Kamikaze attacks by Black Air Tigers and after

By Commodore R. S. Vasan

(March 06, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) For quite some time the limited air assets of LTTE have been in the news and did create a sensation quite disproportionate to their capabilities. The full details of the Tiger air force and the Czechoslovakian aircraft Zlin 143 and its implications have been discussed in detail in an earlier article by me published on 03 Jun 2005 (External Link). This paper may be read along with the analysis of Mr. B Raman who has covered the air aspects of the recent air attacks in a detailed analysis.

When one looks at the track record of the guerilla air force, while there have been many attempted air attacks, the coordinated ground and air attack on Anuradhapura Air base in the wee hours of 22nd October 2007 stands out for its success in destroying SL aircraft and helicopters on ground. The recent attack at night by a pair of aircraft on February 20, 2009 targeting the SLAF buildings, but hitting the Internal Revenue building with out achieving anything of substance created a lot of media hype. In the past, the LTTE was able to draw a lot of attention to itself and its fledgling guerilla air force with its attacks mostly at night, using improvised weapon release systems, GPS and other aids at extended ranges operating from dispersed Runway strips in the LTTE held territory. In the recent failed attacks, wide publicity was given by the pro LTTE nets to the Black Air Tigers who belonged to the tribe of suicide bombers whose desperate kamikaze attacks inspired by the actions of Mohammed Atta and his friends who carried out a devastating attack on the WTC using hijacked commercial aircraft on September 11, 2001. It was noteworthy that this attack was launched from the shrinking LTTE territory despite the SL Army having already overrun defences to take control of the six to seven airstrips used by the LTTE earlier.

The photograph of the two pilots who perished in the attack namely Colonel Rooban and Lt Colonel Siriththiran along with Prabhakaran was released to the media by the LTTE. It is an established custom in the LTTE for those on suicide mission to have the last supper with the leader and to seek his blessings before setting out on a suicide mission.

On 02 March 09 in another part of the world, at Toronto, floral tributes were paid by the pro LTTE Tamils who considered the suicide attacks as heroic acts accomplished by the first martyrs from the black air tigers. However, a spokesman for the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, from Canada called the event "deeply disturbing. Without reservation, without hesitation we condemn the glorification of terrorists like the Tamil Tigers,"

One could only feel sad at such wasteful loss of such dedicated committed skilled pilots who achieved only limited objectives. Unlike the huge commercial jets used by the Al Queda sponsored terrorists, the Zlin 143 could carry very limited explosives/bombs and unspent fuel. It was reported that each aircraft was loaded with 200 kgs of explosives which did not detonate at least in one aircraft. After the prolonged sortie from Puthukudiyirippu the amount of fuel left was not enough by itself to cause incendiary damage. If the aircraft had succeeded in crashing in to the Air Force building as planned and had exploded along with the explosives and bombs, the loss of lives and property would have been immense. More importantly, it would have demoralized the planning sections of the SL Air force and temporarily impaired the efficiency of the team. The success would have given a fillip to the LTTE (and its supporters) which was fighting with its back to the wall.

While the LTTE tried to make out the attacks, on a near moonless night, as a successful one; from the analysis of the photograph of one of the aircraft and the debris it is clear that it was shot down prior to a controlled crash in to the chosen building. The body of the pilot was also in tact. The failure is also due to a better state of preparedness and pre warning received by the Air Defence in and around Colombo.

The intention to bomb the air force headquarters located on Slave Island is quite understandable as it is the SL Air force that has caused immense misery to the LTTE both on land and in the surrounding seas. The attacks therefore were so planned to neutralize the air superiority enjoyed by the SLAF. The attack in this area killed two and injured 45 personnel. The combined air/ground attack on the Anuradhapura air base in 2007 was meant to destroy the SL air assets which carried out attacks on LTTE targets at will. This action was combined with ground action by the commandos.

The LTTE today has nothing much left in its inventory to take on the might of the SL Air Force. The efforts to procure anti aircraft missiles and other ammunition have failed due to the increased surveillance of such dealings by International intelligence agencies. The sinking of the LTTE vessels, possibly carrying replenishments from far off locations, even in high seas has prevented the LTTE from acquiring a retaliatory capability from sources abroad.

Of all the terrorist organizations in the world, LTTE perhaps is the only organization that has assiduously tried to build up a capability in all the three dimensions to provide a cutting edge advantage to its guerilla forces. In addition, the pictures of the aircraft repair yard, however elementary, indicate that the LTTE worked to a plan to build, maintain and operate its own inventory. The captured facility had drawings from Popular Science journal and other reference books on which the LTTE engineers were working. There were lathes and many machines to fabricate alluminium alloy/metal sheets as per directions in the simple ‘do it yourself ‘books. The photographs released by the SL military www.army.lk shows tell tale signs of even some efforts to build helicopters.

Figure 1- Drawings for making aircraft

Figure 2- Reference Books

If the conflict in the Island had driven many Sri Lankan Tamils to far off countries both to pursue livelihood as well as to avoid persecution in their own land, it also added to the collective strength and potential of this community in supporting the LTTE. It is acknowledged, that many innovations by the group owes its success to the support from the diaspora with access to better tools, literature, technology and funds.

The available pictures of a crude underwater vehicle built in their own yards bears testimony to the ingenuity of the LTTE which tried to even build their own submersibles. The ostentatious purpose was dual in nature. While it could be used to smuggle essential military hard ware/drugs it could be used for attacks on SL Navy targets. Media reports on 05 Mar 09 also carried reports of efforts of the LTTE to have ten feet rockets that could be fired up to 300 meters with 200kg of explosives. So it is clear that LTTE used all means to equip itself, even indulged in some in-house R&D to take on the SL armed might with a great degree of ingenuity.

Figure 3- Submersible?

Figure 4- Submersible

That the LTTE was able to scout for modern weapons and military hardware to be used against the state through its international contacts by using the Sri Lankan Tamils has never been in doubt. This was in addition to getting arms and ammunition through clandestine means and through established contacts with other terrorist organizations. The LTTE perhaps would have become the most modern dreaded terrorist force in the world with access to high end technology and hardware but for the global reaction post 9/11. The attack on WTC brought about a paradigm shift in the way that other countries, notably the West responded to the activities of terrorist organizations irrespective of their geographic location. The proscription by 32 countries put LTTE on the hit list of suspect organizations thereby inviting greater scrutiny.

With out the ability to lay its hands on the most needed Surface to Air missiles/anti aircraft weaponry, with its ambitious programme to build submarines having been scuttled, having lost the airstrips in the progressively shrinking territory, with heavy attrition of aircraft ,ships, manpower and international support for its cause, the LTTE has no options left. The ‘do or die’ approach which many feel is to be expected, will only claim more lives on both sides with no end in sight. .

(The author is presently the Head, Strategy and Security Studies at the Center for Asia Studies at Chennai and can be contacted at rsvasan2010@gmail.com)

-Sri Lanka Guardian