India’s various dilemmas: Domestic, regional, global

by Harsh V. Pant

(December 08, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Indian government’s inability to articulate a coherent anti-terror policy has resulted in a rather farcical situation where anyone who is someone is now pontificating on what can be done. From Amitabh Bachchan’s decision to put his loaded revolver under his pillow to Simi Garewal’s advocacy of launching attacks on terror camps in Pakistan, the media is leaving no stone unturned in putting up a theatre of the absurd for its viewers. This is what happens when a government abdicates its responsibilities and the political establishment loses even the last remaining shreds of its credibility.

The Prime Minister rather grandly declared in his address to the nation that he "will go after these individuals and organisations and make sure that every perpetrator, organiser and supporter of terror, whatever his affiliation or religion may be, pays a heavy price." He further suggested that he would "take up strongly with our neighbours that the use of their territory for launching attacks" will not be tolerated and that "there will be a cost if suitable measures are not taken by them". By doing so, he raised the stakes without realising that he doesn’t have very strong cards to play. The Pakistani government has all but accepted that it doesn’t control large parts of its territory and so it is not really its fault if some elements of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba planned Mumbai attacks there. After all, it is because of this reason that it has been allowing the US to carry out selective bombings in its own territory.

India, though, is another matter. The present government in Islamabad cannot allow Indian raids into its territory without causing its own demise. Would it serve Indian interests to have an Islamist-military government in Islamabad or full-fledged chaos with even the current semblance of authority gone? Meanwhile, the US would like a restrained response from India not least because its own strategy in Afghanistan is premised upon Pakistani support on the western frontier. Last but not the least, it should not be forgotten that the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan has forever changed the context in which wars will be fought in the region.

The nuclear aspect is important because it is part of the reason that elements within the Pakistani security establishment have become more adventurous. Realising that India would be reluctant to escalate the conflict because of the threat of it reaching the nuclear level, sections of the Pakistani military and intelligence have pushed the envelope on the sub-conventional front, using various terror groups to launch assaults on India. For India, this presents a structural conundrum: nuclear weapons have made a major conventional conflict with Pakistan unrealistic yet it needs to find a way to launch limited military action against Pakistan without crossing the nuclear threshold. Nuclear weapons have allowed Pakistan to shield itself from full-scale Indian retaliation as well as to attract international attention on the disputes in the sub-continent. This was after all what happened during the 2001-02 military stand-off between India and Pakistan after the terror attacks on Indian Parliament. To resolve this structural dilemma, Indian strategists have focused on "Cold War" military doctrine — the ability to launch quick, decisive limited strikes against Pakistan to seize some territory before the international community could intervene, which can then be used as a post conflict bargaining chip.

This doctrine is still evolving and it is not clear how effective it would be in making sure that the conflict remains limited as Pakistan might be forced to bring down its nuclear threshold to respond to this challenge. What needs to be recognised, however, that Indian options are severely limited and its adversaries know this.

Given this strategic reality, the Indian government should have formulated its anti-terror strategy long back. Terrorism is the biggest threat India has faced sine the 1980s and though the nature and scope of the threat has changed over the years, there has been no attempt to think through this problem.

It requires action at various levels simultaneously, a comprehensive solution that allows India to leverage its strength while minimising its weaknesses. Before India can point fingers at Pakistan, it would help if it is fully prepared to deal with this menace domestically. At a time when India needs effective institutional capacity to fight the ever-more sophisticated terror networks, Indian police and intelligence services are demoralised to an unprecedented extent. The blatant communalising of the process under which the security forces were forced to call off searches and interrogations for fear of offending this or that community has led to a situation where the security services have become risk-averse.

The domestic institutional apparatus, therefore, needs an overhaul with an effective coordinating agency, and potent anti-terror laws. From everything one could see on television and read in various publications, the response of the various Indian security services was tragically belated, confused and unsophisticated by modern standards. The temptation will now be to have new structures. But the existing internal security organisation remain under-funded and understaffed. It’s not clear if the new ones will be any more effective. Moreover, despite all our preparations, India will be struck again and the next attack could be even more lethal. So the state capacity should look beyond what can be reasonably imagined and prepare for that eventuality.

At a more fundamental level, however, the debate between liberty and national security needs to be resolved promptly. All major democracies face this challenge, but unlike India, most find answers, imperfect though they might be. The Indian state is facing a crisis of confidence. It should restore its authority at the earliest and take on the extremists head on, whether radical Islamists or Hindus, sending a clear message that whatever one’s justification of grievances, violence would not be condoned. Nation’s security should be paramount, with no group having a higher claim. The simple task of enforcing the rule of law has often seemed to be beyond the competence of the Indian government, allowing extremists to take over the broader discourse on national security.

At the regional level, this crisis allows India to once again make it plain to the world that it cannot expect to win in Afghanistan by ignoring Pakistan’s eastern frontier. The objectives of terror groups operating in Afghanistan and India are similar and unless a holistic view is taken of the region, neither Afghanistan will stabilise nor India will get a respite from constant attacks. India should build pressure on the US and the international community so that the Zardari government in Islamabad is forced to take substantive verifiable actions against terror groups operating from their territories.

India’s case must be couched in a language that makes it clear to the world that if collective pressure can be brought to bear on Islamabad, it will not only benefit India but the global community’s efforts in stabilising Afghanistan. India should start demanding a fundamental restructuring of Pakistan’s security organisations as it is clear to everyone now that they are as culpable in the mess that is unfolding in Afghanistan and in the continuing menace of terrorism in India.

Ultimately, however, India needs to realise that it is in this alone. It will have to rise to the challenge that the present moment in its history demands, otherwise the very idea of India would soon be a fond memory.

Harsh V. Pant teaches in King’s College London - Sri Lanka Guardian