) on camera constituted a message in itself: "may a pox befall the house of Pirapaharan and the Tigers" was what visage proclaimed. Kannaki had arisen again.

These outspoken Tamil individuals would surely be among those who would cast rotten eggs at Hilary Clinton! Perhaps we should not be surprised at Clinton’s insouciance. Nor am I surprised by the pantomime, a Dance of the Seven Veils, being performed at the electoral platforms in Tamilnadu. In similar fashion Sri Lanka’s democratic process has often revealed how vote-gathering inflames ethnic passions. The LTTE’s demise has sparked off an upsurge of pan-Dravidian sentiment (an issue demanding specialist treatment). The shameless exploitation of this current by Jayalalitha and Karunanidhi seems par for the course in populist politics.

But how can Tamil dissidents who are fully aware of the character of the LTTE also fall into the same simpleton stance: namely, believing that ceasefires will help a "trapped people?" Take Nirmala Rajasingam’s passionate appeal in The Independent newspaper in Britain on Friday 24th April. While denouncing the LTTE for its "atrocities" and asserting, validly, that the "LTTE’s exclusivist Tamil nationalism and extreme militarism have led the Tamil community to this political dead-end," Rajasingam also insisted that the government’s claim that there were few civilian casualties "defy reason," and spoke of "huge civilian losses through indiscriminate fire."

Indeed, she began her essay with these words: "The world has watched aghast at the level of bloodshed and the horrific plight of the civilians who have now been under siege for months." She seems to have been accepted as an authority by The Economist of 23 April (Anon 2009a) which has another anonymous article on "Dark victory," which notes unequivocally that "in its rush to exterminate the Tigers—partly in justified fear of their skill at manipulating foreign opinion—the army has shown a cruel disregard for Tamil civilians crowding the battlefield" (Anon 2009b).

But what exactly is the count of those "civilians" killed as against those who have fled the coop in the last 5-6 months? An UN report dated 24 April estimated the death toll among civilians as 6,432, with those injured being estimated as 13,946. These figures must be qualified by two sets of facts: (a) they include individuals who stepped on LTTE mines and those shot by Tigers (or killed by suicide bombers) as they fled; and (b) a few of these civilians would be new conscripts who had not been issued with uniforms.

Our adjectives must be relative. So, let us place these numbers in comparative context beside the figure of 175,714 people who reached the government lines by 24 April, with roughly 68,000 having escaped before 20 April and 107,000 in that remarkable moment between 20 and 23 April.

The dead 6432 make up roughly four per cent of those who have survived. Add the injured, some 13,000 according to the self-same UN report, and one has 20,000 casualties [caused by both sides] set against roughly 170,000 freed. While the figures are not to be laughed at, the death score is not "huge" while talk of "extermination" by Rajasingam’s accomplice, Dark Victory, displays mind-boggling bias and/or credulity.

So what we see here from Rajasingam is an emotional outburst from a Tamil heart. That is understandable. But, here, the combination of inaccuracy (re the large number of deaths on 20-23 April – not true according to Reddy) and stridency in her outburst suggest that it is a voice of someone who has been imprisoned in a medieval monastery for centuries and has no awareness of the devastating power of modern weaponry (or medieval crusades for that matter). If there had been no restraint at all in the army offensive during the past six months, I can assure her that we would have had a death toll in the 30-50,000 range. As caveat let me stress that this claim does not mean that there was no cavalier bombing and artillery fire on some occasions.

But the more immediate issue NOW is this: given that between 15,000 to 50,000 "civilians" are still trapped within the remnant LTTE patch of 5-6 square kilometres is the demand for a "humanitarian pause" (that is, "ceasefire" in ethical clothes) presented by concerned agencies a pragmatic course that will aid the Tamil people in Rump Eelam?

This is not a novel issue. Strident NGO and human rights voices demanded a ceasefire from January 2009 onwards. It prompted my initial essay on Dilemmas at War’s End: Thoughts on Hard Realities in mid-February 2009. So, we have before us a conundrum that has been faced over 4-5 months. In addressing the dilemma now, we can benefit from the experiences in this period.

But to fully grasp the ramifications we must (A) understand the ultra-nationalist ideology of the LTTE and (B) undertake a brief historical summary that delineates previous peace-talk failures as well as the steps leading to this present Eelam War Four (see Box).

Tiger Ideology

Here I am in agreement with Rajasingam in her characterization of the LTTE as "militaristic" and fascist. Fuller elaborations have been provided recently in cyber-space and a capsule version suffices here.

Every LTTE fighter takes an oath to sacrifice "life and soul" to the talaivar Pirapaharan and the cause of "Tamils’ freedom." This gifting of life as weapon, or uyirayutam, secured widespread admiration among the SL Tamil people from its inception in 1982/83 because it bespoke the quality of arppaNippu (dedication). The LTTE’s capacity to withstand the IPKF (1987-89) and then the SL government forces from 1990-2000 compounded this admiration. From then on the LTTE was widely regarded by many Tamils as their best bulwark against Sinhala domination.

Abbreviated History

A. Peace Talks 1989-90.

B.June 1990: Eelam War Two begins after LTTE launches surprise move against police stations in north and east.

C.Late 1994 Presidential Elections sees Chandrika Kumaratunga elected on a peace platform.

D.Jan-April 1995 Peace talks.

E.Mid April 1995: mini-Pearl Harbour sees 2 gunboats sunk in Trinco by LTTE frogmen.

F. April 1995- late 2000: Eelam War Three.

G.Early 2001: New UNP government of Ranil Wickremesinghe signs CFA with LTTE.

H.10 April 2002: Pirapaharan & Balasingham hold grand media event for world press at Kilinochchi.

I.Peace talks at different venues were held from December 2001 to 2004: with key points being (a) Sattahip, Thailand, 16-18 Sept 2002; (b) Oslo, Nov. 2002; followed by the Oslo Declaration of 5 Dec. 2002 – all confirming LTTE’s de facto demi-nation status.

J.2001-04: Wickremesinghe’s policy of consumer materialism begins to penetrate the fun-starved terrain of Tigerland and some Tiger cadres display a fondness for the "good life" – a process that frightens Pirapaharan no end.

K.Late 2002/Early 2003(?): When Balasingham, Tamil Chelvam and Karuna return with the Oslo principles for a political settlement that secures what can be called "pragmatic Eelam," namely, autonomy for the north & east within the Sri Lankan state (Roberts 2002a, b, c), Pirapaharan goes off the deep-end and tears up the document. Thus, against the sentiments of his leading advisors Pirapaharan directs the LTTE to prepare for war – a course I can confirm from my findings in the course of a visit to Jaffna and Kilinochchi in late November 2004 (sources cannot be divulged).

L. April 2004 et seq: Karuna defects and the Eastern Province is swept by faction firefights. The LTTE emerges as winner, but is clearly weakened as a result.

M.26 Dec. 2004: tsunami decimates Sea Tigers and delays LTTE plans.

N.12 August 2005: Kadirgamar is assassinated as the preliminary step in the LTTE policy of assisting Mahinda Rajapaksa and the UPFA to win the Presidential election – thereby removing a potential PM and a dangerous Tamil foe.

O.Dec. 2005: Mahinda Rajapaksa scrapes in as President with the abstentions of Tamil voters serving as one factor influencing his victory and the support of the JVP and JHU as another factor. Thus, by early 2006 one has two sets of hawks facing each other, the ultra-nationalist Tamil Tigers and the chauvinist UPFA regime, the one totalitarian and the other restrained by electoral demands, but leaning towards extra-parliamentary methods.

P.Late 2005: intifada tactics by the LTTE in Jaffna Peninsula West where the GOSL is seen as an "occupying army."

Q.6 August 2006: Mavil Aru intervention by LTTE sees undeclared war breaking out in Trincomalee District. This moment eventually escalates into full-scale war on all fronts although the major focus is the Eastern Province. So we have Eelam War Four.

R.2007: the GOSL forces gradually prevail in the east: with (a) the capture of Vakarai on 19 January 2007 and (b) the final ascendancy at the Toppigala redoubt on 11 July 2007 marking two central victories. After Toppigala Tiger power in the east is confined to isolated units in the deep jungle.

S.2007: over the course of the year the Navy intercepts and destroys 10 LTTE supply ships in international waters (with the aid of Indian intelligence networks)

T.Early 2008: the army begins to chip away at the LTTE frontline defences in Mannar District while threatening them on all other fronts as well.

U.May-November 2008: army breakthroughs see the LTTE lose control of the north western coast, severely weakening their supply lines from India.

V.Late-2008: the LTTE is squeezed in by a three-pronged pincer from south, west and northern edge above Elephant Pass

W.1/2 Jan. 2009: The strategic Paranthan junction town falls to army and the LTTE abandons its capital Kilinochchi.

X.25 Jan. 2009: The military HQ of the LTTE at Mullaitivu is captured.

Y.2008/09: as the LTTE withdraws in orderly fashion at different stages during the moments U to X in the Timeline Box, it persuades and/or forces the Tamil people to move with the LTTE into the remaining Tiger territories.

-Sri Lanka Guardian