Fall of Paranthan, Defence of Kilinochchi and the War in Wanni

"The year 2008 would go down as the one in which the LTTE lost the largest chunk of territory held under control, despite suffering a very high casualties. But given the LTTE's limitations of force level and fire power, it appears to have gone with the plan to defend Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass area with all its strength rather than stretching itself on a wide front."

(January 02, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Sri Lanka security forces have started the year 2009 with the capture of Paranthan, the key road junction located on the A9 Jaffna-Kandy lifeline between Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass. The fall of Paranthan adds a new dimension to the war because it splits the mutually reinforcing Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass defence complex. It is a moot point now whether the LTTE was right in concentrating on strongly defending Kilinochchi when tactically Paranthan was more vital for this very reason.

As the fall of Paranthan has weakened the defenders of both Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass, the LTTE has to recapture Paranthan, or get eliminated piecemeal from Kilinochchi or Elephant Pass. Even in its present beleaguered condition this possibility cannot be ruled out as Paranthan is only 4.5 km from Kilinochchi.

To prevent any such LTTE initiative, the security forces have to enlarge their gains in Paranthan immediately and break up any move for counterattack. This task might be beyond the capability of Task Force I as it has to hold the ground with the LTTE forces concentrated both in the north and the south.Later in the day on January 1, 57 Division was reported to have captured Iranamadu Junction after inflicting casualties on the LTTE. Defence sources have claimed that after its capture the troops were advancing eastwards, presumably to consolidate the gains.The falll of Iranamadu also opens yet another approach to Kilinochchi from the southeast. This makes Kilinochchi more vulnerable than ever before. So we can expect the security forces to pump in more forces into Paranthan and follow it up with an all out offensive to capture Kilinochchi Thus operations in Kilinochchi-Pranthan area in the next two weeks are going to be crucial to both sides.

Of course, the security forces have the option to resume the 53 Division's offensive in the Muhamalai sector to capture Elephant Pass, but without reinforcing Paranthan further it might be risky.

Undoubtedly the security forces had suffered heavy casualties last month in their bid to capture Kilinochchi and Paranthan. While the LTTE is defending Kilinochchi doggedly with its crack forces, the divisions attacking them are probably diluted with fresh recruits inducted as reinforcements. Army's expansion spree has resulted in large scale recruitment and training for a shorter period of about 12 weeks. Inevitably, shorter training duration would affect the overall fighting capabilities of troops. Probably this had resulted in the higher casualties of the security forces in the Kilinochchi operations. But unlike in the past, the security forces have shown that they can take the casualties in their stride to successfully carry forward the offensive as shown in the Task Force I's capture of Paranthan. This would indicate a high level of motivation among the fighting formations of the security forces.

Given this tight tactical situation, the LTTE's fierce defence of Kilinochchi has to be put in perspective; it is neither Stalingrad nor El Alamein. Such rhetoric might sound impressive, but the reality in Kilinochchi is totally different. This is an internal war between the State and insurgents fought in a very small area unlike the world war operations fought in urban setting or a battle of manoeuvres in desert. Such a comparison would also be ignoring the progress of war on other fronts while looking at the Kilinochchi battle. Even if one grants superhuman capabilities to the LTTE, it is so precariously perched in Kilinochchi as it has to survive the battle of the day, every day.

The fall of Paranthan also widens the option of the security forces operating on other fronts as well. Though the security forces were tied in knots in their offensives on Kilinochchi and Paranthan, they made good progress in the Welioya Sector according to the defence sources. They have claimed that 59 Division was eating into 20-km stretch of the A34 Mankulam-Mullaitivu road extending from Oddusuddan to Mulliyavalai- Tanniyuthu. The loss of this section would cut off the command and control of the LTTE forces operating south of the road exposing them to the threat from two task forces and elements of 59 Division from three directions.

The progress of 59 Division would further restrict the limited access the LTTE enjoys to the east coast in Mullaitivu district. This would also drastically reduce the capability of Sea Tigers. This is evident from the failure of repeated attempts of the Sea Tigers trying to take up both offensive and defensive tasks off Alampil-Mullaitivu coast. This would further disrupt the already limping LTTE's overseas supply lines from the east.

The gains made by the security forces in the year 2008 probably spell the marginalisation of the LTTE's conventional military power. What will be the impact on Sri Lanka when the LTTE with its never ending quest for an elusive Tamil Eelam turns to guerrilla mode completely? In the last six months there have been fewer LTTE urban terrorist operations in Sri Lanka. Over four tonnes of C4 explosives are reported to have been recovered in Colombo and its suburbs during 2008. If this report is correct, it represents the sizeable failure of LTTE's effort to enlarge its terrorist activities in the metropolis.

Of course, the LTTE's failing fortunes of war might be the immediate reason for this. This is also due to Sri Lanka's tightened internal security measures despite police high handedness and greater public awareness of the nature of terrorist threat. Frequently the public have informed the police on finding suspected explosive devices. This shows that they are not prepared to accept terrorist activity in their midst, regardless of their political inclinations.

The year 2008 would go down as the one in which the LTTE lost the largest chunk of territory held under control, despite suffering a very high casualties. But given the LTTE's limitations of force level and fire power, it appears to have gone with the plan to defend Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass area with all its strength rather than stretching itself on a wide front. So in the trade off of territory for delaying the offensive on all fronts, the LTTE was making the best out of an operational situation where they are outnumbered, outgunned and probably strategically outwitted.

The high casualty among the partially trained LTTE "freshers" in the delaying actions was inevitable in the LTTE scheme of things. That might not be the way the kith and kin of the dead would look at the LTTE tactics because at the end of the day they have gained nothing except death and destruction and the privations of war.

The military successes are going to create a new set of political dilemmas for the President. If and when the A9 highway is opened and normalcy of sorts is restored, the President is likely to come under tremendous pressure for evolving a political package for solving the Tamil issue. Even if he goes for a national election, riding his military success to improve his hold on the parliament, the dilemma of Tamil issue is likely to continue. In the next six months there will be a new government in power in New Delhi. And its political equations might also be different which could see the Sri Lanka Tamil issue coming to the limelight once again. And that could mean India – Sri Lanka relations becoming a different ball game.

So the politically shrewd President Rajapaksa is probably getting ready to look at all his options. Of course, before any such move Kilinochchi will have to be captured first and the LTTE evicted from A9 road.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com) - Sri Lanka Guardian