Emerging Issues in Managing Counter Terrorist Operations

By Col. R. Hariharan

(February 23, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) India had been fighting extremism, militancy and insurgency of many kinds ever since it became an independent nation in 1947. India had been at the receiving end of trans-national terrorism for many decades now. However, in the past the world had sidelined it as part of India's disputes with its neighbours. But after 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in New York, this attitude changed with the recognition of Pakistan as the homebase of Jihadi terrorism.

It was only after 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India was recognised as one of the frontline states facing the threat of global terrorism. Now terrorism has become a major national security concern as demonstrated in the national impact created by the 26/11 terrorist raids. In this attack less than a dozen terrorists infiltrating from Pakistan demonstrated their awesome power by holding one of the largest cities of the world to ransom for three days!

Terrorism is now reckoned as an added dimension in international security calculus particularly since the U.S sponsored global war on terror was unleashed after the 9/11 terror strikes. Security and Law Enforcement Agencies (SLEA) have to fully understand contemporary terrorism and tailor their approach to tackle it successfully. In their response to the gloablisation of terrorism, the states tolerance levels against other forms of anti-state activities have also undergone a change after. Thus the state's stance has hardened after discovering seamless connectivity between some of the terrorist groups and other types of non-state actors.

Profile of contemporary terrorism

The 9/11 strike, the attack on Marriott Hotel in Pakistan and the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks have shown the modern terrorists in action. In these attacks the terrorists have shown a penchant for meticulous planning and execution, using tools of modern technology. The modern terrorist belongs to a different genre than his predecessors 30 years back. Contemporary terrorism is increasingly getting a global profile though its roots continue to be local.

Global networking: Al Qaeda and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have demonstrated two different models of global networking. While Jihadi terrorists operate on a loose affiliation of like minded groups inspired by religious extremism across many continents, the LTTE uses ethnic identity as the tool to build its network among expatriate Tamils. They operate on a global scale using dedicated and indoctrinated locals networked in many countries to gain access to political support, finance, arms and technical expertise across the globe.

Multiple dimensions: The modern terrorist organisation operates on many dimensions. It uses legitimate business as a cover to finance terrorist operations. Traditional hawala channels of illegal money transfer have been refined to organise fund flow from abroad. Front organisations involved in legitimate business or social work have been used as part of an integrated strategy to build tentacles of the organisation in many countries. Local criminal networks, narcotic gangs, illegal arms traders and human traffickers are often used to assist terrorist operations. Corrupt local officials are also used to provide critical support to these anti-state organisations.

Global propaganda war: Global TV and web networks provide a wide field for the terrorist to propagate his cause and make exaggerated claims of success. And this comes free of cost in most of the cases as media channels compete for news. At the same time, terrorist organizations also wage psychological warfare in the target country against the state and its security forces by denigrating them through well-planted news stories in local and inter-national media. Thus killing of a terrorist in an encounter is often branded as murder. Often, the local politicians for their own selfish interest play into the hands of terrorists by supporting such 'causes.'

Out of the box thinking: The modern terrorist is fairly well educated and fully aware of the implications of his actions unlike his predecessors two decades ago. He has the ability to think out of the box in selecting targets, choice of countries and methods of operation. He uses access to information available in free societies to assist his planning and execution of operation. Religious freedom and freedom of expression prevalent in democracies are fully exploited to propagate terrorist ideology through religious schools and places of worship.

Technology orientation: The modern terrorist is tech-savvy. Mobile phone has replaced cumbersome clandestine radio sets as the mode of communication.. They are used not only to communicate, but also trigger terrorist action from remote locations. The Internet is his real time communication mode. He uses modern high power explosives and does not hesitate to improvise them when the need arises. Knowledge resources available in the web are a boon to him. His international networking helps him access to technology solutions to problems in planning and execution.

Changing social expectations

Just as the terrorist profile has changed, social expectations from the SLEA have also undergone changes. Growing literacy and urbanisation have resulted in greater public awareness of happenings around the world. Civil society is also spreading awareness of human rights and fundamental freedoms among citizens more than ever before.

As a result there is a greater demand for accountability from the SLEA in carrying out operations against non-state actors. The Right to Information Act (RTI) is in force now. Though it is not yet in full bloom, in the coming years RTI is likely to lead to a more open society with greater transparency in official action. In keeping with this trend the demand for conformity of official actions to laws of the land is likely to become the order of the day soon.

With the insidious influence of politics becoming an external force affecting performance of internal security agencies, actions of SLEA have to be very carefully planned to avoid drawing flak from public and politicians in addition to achieving results. As SLEA operations are now performed under the full glare of media and public scrutiny, they have unwittingly become ingredients that influence operational results. Unfortunately, the SLEA have not been paying adequate attention to some of these "soft issues" that indirectly impact operational results. The soft issues include human rights, media management, and interface with population. These issues have often clouded the operational decision making and execution process affecting the final results. Time and again weaknesses of the SLEA in these issues have been exploited by terrorists to their advantage. The SLEA have no choice but to evolve strategies to enable them to turn such "soft issues" issues as a positive value addition to augment operational effectiveness.

SOFT ISSUES

Human rights

Emergency situations brought about by operations against non state actors often cramp citizens normal life; frequently their basic democratic and civil rights are also curtailed under special laws enacted to tackle terrorism. Typically, in such environments the citizens' right to assemble or move freely, express their opinion on banned organisations, and indulging in democratic forms of protest like strikes and agitations to rally public opinion run the risk of attracting police action. Generally, well informed public accept such restrictions for reasonable period as essential part of the State's response to terrorist acts. However they expect the SLEA to conform to the laws and not exceed powers conferred on them.

However, in an environment where extremists are operating there is an erosion of public trust and credibility in the State. Particularly in communally or ethnically charged atmosphere, violations of human rights by the SLEA gain disproportionately high negative publicity even though people may ignore such aberrations of terrorist outfits.

The men in uniform coming from rural areas are often unaware of the rights of citizens because they themselves have not enjoyed such rights. So misuse of such powers conferred on them under laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 2008 (UAPA), the National Security Act (NSA) of 1980, or the Maharashtra Control Of Organised Crime Act of 1999 (MCOCA) is possible.

Human rights have become a global concern with international watchdogs like the Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) monitoring it all over the globe. Their reports wield considerable influence in the western world particularly in the EU countries and the U.S. The UN also has its own bodies to monitor human rights among its member states. Human rights lobbies influence government policy making in many countries. As Human Rights awareness increases, it will increasingly affect executive actions of governments in many ways.

Security forces the world over are increasingly becoming aware of the importance of human rights issues. Though SLEA are taking tentative measures to tone up the system, still there are a number of functional issues. The main problem of security forces is lack of sensitivity to the dynamics of human rights in operations. Much of the misuse of anti-terrorism laws is due to political compulsions and brutalisation of police forces. However, an important factor in misuse of the special powers is due to indifference of SLEA in disciplining their own ranks. The SLEA leadership itself has to set a role model in adhering to such norms for subordinates to follow. In fact, handling human rights issue should become as a part of standard operative procedure. Then only the rank and file will take human rights issues seriously. Any violation of human rights should be handled through the due process of law and not be condoned as a routine. There is a need for self accountability and transparency in handling such cases.

Media management

Counter terrorism operations are also wars to win hearts and minds of the people. Modern tools of interactive media have made news coverage an important mode of reaching the public and influencing their opinion. At the same time, news channels are in a highly competitive business to gain viewership. Though majority of the media is supportive of the State effort, competition among them often results in spread of half baked and sensational information. There are also inherent risks of compromise of security of operations through investigative and sting operational stories put out by media. There is a need for the SLEA to balance security requirements with the information needs of the public and media.

Empowerment of commanders to directly communicate with the media can also be counterproductive as many SLEA commanders lack adequate formal training on public communication.

Ideally the media should be turned into an ally of the State and the security forces. To achieve this the SLEA have to plan and develop media strategies in tune with the operational environment. Hostile media is a tool that is often used by non state actors to indirectly project their cause. The SLEA should be prepared to handle hostile media as well as scoop artists. The best strategy is to provide adequate facilities to the media to access real time information, within the constraints of security. However, this is not always possible if State policy imposes restrictions for political reasons.

In such cases SLEA out of frustration often use extra legal methods to handle hostile media; such acts are bound to damage their case further. The troops in field must be fully made aware of the risk in such high handed behaviour. Prosecuting or proscribing hostile media is an extreme step that should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances as it invariably increases negative publicity. So it has to be used cautiously in extreme cases only. Cultivating a friendly press over the long term requires a level of openness in providing regular information and access to media through well trained media communicators. This has to be ingrained in culture of troops public conduct. However, these actions have to be part of an overall strategy rather than a reactive knee jerk response. Everyone must be impressed that a friendly media is worth a hundred military victories in winning the trust of the people.

Interface with the public

Population living in areas of civil strife face enormous problems in their daily life. Deterioration or absence of public services and stilted functioning of government agencies are the norm rather than exception in such areas. As a result, there is no viable government mechanism to handle public grievances i such areas. Invariably there is no rule of law and this further erodes the credibility of the government machinery. The non state actors exploit such a situation to build their grass root support. It also helps them to collect funds and enlist recruits. This enables them to assert their power posing as true agents of deliverance.

In such an environment the SLEA are the only visible manifestation of government. Already disillusioned with the government machinery's performance, the public see the SLEA as agents of a non-effective and corrupt system. This can be seen in Naxalite dominated areas in Chattisgarh and Jharkand. Wherever the SLEA has been able to project a positive image, they have achieved lasting success in these areas. Creation of a people-friendly mental attitude among the troops has to be reflected in all their actions. A structured public interface to handle grievances provides a key value addition to operational success. To be effective, the grievance system should also provide a feedback to the users on follow up action taken. Involvement of public volunteers and NGOs in such endeavours will increase its credibility.

The public services are usually dislocated in areas where militancy and extremism are active. In order to improve relations with the people, the SLEA public grievance system should also interface with public services like public health, power and water supply, and civil supplies and work closely with them to attend to public complaints speedily. Attaching representatives of public service agencies with the grievance system can be useful in improving the overall credibility of the force.

OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The SLEA operational leadership is geared only to handling issues related to the basic role of the agency involved. While the time tested, traditional training methods and processes have their own merits, the SLEA leadership has to adapt the methodology to effectively handle contemporary terrorism. Situational leadership style is required to tackle terrorists; essential skill sets for commanders and leaders in the field include clear communication style, team operation, structured operational planning and problem solving methodology, and an understanding of modern communication tools. More than all this the leader is required to build a learning organisation of his command.

Though some of the focus areas of leadership might be appointment and organisation specific, there are core elements common to all. These include flexibility of approach, adaptability, brainstorming for solutions to difficult problems, and learning from each operation. The leaders have to keep abreast of current developments in the terrorism scene they are operating in. There is no short cut to periodic orientation courses specifically designed for forces at various levels to understand lessons learnt in earlier operations carried out and techniques adopted in them. . This will require a culture which encourages the leadership ability to analyse and assess situations and take quick follow up actions.

SLEA need to modernise their mindset on using modern technology tools. Unless this is becomes part of the training at recruits level the forces will resist use of new technology tools to improve operational performance. Databases on terrorists and their allies need to be created on a real time basis and used for drawing useful assessments. These databases should be networked both nationally and globally. As these are now being created, the SLEA officers even at junior levels need to be trained on their use.

The 26/11 Mumbai terror raids have amply demonstrated lack of networking among the SLEA. Bureaucratic structuring of command and control systems, inter-ministerial/ departmental jealousies at the state and central level, and ego conflicts between agencies and their leaders are some of the biggest obstacles to effective net-working. Official measures alone cannot bring about improvement in this situation unless there is a conscious effort among leaders at various levels to do so. Such interactions need to be encouraged through informal networking techniques apart from adopting a structured system of follow up action taken on information in the pipeline.

CONCLUSION

A new breed of terrorists who believe in using religious faith as a vehicle to usurp the political process through violent means have become a major security threat. The modern terrorists are networked globally. This has enabled them to procure modern weapons and tools of terrorism. They have also globally gained access to finance, information and expert manpower required to carryout their tasks. They fully exploit the modern means of communication to carry out their operations as well as propaganda. Other non-state actors also tend to copy some of the methods used by terrorists in their actions. Thus there is a risk of this culture encouraging overall national security cannot be under estimated.

The SLEA has to understand the increasing expectations of society. There is greater public consciousness of their rights to good governance. This requires greater accountability of official action at all levels.

There are a number of leadership challenges in operating against terrorism. In order to meet the current needs, the SLEA need to relearn the leadership style, techniques and methodologies. Training of the rank and file need to be oriented for effective use of modern technology tools. To improve their overall performance, SLEA need to not only cooperate and coordinate their operations, but also learn to counter terrorist propaganda and progressively project a positive public friendly image. This can be achieved if only a user friendly public interface is built up to change people's mindset.

(Extracts of this article were included in a presentation made a course of senior officers of the BSF at the Indian Institute of Management, Indore on February 14, 2009)

-Sri Lanka Guardian