Military Victories

By General [Rtd] Gerry de Silva
Courtesy: The Montage

(March 10, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) THE CURRENT SPATE OF BRILLIANT MILITARY victories leaves one wondering why the Sri Lankan Security Forces could not explode the myth of Tamil Militant invincibility before? Why did it have to take over two and a half decades of conflict, which was only instrumental in denuding our manpower and financial resources to the extent that it has, up until now? At the cost of development, peace and innumerable lives of innocent civilians caught up in the crossfire in the conflict zone, the opposing forces in the country, have indulged in wasteful and useless combat strategies, causing wanton destruction of national resources and wealth, to the detriment of progress and prosperity. Basically, the politico-military strategies pursued have been by and large ineffective and not commensurate to the expenditure incurred by the national exchequer and its valuable manpower resources. The time is opportune to analyse the reasons behind these drawbacks.

Let us examine the positive aspects of the current politicomilitary strategy so as to make a comparison of the factors behind previous attempts that did not live up to the expectations required to bring about a positive end to the conflict.

Primarily, a committed and supportive political leadership dedicated to the aim of ridding the country of the scourge of terrorism has been the most dominant influence towards motivating our military personnel to attain unprecedented heights in combat efficiency and the ‘will-towin’. Despite severe constraints in terrain and weather conditions and the mental and physical strain of a long drawn out conflict, never before undertaken at such magnitude, our heroic forces never tarried.

The sustained, aggressive and ruthless pursuit of the military option must figure prominently in the equation of success. In this context, the professionalism of the field commanders and the rank and file who transformed frontline combat into an unwavering resolve to destroy the enemy and pursue the path to victory over the past three years must receive the highest praise, esteem and admiration of the nation.

We are indeed fortunate to possess three of the finest battle hardened Service Commanders at this crucial juncture in the war against Tamil Militancy. The Joint Operations strategy exercised has been undoubtedly a vital factor in the march to victory. Maximum success has been achieved by the intelligent, timely and decisive use of military resources available within each service command and exercised jointly in combined operations designed to reduce the fighting capabilities of the enemy to total ineffectiveness. To their eternal credit the momentum of aggressive action has been maintained throughout.

It would be incumbent on the writer to discuss negative factors that de-motivated the military leadership of the time, in comparison to the determination of the present government to lend all support and cooperation to the requirements of the war effort. The political will of the leadership of previous regimes is in question on certain decisions taken, some unannounced, even to the military hierarchy. In 1985, an exasperated Minister of National Security, Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali, blurted out, “I am convinced. But kindly try and convince my Cabinet colleagues”, responding to a request made to increase manpower strengths to combat the escalating war against Tamil Militancy.

Politicians are always suspicious of too large a standing army. They should by now understand that a coup-d’etat by the military would not be even a remote possibility in a country such as Sri Lanka. Sri Lankans are an intelligent race with a high percentage of literacy, possessing a social fabric so closely knit as to discount any possibility of a military take-over. Perhaps the reason why previous feeble attempts failed.

In a lighter vein, can anyone in Sri Lanka keep a secret? Politicians should not rush to the premise that Sri Lanka is some sort of a ‘Banana Republic’ frequently associated with countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Another startling example is the incident relating to funding of the war effort during the tenure of Mr.R. Premadasa as President. Secretary Finance, Mr. Paskaralingam, emphatically stated, “I will not give the Security Forces a cent more than the annual budgetary allocation of Rs. 23 Billion,” in response to a request made by the military leadership for the additional requirement in capital expenditure for essential weapons and armaments required for offensive action. Was there any point in being a professional soldier anymore? Disgusted, discouraged and demoralised, the ‘bunker mentality’ was conceived and the plight of the soldier not appreciated by the critical masses.

The fight within was more nervewracking and unsettling, than close combat with the known enemy. In a separate incident a frustrated and furious Deputy Minister of Defence, General Ranjan Wijeratne, walked out in protest against treasury officials at a conference held in the MOD when he was vehemently refused the financial estimates projected to implement the military strategy necessary to effectively counter the terrorist threat that was gathering momentum steadily. Compare the Rs. 23 Billion budget of the Defence Forces in the 1990s with the current military budget of approximately Rs. 200 Billion and a standing Army of 200,000. Further, the present political leadership that has figured prominently in the equation of military victory must be given credit for the guarantee of autonomy extended to the military leadership to engage in combat strategy within the parameters of the national plan. The unflagging support given to the security forces by the government, including that of a strong and committed Secretary of Defense with battle experience, has ensured that the highest levels of motivation and morale have been maintained by the military leadership in the battle front enhancing the ‘will-to-win’.

State-of-the-art weapons, communication systems, combat supplies, naval and air craft: all have had their impact in the overwhelming victories our security forces have been credited with. Once more it would be pertinent to compare this with the limited resources that were available to our forces previously. It must be made known that the military had not been equipped with the anti-armour and bunker busting capability of the Rocket Propelled Grenade [ RPG ] until the LTTE fired one at an Armoured Fighting Vehicle [AFV ] in Oddusudan in the early 1980s. Further, the Multi-Barreled Rocket Launchers [ MBRLs ] were acquired only after this piece of artillery equipment had been used by the LTTE in the Wanni in 1996.

It seemed that no one wanted to finish the war that was placing mounting demands on the resources of the country and the government.

It was obvious to many that the policy adopted was to keep scratching at it like the proverbial ‘Beggar’s Wound’. Some even alleged that the politico-military hierarchy had much to gain personally from prolonged belligerent action they had no intention of terminating. Credit must also be extended to the government for disregarding pressure from the International Community and some foreign NGOs to suspend the military action just as it reached its most decisive phase and opt for a negotiated settlement despite the hue and cry over humanitarian concerns. Past experience; at least on four previous occasions, we have witnessed negotiations stalled on flimsy excuses given by the militants undoubtedly with the aim of returning to belligerency. The militants used these opportunities to come out of it with their image of freedom fighters enhanced, with more sympathy for their cause, better equipped, stronger militarily and in better fetter to resume the conflict. It is a matter for conjecture as to whether they were genuinely interested in a negotiated solution to the long standing imbroglio. Despite public announcements of ‘unconditional talks’, very soon after agreeing to negotiations, conditions were laid down. Lest we forget, Pirabaharan, never retracted on his objective and dream of a Tamil Homeland. “The thirst of Tamil Tigers is Eelam. Kill me if I settle for less”.

A source of solace to our heroic forces battling it up front has been the excellent welfare measures adopted and the care and concern generated by the government and the military; for the serviceman and their families, for those unfortunate to be wounded-in-action and for the dependents of gallant personnel who have made the supreme sacrifice.

The State’s media campaign highlighting the noble sacrifices made by our gallant servicemen with the objective of obtaining the willing acquiescence of the polity towards the war effort has borne fruit. The strategy is unprecedented.

Whenever combat operations were meticulously planned, troops motivated to reach the zenith of combat oriented operations training, given the military resources to ensure success, professionally led and inculcated with the ‘willto- win’, the military campaign always succeeded. In this context it would be worthwhile quoting from the observations made by Prof. S.D. Muni of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and a former Ambassador of India to Viet-Nam. In an article published commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the Indian Peace Keeping Force involvement in Sri Lanka, he states, “……the perception of LTTE’s overall military prowess is exaggerated” and to further illustrate his conclusion he adds, “The Vadamarachchi Operation of 1987 under J.R Jayawardene forced Pirabaharan and other militant leaders to pack their bags for Tamil Nadu. It was the humanitarian intervention with the so called ‘food bombs’ that saved the day for them. Continuing, he states, “During the ‘ Riviresa Operation’ in 1995/ 96 when the LTTE refused to come to the negotiating table and opened fire, it was driven out of Jaffna and pushed to the north eastern sea-board by the armed forces. The success of LTTE’s recent campaign, ‘Unceasing Waves’ is credited to disarray and demoralisation, besides complacency and mismanagement on the part of the Government was the political rivalry and conflict between the ruling PA and the opposition UNP. Notwithstanding all this, once Colombo recollected its political will, the fall of Jaffna which appeared imminent was averted. It is therefore clear that the secret of the LTTE’s prowess lies more in its skill for political manoeuvre than its overall strength and agility on the battlefield”. Colonel R.Hariharan, head of Intelligence of the IPKF in Sri Lanka, has stated as follows in an article published in the Daily News of 6th February 2009, “Its failing fortunes in the present war have pushed the LTTE back to the position in which it was in 1987 – under mortal danger from the SLSF. It was India that rescued the LTTE then. Now that the LTTE is fighting for survival once again, its propaganda machine is asking the people of India to save Tamils in Sri Lanka. -Sri Lanka Guardian