LTTE: missteps, misdeeds, and 33 years later

Interview with Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.

By Udara Soysa

(March 13, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) 1) What do you think the main difference between the operational realities between current Eelam War and the IPKF conducted war against the LTTE?

There is no comparison between the two situations except that we were fighting the same opponent. Indian army was fighting for an objective that was not clear in a foreign country. India's goals had international influence. So it was primarily not a war against the LTTE or Sri Lanka. The war was thrust upon the army by political leadership who could not think through the problem. So our war did not enjoy broad political support in the home country and courted a lot of suspicion in Sri Lanka. In fact, the Indian operation in Sri Lanka became a victim of the political divide among three major political entities - a waning Congress, a rising BJP in league with other opposition groups, and rising regional satraps who had no common agenda on Sri Lanka. It finally led to the establishment coalition politics in New Delhi giving a big clout to the regional parties in national mainstream that continues to this day.

The LTTE was learning its craft, trying out various methods of fighting and survival with nascent conventional capability. It realised the value of Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates to build up its movement as other Tamil militant groups had become political parties. The LTTE also benefitted from Tamils' disappointment when India failed to deliver as per their high expectations. The LTTE also cashed in on the downgrading of Indian influence among Tamils. LTTE was less ambitious and more realistic in those days; and probably listened to international community more intently to win their sympathy.

Military operations were less modern as Indian army did not use air force to its full potential. Similarly Navy was employed purely to support logistics as the LTTE naval wing was in infancy. Considering that our operations were the first ever in a foreign country after independence, they had the hall marks of hasty planning at Army HQ. It was a good learning opportunity for the services as a whole on planning and conduct of operations overseas. Troops at ground level did achieve results over a period of 18 months of intense counter insurgency operations for which they were not primed initially. But politically it left India confused.

2) How do you see the current military balance in Sri Lanka?

I confess I have inadequate inputs on both sides' performance and current status to assess "military balance." It is difficult to assess the military balance between a regular armed force and a insurgent force that has probably lost its conventional capability. As the LTTE is probably revamping itself into unconventional mode we need to see how the SLSF responds to the LTTE in the coming months when LTTE steps up its guerrilla attacks and suicide bombings after the current spell of war is over. But as of now the LTTE appears to be terribly weakened by the SF; the LTTE's future will depend up how the Sri Lanka government regains the trust of Tamil population which is feeling insecure at present.

3) What were the key factors that affects and affected the current military balance ? Can you comment particularly on international, military, political and leadership factors?

This will require a major assessment exercise for which adequate inputs are not available with me. It will take some more time when the background information surfaces. After that only we can evolve a reasonably accurate picture. But few things stand out even now: President Rajapaksa's solid political support to the armed forces, Gen Fonseka's flexible approach to planning and conduct of war while sticking to end goals, and the limitations of international community to influence wars in South Asia when the rulers dig their heels and stand firm. It holds valuable lessons for South Asian nations on national mobilisation for war and its fall out on fundamental freedoms of citizens.

Basically, LTTE failed to strategise on its unconventional strengths by its grandiose dreams of having a conventional capability. Non state actors require national commitment from another country to build a conventional capability. Taml insurgency in Sri Lanka requires at least a neutral India, if not support, to succeed but Prabhakaran burnt his boats when he plotted to kill Rajiv Gandhi. That act hurt India's pride.

4) How do you see the current LTTE strength ?

Inadequate inputs makes the guess hazardous. I wonder whether Prabhakaran himself will have a clear and accurate idea of LTTE strength in numbers as it is in a state of flux. If the body counts are honest, I presume the LTTE strength will be around 3000 cadres dispersed all over; you may add a few hundreds to a thousand in and around their area of control.

5) What was the biggest mistake LTTE did during the current Eelam war?

The LTTE's mistake was made before the war in not correctly assessing the changed mindset of Sri Lanka national and military leadership. Probably, it was difficult becausethe national leadership probably evolved a clear cut vision on future course only after its (unexpected?) military success in the east. So the LTTE was probably lulled into complacency in not reading the dynamic situation.

6) How was your experience in the ground during the IPKF operation times in late 1980's?

Question is not very clear. IPKF experience was not the first war experience for me. From a soldier's point of view all wars are the same. But Sri Lanka experience was the first time I saw the armed forces frustrated as the national leadership palmed off its responsibility to the army to tackle non military issues at which it was a novice. It was the only war where political expediency at the home country and the host country took our army for a ride. I hope our army has become wiser now.

7) Can you comment on Prabhakarans personality and his contributions to the LTTEs augment of power over the decades?

This is the subject for a book which I do not propose to write now. He is still a powerful personality influencing a lot of Tamils - both combatants and non combatants; that is how suicide bombers are still motivated to die to fulfil his command.

8) How do you see the current situation in Eastern Sri Lanka?

Loss of a good opportunity given to the government to show the Tamils that they would be better off in peace and tranquility which are yet to gain a firm foothold in the east. It is a discouragement for Tamil leaders who would like to wholeheartedly join the national mainstream. It reinforces the suspicion of sections of Tamils who doubt the "ulterior motive" of the political leadership in Colombo in waging war.

9) Do you believe that the current war can end within this year? If so, what can Sri Lankans expect after the end of the war?

It will end in its present form and after some time come up perhaps on a much smaller scale in other forms. To determine the time frame for this, much depends on how the leadership on both sides play the scene after the end game.

10) What type of political solution do you think is ideal for Sri Lanka?

No one can really lay down a magic formula. Ideally the right political solution will have to be "owned" by most of the people where they see a part of their aspirations are met and one which has the largest chances of ushering in peace. Considering this, adequate ldevolution of powers (I know it is a bad word for some Sri Lanka politicians) to the provinces will be a good idea where people not only pay taxes but also have a say in the development of their own areas. And it can do with a less visible presence of the military. -Sri Lanka Guardian