Lessons from Mumbai Attacks

by R.Swaminathan

(Decembner 07, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) I will not attempt to summarize the voluminous media reporting or presume to make a detailed presentation before this well-informed audience. Instead, I shall only try to flag some of the important areas in which India needs to draw its lessons from the tragic events in Mumbai on 26-28 November 2008. I will mention the issues in the order in which they impinge on a terrorist incident, without attempting to prioritize them.

Political

I can only reiterate the oft-repeated (but unfortunately not acted upon) demand for a political consensus on the issue of terrorism. We have to evolve a collective political, bureaucratic and public will and determination to implement the policy of zero tolerance to terrorism. For this, we need to overcome the needs of party and sectoral interests, turf wars etc

With regard to known Pakistani involvement in jihadi terrorism in India, we have to recognize the unwillingness and/or inability of the Government of Pakistan to control all of its territory and all extremist organizations operating from there. The Govt. of India has been exerting “gentlemanly” pressure till now, without any effect. The time is now, to convert the rhetoric about Pakistan having to pay a heavy price into some concrete actions. In my view, total war between the two nuclear-armed states is a non-existent option. There are also many prudent arguments against unilateral actions by India to neutralize terrorist training camps, ISI’s support to terrorist groups etc. India should now concentrate on getting international (mandate from UN Security Council?) support for multi-national action to achieve the objective. There have been reports about many welcome steps in this direction already initiated by the Government of India; but much more needs to be done. We have, however, to be very cautious and take carefully calibrated measures, as there are quite s few areas and (extremist) organizations in India over which the control of the governments is nebulous or non-existent.

Intelligence

That there is a compelling need to improve the country’s capabilities to collect terrorist-related intelligence can never be over-stated, and so I will not dwell on that point here. The important lesson to be learnt relates to how we handle the information that various government agencies have access to (either through indigenous efforts or through co-operative efforts with other countries) and convert such information to actionable intelligence and reach it to the concerned operational agencies in a timely manner. In the present instance, R&AW has claimed (in “leaks” to the media) that details of the Pakistani ship and LeT’s plan to mount a sea-delivered attack were collected and reported. On the other hand, the Naval Chief has publicly stated that no “actionable intelligence” was made available to the Navy. I am prepared to believe both. We have to ascertain what actually happened to those reports and why they were not available to the Navy before the attack; and then take steps to avoid a repetition of such a grave lapse. There is a report in Hindustan Times (05 December) that a LeT operative had carried out reconnaissance of the target sites and had prepared guide maps more than an year ago, the details of which were mentioned in a charge-sheet filed in a court in UP. If this did not alert intelligence and security agencies to a potential (imminent?) threat, there is something seriously wrong with the intelligence infrastructure.


There is gross deficiency in the necessary involvement of the citizenry in the fight against terrorism, particularly in the area of collection of preventive intelligence. Most successful terrorist attacks have depended upon some kind of local base or support. Without doubt, many citizens, locality welfare associations and private security agencies learn about suspicious strangers and abnormal activities; but have no motivation or viable procedure to share the information or doubts with the intelligence/security/law enforcement authorities. There is a felt need to take pro-active measures to make all citizens, irrespective of religion and political affiliation, feel that they are all equal in a secular setup, sharing equally in the fruits of economic progress and with equal stakes in national development and security. The functioning of the police needs to be modified, to restore a modified form of the old and trusted beat system. It should be made easier (by having dedicated community relations cells in every police station) for the citizenry, their locality welfare associations and private security agencies to contribute effectively in the collection of preventive intelligence.

Security Infrastructure

Another important lesson to be learnt relates to the obviously woeful inadequacy of the overall security infrastructure to face and counter a Mumbai-like situation.

The disproportionately higher casualties suffered by the Mumbai Police (as compared to those suffered by the special commando units) and the abnormal delay in locating a “bomb” left in the Chatrapati Shivaji Terminal highlight the need for specialized units in all metros and major cities. The proposal to establish regional units of the National Security Guards is a useful and necessary step in this direction, but this should be supported by helping the local police to establish their own specialist teams – as has been done in Tamil Nadu.

Political “interference” (and consequent party-influenced bias) has often been mentioned as a cause for the ineffectiveness of police and security agencies in performing their duties. They should be made totally independent of, and fully immune from, political manipulation, without diluting the political authority’s right to give general policy guidelines and to take action against any abuse or misuse of authority. The implementation of the nearly three decades old recommendations of the National Police Commission and the state-level enactment of new legislations based on the model Police Act drafted by the Soli Sorabjee Committee – as directed by the Supreme Court on 22 September 2006 – should be expedited.

The central government should have the authority, under the emergency provisions in the Constitution (which may have to be amended suitably), to render support to the local authorities (by moving and providing specialist units) in cases of major terrorist incidents or other significant threat to national security, without having to wait for a request from (often vacillating) state governments.

All agencies and personnel dealing with national security should be made fully accountable to the government and to the citizens. The widely-prevalent current practice of finger-pointing and blame-shifting should not be allowed to continue. Before that, we must ensure that a workable inter-related and coordinated intelligence and security infrastructure is put in place.

Physical Security

All vital and vulnerable installations should draw up (with government help and support, as required) detailed procedures for different levels of physical security, so that the appropriate level could be implemented with the minimum delay. In effect, we should not be reinventing the wheel every time we want to travel. These procedures should include details of site plan, entry and exit routes, precautions and procedures, agency responsible, manpower and weapons requirements and their sources etc. Vague and frequent “alerts”, without application of mind and specification of level of threat, tend to the ignoring of alerts.

The governments (central and state) may have to establish special reserve resources to augment (unilaterally if necessary) the physical security arrangements in vital and vulnerable locations when they face any imminent threat – till such time as the threat retreats or the installation is made to take over the responsibility for such augmentation. As major terrorist attacks, as in Mumbai, cause national trauma and adversely affect the morale of the citizens, the discretion in the matter of augmented physical security can no longer left to the discretion of the managements of individual facilities.

From the events in Mumbai and from their media coverage, it is obvious that ostentatious physical security arrangements (often with personnel who are not specially trained and motivated, having inadequate and/or inappropriate equipment) are breached with ease. Specialized training needs to be given to all those (in government or private employment) who are engaged in providing physical security. Dedicated efforts have to be made to retain and enhance (as required) their motivation and alertness. This is a tall order and not easy to meet.

During Counter-Action

One significant lesson that could be learnt from the Mumbai incidents is that, while ensuring the freedom of the media and the public’s right to know, some kind of voluntary restraint by the media is necessary. Highly intrusive TV coverage could endanger innocent people, hamper operations and may also help the terrorists get information about the plans and actions of the counter-terrorist forces. One could justifiably argue that the restraints suggested by the Government of India were too severe, but their total rejection by the media is regrettable.

Investigation

Conventional wisdom says that investigation is a post-event activity. In the case of terrorism, however, we have to recognize the frequent need for preventive investigation, aimed at ascertaining the details of a plot and foiling its fruition.

The present investigative set-up in India is governed by the prescription of the “police station having jurisdiction” and is essentially a “state subject”. While the investigators are bound by the jurisdictional limits, terror knows no borders. Investigations into terrorist threats or attacks are therefore required to be carried out without such restrictions. There is a crying need for a central agency that is empowered to undertake such investigations throughout the territory of India (and outside, if necessary) without having to seek invitation or permission from the concerned state government. Mr CV Narasimhan, former Director of CBI and Member-Secretary of the National Police Commission, had pointed out the other day that the required legislation could be passed by the Parliament, under Item 8 of the Union List in the Constitution of India.

Inadequacy of Laws

There cannot be two opinions about the existing laws, mostly drafted and enacted before terrorism became rampant, being inadequate to tackle terrorism. There are many demands to revive a special law like POTA or to enact an even more stringent one. These demands stem from the assumption that terrorism is a temporary phenomenon and that the special law could be repealed when the threat no longer exists (or, unfortunately, when it is politically expedient for the government of the day to do so). It is time to recognize the reality that terrorism will continue to pose a serious threat to our national security for a long time. Its all-pervasive nature and viciousness may vary, but the threat will remain. The need therefore is to incorporate permanent special provisions to deal with terrorism in our criminal code (consisting of the three “major” acts, i.e. Indian Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Evidence Act).

The special provisions should (possibly in a separate chapter in Indian Penal Code) clearly define terrorism and terrorist offences; and prescribe stringent and deterrent punishments, including prescribed minima for incarceration. The new provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code should provide for speedy trials (somewhat on the lines of military court martial), denial of bail after the charge is framed by the court, restrict the number of appeals to one (and that too only on substantive points of law) etc. Time limits could also be prescribed for filing charge sheets, trial procedure and appeals. Special provisions in the Evidence Act should try to liberalise the rules of evidence (loading it in favour of the citizens instead of the terrorists). Along with the introduction of special legal provisions to tackle terrorism, required safeguards against misuse or abuse of the provisions should also be enacted.

Criminal Justice System

It is unfortunate that criminals, particularly those involved in terrorist attacks, are able to use the existing safeguards in our laws to delay or evade punishment – thus reducing the deterrent effect of suitable punishment for crimes. The trial of those accused in the serial blasts of 1993 in Mumbai dragged on for 13 years, and the appeals process is yet to materialise. The suggested amendments to the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code should lead to quicker and clearly deterrent punishments and may hopefully help in preventing terrorism from assuming more virulent proportions.

Serious consideration needs to given to the withdrawal of the normal provisions of parole after conviction, in terrorist cases. A reasonable (default) time limit seems necessary to be placed on decisions on mercy petitions, in such cases.

Need for a New Central Agency

I have already mentioned the need for a central investigating agency for terror-related cases. There have been reports in the media about the government having decided to establish such a Federal Investigation Agency. However, it would be highly inadequate only to strengthen the investigative set-up. Establishing only a central investigating agency, without the responsibility and authority relating to other areas concerned with terrorism, would be like concentrating only on improving the autopsy and mortuary facilities when an epidemic is threatened or is raging, without at the same time providing for vaccines for prevention and control, treatment and care of patients etc.

What is needed is a credible counter-terrorism infrastructure, with all-India jurisdiction, that can (and should) handle centrally all issues relating to terrorism affecting national security. I commend the proposal to establish a Central Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CCTB) - the exact terminology not being too important - either independently or as a part of the IB or the CBI. It should be vested with the entire range of duties and responsibilities relating to terrorism - subsuming state jurisdictions. Its functioning, as that of all police agencies in the country, should be made totally immune from, political interference in their day-to-day functioning.

The CCTB should have at least the following responsibilities and capabilities :

· Carry out on a continuing basis the strategic planning of counter-terrorist measures, benefiting from the experience and expertise of analysts in state and central governments, academia and civil society and advise the appropriate authorities suitably;

· Have total access to all terrorism-related intelligence reports from all resources of state and central governments;

· Collate, analyze, appreciate and promptly disseminate processed intelligence inputs to all concerned operational entities – avoiding the normal “through proper channel” procedure;

· Recommend and arrange to provide temporary additional security to threatened entities till adequate regular arrangements are made; monitor the progress in following up of action on agreed measures; and assist in the prevention of terrorist incidents;

· In the event of a terrorist threat materialising, host central and on-site command and co-ordination centres, with representatives from the lead agencies and access to other specialists; and act as the clearing house for all information on related developments;

· Most importantly, carry out and/or co-ordinate post-incident investigations; without having to wait for requests/clearances by state governments, and transfer to the Strategic Planning Group the details of lessons to be learnt.

Conclusion

Our national war against terrorism, to protect our national sovereignty and security, has to be fought to the finish over a long time, without apologies or regrets. Enough valuable time has been lost in pandering to vote banks, alibis of secularism, human rights and civil liberties. Governments have been crippled from taking single-minded and firm actions (using our entire national resources) against elements that seek to destroy our nation. Let us remember that “Samshayatma vinashyathi”, i.e. Ditherers will perish!

[This paper was prepared by R.Swaminathan, former Special Secretary, DG (Security), Govt. of India, as the basis for initiating a discussion on the subject, organized by the Observer Research Foundation – Chennai Chapter, on 06 December 2008. He can be contacted at rsnathan@gmail.com - Sri Lanka Guardian