What Really Happened at the 2005 Presidential Election?

By Thomas Johnpulle

(February 24, London, Sri Lanka Guardian) Facts and figures don’t add up with the oft claimed allegation about the 2005 Presidential Election. According to this widespread claim LTTE ordered Tamils not to vote and Ranil being their obvious choice, lost as a result. A hardliner instead assumed office and plotted the downfall of the LTTE. Although Ranil’s docility is blamed for his downfall, it does not fully explain the stakes of the LTTE. It is essential to look at past Presidential Elections in sorting out this riddle. Also it is important to look at the voting pattern of people, especially in the north and the east. Being the oldest democracy in Asia, Sri Lankans know only too well their decision making power through elections. Apart from the published outcome of an election, an election sends out many more messages.

Presidential election verses General election

A Presidential election is different to a General election. The choice is only two fold at a Presidential Election and this reduces people’s interest to an extent. This has a remarkable impact in the north and the east where voters are severely polarised based on ethnicity. In the north-east Tamil voters would generally vote for Tamil candidates and Sinhala voters will only vote for Sinhala candidates. This same trend is there among the Muslims too. This can be practiced at a General Election but not at a Presidential Election because there was no instance when either of the two main candidates was a Tamil or a Muslim. However, Muslims have integrated well within the two main political parties and they don’t mind a Sinhala candidate.

This was enforced on Tamils since 1931 without a break by successive Tamil political parties. All major political parties that won the Tamil vote in the north and the east were Tamil parties with Tamil demands, fielding Tamil candidates. However, at a Presidential Election, the contest is between two Sinhala from the two main parties. As a result in all Presidential Elections, Tamil majority areas in the north and the east have shown tepid interest. This also means a Presidential Election must only be compared against another Presidential Election, not a General Election.

Total valid votes for non-Tamil candidates at Presidential elections as a percentage of total registered voters.

Source: Department of Elections, Sri Lanka. Ampara (Digamadula) district is not included in the analysis as Tamils are not the majority there.

In all Presidential Elections in the post 1983 era (where no Tamil candidates contested), Vanni and Trincomalee recorded the highest voters’ turnout at the 2005 election! In contrast Batticaloa and Jaffna recorded the lowest turnout.

The facts are, most Tamils in the north and the east didn’t vote at Presidential Elections after 1983 to different degrees. It is not something unique to the 2005 Presidential election.

The ability of the LTTE to restrict voters

Voters of Sri Lanka were restricted by violence most notably at the 1989 Presidential Election by the JVP. Areas with high JVP activity saw a dismal voter turnout. People were gunned down for voting and JVP issued a specific threat to voters not to vote and that the first to vote in certain polling booths would be shot. Unfortunately they did enforce it. LTTE on the other hand did nothing of the sort at the 2005 Presidential Election. On the contrary, it allowed people to move freely if they wanted to. Election violence was committed by the supporters of both major parties in electorates in the “south”. In comparison the “north” was completely peaceful.

The only deterrence LTTE made was by way of propaganda equating both major candidates. All the candidates were Sinhalese.

Apart from the Vanni election district, the vast majority of voters were in government controlled areas in the districts of Jaffna, Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Ampara. LTTE’s ability to restrict them was minimal and there is no recorded attempt of stopping the voters.

Voters’ turnout at the 2005 Presidential Election, Jaffna district.

Source: Department of Elections, Sri Lanka. Mostly LTTE controlled electorates included Kilinochchi, Chavakachcheri and Point Padro.

It is clearly visible from the above, the interest of voters in government controlled areas, although 1.63% higher than in LTTE controlled areas, was unenthusiastic. Without a doubt, it was not LTTE’s influence that kept voters away. It was something else.

Out of 250,386 registered voters in Vanni only 100,492 voters were in LTTE controlled areas (source: Tamilnet). Out of this 65,504 voters were in LTTE controlled areas in Mulaitivu. If the total district vote is taken as representative, the electorate vote can well be representative as well. In the past three consecutive elections SLFP led parties have won Mulaitivu.

Therefore if extrapolations are done for other electorates based on the pattern, the same would apply to the second largest electorate under the LTTE - Mulaitivu with a different outcome. The assumption people in the north would mainly vote for the UNP shatters.

Interestingly Vanni election district recorded its highest ever turnout at a Presidential Election after 1983 in 2005. This includes people who travelled to government controlled areas to vote from LTTE controlled areas. Though only a handful, no recorded attempt was made by the LTTE to block them. In contrast the government did block these voters at the 2001 General Election which act was severely condemned by the LTTE!

The conduct of persons close to the LTTE and other events

The conduct of persons close to the LTTE was quite the opposite of what one would expect from them if they were supporting an election boycott. They were working overtime! Without any disrespect, MPs Mano Ganesan, Rauf Hakeem and P Chandrasekaran were at the forefront of supporting political activities with the LTTE. They all had MoUs with the LTTE by that time. All of them did their utmost in getting voters to vote for the UNP and it didn’t antagonise the LTTE at all. In fact some of them visited LTTE leaders even without any problem during their very busy schedule before and after the election! Not even a warning was made to them by the LTTE. The same LTTE that boasted that Pirapaharan is the President and the Prime Minister of the Tamil people and screamed about its sole representative claim did nothing to disapprove otherwise.

These Tamil majority electorates outside the north-east showed higher enthusiasm in 2005 than previous Presidential elections. LTTE could have easily got them boycott the election through its supporters who commanded Tamil voters in these electorates. But no attempt whatsoever was made. In fact a prominent media institution that is alleged to be the mouthpiece of the LTTE was also working overtime to promote a particular Sinhala candidate.

On the other hand the LTTE killed the then Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar just two months before the election. Had he survived, he would have been a very powerful factor in swinging votes in favour of the UPFA candidate.

These events clearly show that LTTE was far from indifferent at the 2005 Presidential election. None of these highly significant events can be explained by the theory that propagates that LTTE wanted Tamils to boycott the election.

Interestingly, the UPFA candidate skipped the vital last day election meeting citing LTTE threats. The importance of the last day, last hour canvassing is evident from the effort campaigners put to it. It is seen as the climax of the campaign and often leads to predictions of the outcome of the election. Therefore the UPFA candidate wouldn’t have given it up for bogus reasons.

Karuna Amman’s conduct was also significant. He vowed to retaliate if the LTTE tried to stuff ballot boxes in favour of the UNP. Had this happened, it would have led to a worldwide mockery of the Tamil Elam struggle where two senior LTTE leaders doing their best to promote rival Sinhala politicians at an election!

Just a few days to the election, a group of UNP high rankers held a press briefing in Kandy. They highlighted what UNP governments have done against the LTTE and compared it against the then current UPFA government. This was a move by them to gain Sinhala hardliners’ support at the expense of the LTTE. Interestingly all the members of this group crossed over to the UPFA side a few months after the election! They were decorated with important ministries. A popular Buddhist monk parliamentarian from the hardline JHU crossed to the UNP and it further restricted UNP’s appeal among the north-east Tamils.

What More Ranil Had for Tamil Voters in war prone areas?

Nothing! His colourful promises had unfortunately exhausted by 2005. Although a ceasefire was declared in 2002, most Tamils living in the north-east felt it is far from the resolution of the problem. While Ranil’s government failed to come up with any proposal, it backed down from peace talks by not discussing the only available proposal – the ISGA proposal by the LTTE. Further, Ranil has gone in the reverse gear from 1999 to 2005. In 1999 he said he would unconditionally handover the north-east to the LTTE for two years but by 2005 he was clinging onto Chandrika’s 1999 promise of an unspecified “united-Sri Lanka” solution which was overwhelmingly rejected by the Tamil people. Tamils, especially living in the north-east were not concerned about a Sri Lankan solution; they were concerned about a solution for the LTTE.

This is not to say Mahinda had anything for them. He offered nothing significant compared to at least diminishing offerings by Ranil. Maximum devolution within a unitary state and a united country with no provision for an independent Tamil nation meant the same thing for Tamils in the north-east. They knew both meant the same thing – LTTE’s displeasure and hence eventual war. What LTTE wanted to stop violence altogether was a solution for Tamil Elam not for Sri Lanka. Don’t give them that and there will be war. It doesn’t matter the war would be against a unitary Sri Lanka or a united Sri Lanka. Tamil people living in the north and the east were completely aware of this fact although Tamils living outside the north-east paid scant regard to it. Therefore the former had no reason to prefer one candidate over the other.

Warning signs disregarded

LTTE has shown that it has no long terms friends or enemies. In 1989 it welcomed President Premadasa’s gestures until the IPKF was sent back, then got back to violence. In 1994 LTTE promoted Chandrika over her rival violently and escaped the wrath of both President Wijetunga and the possibility of another strong president in Dissanayake. It tried the same tactic in 1999 by trying to eliminate Chandrika in favour of Ranil. However, Chandrika made amends with the LTTE soon and even went to the extent of sharing tsunami aid with it. So long as it helps LTTE survive and prosper, it doesn’t mind any bedfellow. However, by 2004 LTTE had established itself as the de facto ruler of most part of the north-east and was consolidating its position politically. It wanted to grab all the seats from Tamil areas in the north-east and demanded that the UNP doesn’t field Tamil candidates. UNP’s Batticaloa candidates were killed and threatened by the LTTE while the popular candidate from Jaffna was forced to contest from Colombo. After a rigged election in the north and the east, LTTE almost managed to get what it was after.

The 2004 TNA victory in the north-east was clearly at the expense of the UNP. This was a clear warning by the LTTE to the UNP that it no longer required the services of the latter.

Source: Department of Elections, Sri Lanka. Although parties like SLMC and EPDP also play a part in these districts, they were factionalised by the time of the 2005 election.

However, Ranil refused to learn the lesson and pinned his hopes on the TNA vote bank again to give him the edge at the 2005 Presidential election.

UPFA’s Dilemma

UPFA was not without problems. The clash between Chandrika and Mahinda had become open and direct. As the leader and the perceived owner of the SLFP, she appointed all her loyalists as electorate organisers. A number of them were not supportive of Mahinda. Other than in a few districts in the south, the UPFA couldn’t get the aggregate of SLFP and JVP votes. Gampaha district that used to perform best among all districts for the SLFP was hopelessly low in votes due to the strong support for Chandrika. This severe infighting led to a razor thin victory margin for the UPFA which was unexpectedly low although the overall outcome was widely expected. The UPFA campaign didn’t concentrate on Tamil votes very much and no attempt was made to capitalise on the conflicts upcountry Tamil parties had amongst each other. Conversely, they didn’t even try to spoil the support UNP was getting from Tamils. However, had the LTTE manifested its desire to support the UNP candidate before the election, UPFA would have surely countered it.

Although Ranil is blamed for weak leadership there is no guarantee that he would not have waged a war with the LTTE albeit a successful war. The conduct during premiership is no guide to how one would behave after assuming the high office of the President. Except for Wijetunga, all the other former Prime Ministers showed a marked difference after becoming the President, to say the least. Besides, there was no significant drop in defence expenditure in 2002 or 2003 and heavy investments went on to strengthen SLN patrol crafts, rapidly increase multi-rocket launchers, train locals to pilot all SLAF crafts and it also allowed the economy to recover and grow for tougher times ahead. Though not fact checked, according to own admissions by UNP seniors, they also plotted Karuna’s defection which later became very handy for the military. The Minister in charge of the “peace” process in Ranil’s government also procured warships!

LTTE’s strategic blunder was its uncompromising stand. Had it been flexible when a specific solution was drafted and offered by the Chandrika administration, it may have evaded the wrath of the people. Then it would have been a matter of building up from there. By the time it came to Ranil it was too late and he had no specific solution while he refused to discuss LTTE’s specific proposals. The absence of war and international monitoring meant Ranil could afford to do it. History will have it that the last set of political proposals the LTTE received would be the political package of 2000. For nine years it was not offered any specific ‘solution’ and it may not survive politically to see another.

So Mahinda won and Ranil lost. But most analysts have failed to see the third outcome of the election. Some of them stubbornly refuse to admit it. Some others use it to throw mud at their political rivals. It is not about Ranil or Mahinda but the people; Tamil people of the north-east who always refused UNP-SLFP presidential election candidates. People willingly abstained from voting because none of the candidates offered anything that would solve their day to day problems in the long run. In Jaffna and Vanni this percentage far outweighed the votes of each and every candidate! As long as this fact is evaded as politicians did evade it ever since, they cannot expect any noteworthy support from the people. It may not affect the battle between UNP and SLFP, but it surely affects the country. Government’s much talked about democratisation process must cover these forgotten people (their un-cast votes) and their unheard decisions made loud and clear at crucial elections ever since 1982.

-Sri Lanka Guardian