Most of the LTTE’s senior military commanders have been moved to the eastern part of the Wanni region. What are the LTTE's most experienced and senior commanders who taught war tactics and strategy doing in a remote part of eastern Wanni?_______________
by Arush from Wales for Sri Lanka Guardian
(January 05, London, Sri Lanka Guardian) The politically motivated Sri Lankan military was occupied Killinochchi town on 2nd of January. This is due to the biggest ever offensive operation launched by the Sri Lankan armed forces called as "Wanni Operation"; this operation had started in February 2007 and not yet come to an end but dragging on for more than 23 months. However, Killinochchi was vacated by LTTE few days ago and LTTE shift their fighters and heavy weapons to further north east.
In south many towns, crackers were lit and the national flag was hoisted in public places. In Colombo, breaking news on TV, radio and even SMS messages had set the stage earlier. The burst of crackers surpassed the crescendo created by fireworks that signalled the dawn of 2009.
The fall of Kilinochchi is not a new in Eelam wars; it was captured by the army during the third phase of Operation Sath Jaya in September 1996. However, it fell back into LTTE hands in September 1998 when they launched Operation Unceasing Waves II.
So why these din of fire works and so and so…..?
The big fire works and nation wide celebrations come ahead of elections for the Provincial Council for the North Central and Central provinces on February 14. The Opposition and Government are now gearing for forthcoming elections to the provincial councils. And it is to be expected that while the Opposition will rest its case on the ' cost-of-living ', the Government is going to rely entirely on the 'war on Tamils'. Further more, Mahinda was also confronted with political problems at home, from the war victories the Sri Lankan government is trying to stabilize their political grip in South. These are the hidden plans concealed in this celebration.
Sinhala youths graveyard
For the Killinochchi battles SLA lost several hundreds of soldier’s lives in Eelam war III and IV. The casualties occurred during the confrontations in Paranthan and Kilinochchi areas are as follows:
September 1996 (Operation Sathjaya): After the Mullaithivu debacle SLA planned for another offensive to surprise the Mullaithivu defeat in south. The SLA launched Operation 'Sath Jaya', which was carried out in three stages over 70 days, after advancing 12 km and capturing Killinochchi Town, it was halted. During 'Sath Jaya' operation, more than 500 soldiers were killed and several hundreds were injured.
February 1998 LTTE Counter offensive: The government claimed that the more than 100 soldiers Killed, with 41 bodies handed over by the ICRC and more than hundreds wounded.
September 1998 (Operation Unceasing Waves II): The LTTE captured Kilinochchi (54-3 Brigade home) on 29 September and according to the government figures losses totalled 975 soldiers Killed, with 674 bodies handed over by the ICRC and more than 500 wounded. However, the Leader of the Opposition, Ranil Wickremasinghe, rose to open debate in Parliament. He declared that 1500 were killed in action, 2000 more were wounded and a further 100 were missing in action.
Aug 2008 - Jan 2009 Counter offensive: According to the government figures, that more than 500 were killed in action, 1500 more were wounded and handful amount of soldiers were missing in action.
After Operation Unceasing Waves II the Sri Lanka's opposition (UNP) MP late Mr. Ronnie De Mel, speaking on the extension of the island wide emergency in the parliament on October 1998, said that the debacle of the Sri Lankan army in Kilinochchi is the greatest defeat suffered by the Sinhalese in history after the conquest of Anuradhapura by the Cholas. Again Sinhala youths (SLA) were entered into their graveyard to satisfy their political leader’s aspirations.
Why it is great defeat?
In 1998 Killinochchi battle, the LTTE had destroyed the Srilankan army’s military assets in terms of man and materials, there is a real victory that breaks the enemy's will to fight and/or destroy off his/her military assets.
But in 2008, the din of fire crackers that greeted the capture of Killinochci drowned a lone voice that urged the south to consider the fact that the LTTE had withdrawn from Killinochchi with all its military assets and that there is no victory in war unless one breaks the enemy's will to fight and/or destroy a significant part off his/her military assets.
The LTTE had a long experience about the offensive manoeuvres of the Sri Lankan forces from previous battles. On the basis of such experiences they preserved their military asserts for future offensive and defensive strategies.
The head of the LTTE Political Wing, Balasingham Nadesan told the media last week of December that the fall of Kilinochchi would not make any difference since it was another place. The LTTE fighters were vacated from Killinochchi few days before the army arrived after the order came from the LTTE headquarters.
This largest military offensive ever undertaken by the Sri Lankan armed forces aimed precisely at causing critical damage to the LTTE's military assets but which was failed. Why didn't Pirapakaran press the advantage in Killinochchi?
What is the larger picture in Prabaharan mind?
In early part of this decade, the senior commander of the LTTE who was coordinate the artillery units in Op. Jaya Sikurui in the latter part, Colonel Raju told that he had often urged Velupillai Pirapaharan that the Tigers should unleash their recently enhanced artillery and heavy mortar firepower to stop the advance of the Sri Lanka army.
"Every time I asked him he told me to wait, that he would tell me when and where to strike with the big guns. Let them spread out, he would say. But we were worried that the army was getting too close to Mullaithivu. Then one day he called me to headquarters and showed me a point on the map. He gave me a time frame and asked me to make preparations for a concentrated attack there.
When we overran that point, the gains of Op. Jaya Sikurui started falling like nine pins. But again when we were on the verge of sweeping over all of Manal Aaru (Weli Oya) we got orders from headquarters to stop. The LTTE fighters were a bit surprised at this. He and the fellows at the military science division were always studying the larger picture" Later, it was proved in Elephant pass and Wanni battles?
What is the larger picture for now? No body know but this is the million dollar question for every one mind.
Military strategy
According to the military strategy, the SLA has planned to induct seven army Divisions- 57 and 59 Divisions and Task Force 1(Div.58), 2, 3, 4 and 5, which altogether have 100 battalions and 50,000 troops in the final thrust. The seven divisions will launch a coordinate attack in Mullaitivu. In the north two offensive divisions (Div. 53 and 55) are station in the 12 km long Killali – Mukamalai – Nagargovil axis.
But before the Killinochchi fall, the LTTE was successfully tested their counter offensive and offensive capabilities in several fronts. In Iranaimadu, Paranthan, Adampan, Chilawaththai battles shows that the small elite groups of LTTE fighters can make disaster in politically motivated army.
The current battles the SLA has lost the conventional fighting skills at an LTTE in open combat due to three years of small group (Special Forces) warfare in East and North and political motive, which refer to the army conventional mode of action as a "dead walking."
LTTE strategy
Most of the LTTE’s senior military commanders have been moved to the eastern part of the Wanni region. What are the LTTE's most experienced and senior commanders who taught war tactics and strategy doing in a remote part of eastern Wanni?
They are preparing for a major battle. They re-organised and re-structured their military machine to engage in a conventional mode of offensive. Newly formed divisions and heavy weapon units are reserved. The Special Force brigades remain in the background taking part in counter attacks. The strength is calculated not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of factors such as sophistication of equipment, training and morale.
In other hand, during this operation Sri Lankan army suffered unprecedented casualty rate, official figures show more than 1,500 troops were killed and 12,000 wounded in the last year alone. The total figure of the whole operation is much much higher. According to the reliable sources, more than 9 - 10 thousands troops were killed; nearly 23,000 wounded and more than 25,000 soldiers deserted their ranks during the 23 months long current operations.
The geographical size of the areas in which these divisions are concentrated will be difficult to maintain for a long period, the LTTE can easily break these FDLs at any point and catching the SLA in its own trap.
The SLA invaded Vanni with the intention of drawing the LTTE forces into a decisive battle, but LTTE adopted a strategy of retreat-in-depth, pulling back rather than engaging in battle with mass army, and destroying any supply lines that will be a breaking point for all out offensive. Therefore the LTTE counter offensive in Wanni will be hammering the final nail into the Sri Lankan army coffin on the Wanni front. - Sri Lanka Guardian
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