Mumbai attack and Pakistan

Warning to it shouldn’t be just a ritual

by Gen V. P. Malik (retd)

(December 20, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) Two major issues have emerged after the latest, most audacious and daring terror attack in Mumbai on 26/11. These are (a) poor infrastructure and systemic failures in India’s ability to counter terror, and (b) how should India respond to repeated terror attacks originating from Pakistani soil.

The first issue, more important, requires professional advice and the political will to institute corrective measures. The failures are not because of non-availability of advice but due to vested interests, bureaucratic sloth and turf interests.

Unfortunately, the political leadership till now has used terrorism as a tool for electoral advantages rather than a serious national security challenge. Hopefully, the public anger reflected in “enough is enough” will make every one sit up now, and the government will do what should have been done a long time ago.

That the Mumbai attack originated from Pakistan is not in doubt. But blaming radical outfits like the LET and JEM only for this incident would not be correct. Their extensive and visible training, operational infrastructure, the sophisticated and meticulous planning and execution of attacks in Mumbai, Kabul and earlier, cannot happen unless there is official conspiracy or complicity in Pakistan.

It is a well-known fact that the Pakistan Army maintains its unholy alliance with Jehadi terror organisations through the ISI. A few months ago, General Musharraf called the ISI as Pakistan’s first line of defence. The Pakistan Army has refused to place the ISI under civilian controlled Interior Ministry, or to expose its head to foreign questioning, because the ISI is its non-transparent arm to implement military strategies and look after vested interests.

Ever since inception, the Pakistan Army has used terrorists as its extension. It used them against India in 1947-48 war, for Op Gibralter in 1965, in Punjab in mid 80s, and in J & K since 1989. It used them for Kargil war although the actual infiltration was carried out by the Northern Light Infantry and other regular Army units.

That is how mullah-military nexus and India-focused terror outfits — supported, autonomous, or viewed blindly — such as LET, JEM, HUM have flourished in Pakistan. Having failed to achieve success in conventional war against India, the ISI uses these outfits, and people like Dawood, to wage a proxy war of “thousand cuts”. Terror targets are carefully selected to cause insecurity and damage India’s image and economy.

Many Pakistani writers admit that the ISI often indulges in autonomous handling of foreign relations, toppling civil governments, rigging elections, even vigilantism, picking up people and making them disappear. Shuja Nawaz, in his book “Crossed Swords”, writes of a sworn affidavit filed by Pakistan’s Defence Secretary in a High Court stating that “his ministry had no operational control over the two rogue agencies (ISI and ISPR) and therefore was unable to enforce the court’s orders on either agency in matters relating to detentions.”

Any military and diplomatic options to stop cross-border terrorism should be considered in this full picture. India’s last military response to a major cross-border terror act was Op Parakaram. The military was deployed on the Western border for 10 long months. It was withdrawn after we extracted some half-hearted promises from Pakistan. These promises, later converted into “joint declaration” and many lip-serving confidence-building measures, have failed to check cross-border terrorism. The intensity and frequency of terror attacks has increased.

A military option, if adopted, should demonstrate India’s will and capability and hurt the intended targets without drawing India into a nuclear exchange or a costly ground war. The response must rise above the symbolic. In examining such military options, beside political and economic implications, we have to factor in the possible Pakistani military reaction, international support, and its impact on US, NATO and Pakistan military deployments on the Pakistan-Afghan border.

Other than a war, such military options could be (a) air strikes on militants’ camps (their precise coordinates must be known to achieve the desired results and minimise collateral damage) or strategic targets, along with/without commando raids on some military installations close to the border or LoC (b) capture one or two terrorists’ launch pads in Pakistani territory in a surprise attack to put political pressure (c) a naval blockade or action on the high seas. The last one would impact Pakistan’s economy as well as the logistic lifeline of the US and NATO troops fighting in Afghanistan. Strategic implications of such an action in Pakistan would be:

It will lead to withdrawal of one or two Pakistan Army corps from its Western border. There would be a Pakistani riposte for which our civil and military have to be prepared.

A close monitoring and political oversight will be required over the escalation ladder, which can move very fast. The government will need to manage the domestic and international opinion. It will require political will and political consensus, often seen lacking these days.

It will give further excuse to the jehadi groups and Pakistan Army to work jointly against “India’s hegemonic designs”.

During and after the military confrontation, if there is a standoff between the Pakistan Government and its Army, we know who will be shown the door. Such a limited confrontation, for which India has the capability, will certainly convey a strong warning to Pakistan. However, none of us can be certain that it will stop militants’ activities and cross-border terrorism.

Let us look at the diplomatic options. India has pro-actively engaged Pakistan on political, economic and security related issues, including cross-border terrorism. Direct bilateral discussions in Simla, Lahore, Agra, Islamabad; indirect discussion through the US and the UK; multi-lateral discussions in the UN and SAARC; hundreds of track 1 and 2 level dialogues have not convinced Pakistan to stop cross-border terrorism or to take worthwhile action against jehadi outfits and their infrastructure.

Analysed more realistically and less emotionally, it is apparent to anyone that these engagements and strategic Indo-Pakistan hyphenation benefit Pakistan more than India. We lose the advantage of a secular democratic nation, seven times economically stronger, progressive nation. On cross-border terrorism, our pro-active engagements with all types of governments in Pakistan have got us only denials, double speak, false promise, back-stabbing, and made us more vulnerable. Terrorism from Pakistani soil has increased, not decreased.

In dealing with Pakistan on cross-border terrorism, diplomatic options would definitely be preferable to any military option. The latter should be the last resort. Long ago, I had stated that a proxy war on the sub-continent can easily lead to a conventional war. In the current security environment, caused by the continuing terror war, our forces should remain alert for protective as well as pro-active responses. We should also remember Kofi Annan’s advice, “You can do a lot with diplomacy but of course you can do a lot more with firmness and force.”

The writer, former Chief of Army Staff, is President, ORF Institute of Security Studies, New Delhi. - Sri Lanka Guardian