Intelligence slip-up?

More a failure to analyse inputs

by Premvir Das

(December 27, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) If there is widespread, and legitimate concern, at the many inadequacies which led to the carnage in Mumbai, failure of intelligence heads the list. There was no warning, cried the many agencies charged with safeguarding our security and where there was some awareness, it was not translated into “actionable intelligence”.

Some degree of political responsibility has been signalled by the resignation of some key figures in the domain. This is understandable, even if it does not remove the anger or the pain one whit; what is not is why accountability is nowhere to be seen.

On 16th November, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) reported that electronic intercepts had revealed the presence of a Pakistan vessel, Al Husseini, possibly with some terrorists embarked, and indicated the geographic location of the ship. This report was sent off to a number of agencies according to procedure, including to the Coast Guard and Naval Headquarters, and, most important of all, to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

The Navy chief is perfectly justified in saying that this could hardly be treated as actionable information, especially when it was found that the position indicated in the RAW report lay not far from the Pak coast. Nevertheless, precautionary measures were taken by both maritime forces for a few days and then given up, nothing having been found.

This brings us to the seminal question — what happened to this report when it landed up at the JIC, the premier intelligence coordination agency in the country. A quick assessment would have shown that this vessel, given the speeds at which similar vessels normally move, could have been off the Gujarat coast by the 18th and off the Maharashtra area by the 20th.

It could also have been surmised that if the Al Husseini did not make the passage itself, that being too dangerous, but transferred its load to some smaller craft, possibly a fishing boat of Indian registry, that being far less risky, its passengers could be off the Gujarat area by the 18th/19th and in the waters off Mumbai by
the 21st/22nd.

And if this movement was to be restricted to nights only, with the boat faking fishing activity by day, then these figures would be 21st/22nd and 25th/26th respectively. All this should have happened in the JIC once that report from RAW came in.

In an intelligence agency, especially one coordinating inputs from several sources, analysis is critical along with linkage to previous inputs. Two months earlier, reports had indicated that high-profile targets in Mumbai such as major hotels could be targeted. Linkage to sea proximity was also expected.

In Gujarat, the visible major targets are the ports, including the largest viz. Kandla and the oil terminals at Vadinar and the refinery at Jamnagar. These can be damaged by explosives placed suitably but the quantities required and the sites at which they would need to be put would require a very major operation quite unlike taking a loaded truck into a hotel building.

The Somnath temple at Veraval, which attracts hundreds of devotees and could be suited for a Hindu-Muslim scenario, was a possibility but given the background information held, Gujarat did not seem targeted.

This brings us to Mumbai. Logical analysis would show that the ingress would be best managed at one of the three fishing community points at Mahim, at Cuffe Parade or at the Sassoon Docks. The first requires a long road movement to the high profile downtown areas; the other two are in close proximity.

From Cuffe Parade, taxis can be taken by just crossing a road, at Sassoon Docks one has to traverse through very densely located buildings and narrow roads before emerging onto the very busy Colaba Causeway. It is also adjacent to a naval heliport.

A direct landing at the Gateway of India looks easy but one has to run the risk of boat patrols and possible presence of warships. If a move against high-profile hotels by people coming from the sea was even remotely possible, then clearly, Macchimaar Nagar, off Cuffe Parade, stood out like a Christmas Tree.

If all this sounds like being wise after the event, and this may well be justified, something on these lines should have taken place in the JIC, even if with different results. But not to have tried to link the pieces and do an analysis, or appreciation as the military calls it, is inexcusable.

Unfortunately, the failure of intelligence, or rather in its processing, is matched by several failures in responding to the crisis after it had developed. By about 10 pm, it had become known that there was a major incident ongoing at the Taj. Soon thereafter, Delhi was informed and the NSG asked to be rushed to Mumbai.

In Mumbai itself, the only forces capable of responding quickly and adequately, were the Marine Commandos (MARCOS), based across the harbour. They, a full 100 of them, could have been on the scene within the hour, two at the most. The call for them took long in coming and they reached much later than they could have.

Meanwhile, in Delhi, 200 NSG Commandos took two hours to reach the airport from Manesar and they waited another two for an IAF aircraft to come from Chandigarh. Yet, as they waited, there were at least one dozen Boeing aircraft belonging to our own airlines on the tarmac, any one of which could have been requisitioned immediately; surely, the Cabinet Secretary has the power and clout to do so.

Considering that so many commandos were being sent, it was known that the situation was grave and required warlike responses. This inability to take hard decisions by people who have both authority and accountability has been allowed to go on without them being called to question.

A third issue concerns actual operations. It is essential that in such cases requiring involvement and interface of many agencies, all business should be controlled through an Operations Centre which would have access to the developing scenarios, have knowledge of resources and allot them to places where they are needed most with appropriate directions. It would also interface with the media.

This mechanism was totaling lacking. Someone called in the Army, as in “aid to civil power” and the GOC went about claiming that everything would be over in two hours when, in actual fact, none of his people had even entered any of the affected sites. He was followed by the GOC-in-C from Pune, who offered the same words of solace.

The media, which should have been stopped at the Regal Cinema, lay sprawled around off Gateway, with great bravery and devotion to their duty it must be granted, but not commensurate with the needs of the operation. Frequent briefings by a well-informed person, every one hour or so, would have been more appropriate.

All these inadequacies and failures are not those of politicians but of people at the delivering end. It will be distressing if, in the aftermath of the Mumbai carnage, accountability of decision makers is not recognised and dealt with. We may, and should, learn lessons and put missing capabilities in place but these can never help if the people who operate the system cannot stand up to the stresses.

And, if they do not, they must be held accountable. No organisation, military included, has ever suffered or got demoralised if its superior authorities have been called to question for their inability to deliver. Generals and Admirals have been summarily dismissed for much less.

The writer is a former member of the National Security Advisory Board , New Delhi - Sri Lanka Guardian