Origins of “the military solution” and its consequences

"The Vadukoddai Resolution unleashed all the mono-ethnic hate politics of Jaffna-centric leadership that had risen to a critical point to demolish the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic polity of the nation."


(December 09, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) The broadband of NGOs, Marxists, academics and assorted intellectuals, who dominate the current discourse on public affairs, has been hounding the government accusing it of pursuing “a military solution” to the Sri Lankan crisis. This broadband of activists, however, does not point a finger, with the same emphasis, at the Tamil Tigers who have been pursuing nothing but a “military solution”. Their accusations are presented as if it is the Government that is bent on pursuing a “the military solution” against the peace-loving Tamil Tigers.

Incidentally, there is nothing original in this accusation. Velupillai Prabhakaran, who has been prosecuting a relentless war against his own Tamil people and the Sri Lankan government, too has been accusing the government of seeking a “military solution”, particularly after Mavil Aru – the point at which he started running backwards. He has never admitted that he has relied exclusively on “military solutions” to get as far as he did. On the contrary, he is wont to pose as the irenic conciliator who attended peace talks and was the first to make unilateral declarations of peace

Of course, he has never admitted that he is also the first to make unilateral declarations of war. Or that he was the first to walk out of peace talks. In his annual speech delivered in 2005 he is on record saying that he was about to launch his Eelam War IV when he was hit by the tsunami. His decision to wage a Eelam War IV confirms that he had no intention of adhering to the terms and conditions of the Ceasefire Agreement he signed on February 22, 2002 promising to keep the peace. His on-again-off-again peace declarations were mere temporary breathers for him to recoup and pursue his permanent “military solution”.

Looking back it is clear now that he signed the CFA only as a temporary halt on his way to his next step of Eelam. Analysts have refused to recognize that he powered his way to CFA through the barrel of his gun. Successive governments were either reluctant to engage the Tigers militarily, believing in the myth of the Tiger superiority, or were under national and international pressure not to pursue the “military solution”.

Prabhakaran, on the contrary was not restrained by any such pressures. He succeeded because he flouted every known cannon of national and international law and pressures that hindered his ”military solution”. Prabhakaran was certain that his chances of getting anywhere were through “military solutions” and not through international agreements or international law. He brazenly ignored the agreement with UN not to recruit under aged children and he has not stopped this war crime even after Secretary-General had reported him three times to the Security Council. He tore up the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement because he did not want to end up as Chief Minister. He shot the CFA to pieces because he was not content with the limitations that restricted his ambitions of achieving his elusive Eelam.

Having defied India and the international community led by Norway he was confident that his “military solution” could not only bring diplomats of the international community to his doorstep but also dictate terms to them. He miscalculated the pressures forcing the successive governments to restrain their “military solutions” -- if they had any at all – as a sign of his military superiority and invincibility. What was needed was a government that was ready to take him on directly without yielding to his militarism.

The success of Mahinda Rajapaksa government was due to its unswerving commitment to plan, organize and direct its “military solutions” to match Prabhakaran’s militarism. The Rajapaksa government provided the most determined leadership against Jaffna-centric militarism which opened the way for Prabhakaran to take over the leadership of the Jaffna Tamils. Prabhakaran has managed to get as far as he did because the previous governments did not have a matching “military solution”. Prabhakaran’s illegal violence succeeded because the legal violence of the state was not organized or prepared to challenge his “military solution.”

By the time he came to Mavil Aru he had territory, resources, goodwill of the international community, power and political prestige to dictate his terms and conditions. Mavil Aru, he thought, would be another cake walk that would add glory to his “military solution”. His overall plan was to go beyond the boundaries defined in the Ceasefire Agreement to his elusive Eelam. He had already in his pocket Kaddaiparichchan, Mutur and Sampur. – all key points in and around the mouth of the Trincomalee harbor. He was in a commanding position to cut off supplies sailing from Trincomalee to Jaffna where the troops were stationed.

It was in Mavil Aru that he met his Waterloo – literally and metaphorically. He was aiming to cut off the water supplies to farmers down stream. It was then that President Mahinda Rajapaksa decided to take “military solution” as a serious strategy to meet the persistent and unrelenting “military solution” of Prabhakaran. For the first time two “military solutions” met head-on, each testing the other. The pro-Tiger pundits never dreamt that the Mahinda Rajapaksa’s “military solution” would win. Even at this eleventh hour the pro-Tiger lobby is hoping that Prabhakaran would pull a rabbit out of his hat. They are baffled as to why Prabhakaran has run out of rabbits. If Prabhakaran can produce a “military rabbit” now they will not object to it. In fact, they will produce excuses to justify it. It is only when the Security Forces are winning that they oppose the “military solution” and prioritize the “political solution”.

The crisis in Sri Lanka has dragged on primarily because neither India nor the international community has been able to make Prabhakaran abandon his “military solution“ and join the democratic mainstream. But the propaganda barrage has been directed against the government, almost exclusively, for seeking a “military solution.” But is this argument based on historical realities or is this argument based, like most of the arguments of this broadband, on convenient political myths. Who really are the fathers of “the military solution”? Was it “the Sinhala state” that sought “a military solution” or did the “military solution” originate in a non-Sinhala community? And if so where and when did the “military solution” originate?

Even a cursory glance at the political and military history of the post-independence period will reveal that it was not – I repeat NOT -- “the Sinhala state” that launched “the military solution.” It was first formulated, organized, propagated, financed, directed and manipulated nationally and internationally, by the Jaffna-centric political class/caste when they collectively passed the Vadukoddai Resolution in 1976, calling upon the Tamil youth “to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign state of TAMIL EELAM is reached.” It was a direct declaration of war by the Jaffna-centric political class/caste on the rest of the nation. No other community or government had taken this drastic step of officially declaring war on another ethnic community / communities.

The “military solution” is spelt out in the two concluding paragraphs of the Resolution. The battle cry is couched in soft but clear terms: “This Convention (held in Pannakam, Vadukoddai, the constituency of the leader of the TULF, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, on May 14, 1976) directs the Action Committee of the TAMIL UNITED LIBERATION FRONT to formulate a plan of action and launch without undue delay the struggle for winning the sovereignty and freedom of the Tamil Nation;

“And this Convention calls upon the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth in particular to come forward to throw themselves fully in the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign state of TAMIL EELAM is reached. “

In hindsight it is abundantly clear that it was the biggest mistake of Jaffna-centric politics. At the time only M. Tiruchelvam, one of the leading lights of peninsular politics, saw the inherent dangers. Perhaps, he may have had some inkling of separatist politics leading them to a dead end – literally and metaphorically. But though he shared some of the feelings of what Malini Parasarathy of The Hindu called “Tamil chauvinism” he was shrewd and sensible enough to gauge the limits of the power of Jaffna-centric politics. Ram Balasubramanian states: “He was opposed to the 1976 Vadukoddai Resolution that demanded a separate state of Tamil Eelam and advised Mr. Chelvanayakam against it.” ( p.5 – Senator Tiruchelvam’s Legacy, edited by Ram Balasubramaniam, Vijitha Yapa publishers, November 2007)

By the time Tiruchelvam rushed from Colombo to intervene it was too late. According to Prof. A. J. Wilson, who wrote his biography, Chelvanayakam had combed the wording in the Vadukoddai Resolution minutely and scrupulously and approved it. The rest is history, as they say. The consequences that flowed from it were unstoppable. Prabhakaran is the child that was born out of this Resolution. A whole new crop of militant groups rose to power on the full force of the endorsement granted to violence in the Vadukoddai Resolution. At the height of the separatist movement, 37 separate groups were operating in Jaffna. ( p.126 -- A. J. Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Dvelopment in the 19th and 20th Centuries, CBC Press, Vancouver.) The Vadukoddai Resolution was like providing ladders to leaping monkeys, as they say in Sinhala folklore.

Prabhakaran had already signaled the direction in which he was going to take his war by taking the scalp of Alfred Duraiyappah in 1975. Not a single “Gandhian” in the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) expressed any horror or condemnation of the assassination of Duraiyappah. They were privately jubilant that the Tamil youth, whom they had brain-washed with the politics of hate, were meting out punishment to the Tamil traitors. The Tamil elders of Jaffna, who were in command of the peninsular politics at this point of time, had entered into a symbiotic relationship with the Tamil youth. When they called upon the youth of Jaffna to take up arms and never cease until they achieve Eelam they handed over power, which they held tightly in their fists throughout the feudal and colonial times, to the restless Tamil youth.

The Vadukoddai Resolution unleashed all the mono-ethnic hate politics of Jaffna-centric leadership that had risen to a critical point to demolish the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic polity of the nation. The unambiguous political message contained in the Vadukoddai Resolution was that the Jaffna Tamils were opting out of the tried and tested framework of parliamentary democracy and committing themselves unequivocally to “an armed struggle”. In passing this resolution the Jaffna leaders were deliberately accepting and endorsing a “military solution” to achieve their goals embedded in mono-ethnic politics.

The consequences of this decision were disastrous to the nation as a whole and to the Jaffna Tamils in particular. The “military solution” was a choice made by the Jaffna-centric leadership and they have been pursuing it relentlessly since then. The responsibility of making that choice and pursuing it should be laid, fairly and squarely, on the leadership of Jaffna Tamils only.

END

H.L.D.Mahindapala: Editor, Sunday and Daily Observer (1990 - 1994). President, Sri Lanka Working Journalists' Association (1991 -1993). Secretary-General, South Asia Media Association (1993 -1994). He has been featured as a political commentator in Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Special Broadcasting Services and other mainstream TV and radio stations in Australia.) - Sri Lanka Guardian