Use Air Force to hunt terrorists

By Maj. Gen. Ashok K. Mehta

(January 21, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) If we cannot act like Israel in self-defence, at the very least, let us emulate Sri Lanka in the use of force against terrorism. For too long we have allowed ourselves to be bled by inadequate application of force against insurgencies and terror attacks. Minimum force, good faith — part of our ancient British inheritance to quell mobs — and refusal to use air power ‘as we do not use it against our own people’ have together inhibited force punch and delivery and undermined the killer instinct essential to deter Mumbais and Mendhars. The terrorists, on the other hand, basked in the glory of 67 and 192 hours of print and electronic halo, their very raison d’etre.

The Mendhar fiasco, by all media accounts, will encumber the list of failed encounters in Jammu & Kashmir whose illustrious predecessor is Charar-e-Sharief, which was also a major lapse in media handling. The Mendhar Gap, notorious for infiltration, was the scene of the epic battle of OP Hill in 1965, an earlier and bloodier Hilkaka. The present cordon and squeeze operation over the New Year was called off after eight days with three dead and four out of 10 Jaish terrorists claimed killed but no bodies. The terrorists slipped out of the cordon as they did during Charar-e-Sharief in 1995, spurring the most grotesque charges against the Army.

In the past on several occasions security forces have responded far too cautiously to Fidayeen commandeering buildings, taking hostages or getting holed up in villages. Valuable time lost by soldiers is precious time gained in publicity by terrorists. Concern for collateral damage has been taken to unwise limits, sacrificing quick results compatible with human rights and the image of the Army. India Today Online has quoted the COAS, Gen Deepak Kapoor, on the Mendhar encounter saying that “we let them go… as we have on several occasions… but will get them when they come back, which they have to…for minimising collateral damage”. The article asks: How does this logic apply to remote uninhabited jungle areas in Mendhar?

Similarly, the Army Commander Lt Gen PC Bharadwaj, an IPKF veteran, has rejected the fact that terrorists slipped away and there was any goof-up. Like in Mumbai and Charar-e-Sharief, there was more than one voice reporting the Mendhar encounter, especially the claim on kills.

In 1993, a Gorkha battalion smoked out six terrorists from a cave in the higher reaches of Dras — Operation Khukuri was over in hours. Had our Air Force been better prepared and integrated more intimately with ground operations, the Kargil war would not have dragged on for 46 days and cost 512 valuable lives. During Parakram, precision-guided munitions from Mirage aircraft vacated a Pakistani encroachment in Machchal sector, obviating a ground assault.

It is not as if we have never used the IAF. It was employed in 1955 in NEFA, 1966 in Mizoram and selectively in Hilkaka and Doda in 2003-04. Attack helicopters were used in Sri Lanka where the Sri Lankan Air Force has played a decisive role in winning the war against the Tigers. The Nepal Army had used Indian Dhruv helicopters to blunt the Maoist offensive. The Israeli Air Force, using intelligence superiority and Hellfire missiles from Apache helicopters, terminated the barrage of suicide bombers in 2005, making ground forces redundant and precision-guided munitions had eliminated collateral damage.

When asked why the Air Force was not employed in countering insurgency and terrorism when the rest of the world was using it, the previous Air Chief replied: “It is Government policy.” Besides not bombing our own people, three reasons are generally cited for non-use of air power: Not raising the ante, which might introduce shoulder-fired missiles escalating the conflict; increase in collateral damage; and, alienation of Kashmiris. There is incomplete understanding of the surgical ability of the Air Force, absence of political will and gross willingness to take casualties and delay.

Now that internal insecurities are being rectified, policy towards use of the Air Force must be reviewed urgently. The country is dealing mainly with terrorists from neighbouring countries and they are certainly ‘not our own people’. Even Pakistan has acknowledged ownership of Kasab. Of the 600 to 800 terrorists operating in Jammu & Kashmir, 60 per cent are from Pakistan. The others are anti-national Kashmiris, militants-turned-terrorists who deserve no mercy or minimum force. These terrorists will be deterred only by use of adequate force whose mix must be left to the service chiefs. The terrorists must not be allowed to slip away because they will be caught the next time around. This could be one of the reasons besides inadequate use of force that it has taken two decades to bring down the terrorists population of Jammu & Kashmir from 3,000 to 800 today.

Since we are unable to indulge in hot pursuit and cross-LoC operations, it is even more necessary that we act decisively on our soil to disabuse the terrorists of a free run. The Army has done a brilliant job using counter-terrorism, which it calls counter-insurgency, and the fencing as hammer and anvil.

The Hazratbal siege culminated with the judiciary’s intervention on the menu to be served to terrorists. Charar-e-Sharief became a joke. Constrained by inappropriate use of force and extraordinary concern for collateral damage when usable tactical devices are available to offset these, terrorists in Mumbai secured some 67 hours of 24x7 publicity and Mendhar gave the terrorists eight days of unearned glory in air and visual time. They then fled to fight another day. In comparison, the suicide bomber attracts only a few seconds of oxygen and publicity and is becoming a less preferred strategy for terrorists.

The Government must authorise more liberal use of Drones/UAVs, coupled with helicopter gunships to monitor and eliminate terrorism. Troops have achieved an exceptional record in human rights, but this must not constrain operations along with the killer instinct. The Army, Air Force and intelligence agencies have to work together to limit the time and window of operations and, most importantly, reduce casualties on the ground. Israelis dominate the ground from the air by robust use of air power. But for this to happen, service chiefs have to prod the Government for sanctioning use of adequate force. Fortunately there is a Home Minister amenable to raising the cost for cross-border terrorism.

Why is India apologetic about fighting this war? Before Kargil we declared the LoC will not be crossed. After Mumbai, the Government said there would be no war. After the nuclear tests, it was no first use. Why does India speak in the negative? - Sri Lanka Guardian