From Anuradhapura to Bombay

by Nalin Fernando

(December 05, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Jihadist terrorist attack in Bombay (Population 19 million) the commercial capital of India on November 27, which killed nearly 200 people was cowardly, brutal and outrageous.

That is what must be emphasized and not what expert level of planning and training went into killing innocent people as the media is oft wont to emphasise. Sadly, it recalls in much the same way the Indian trained but surely not planned Tiger terrorist attack on pilgrims, most of them women, worshipping in Anuradhapura in 1985. Last week, Western countries zeroed in rapidly to condemn the Bombay outrage in contrast to their hesitant response to what happened in Sri Lanka 23 years ago. Now there is a fear of another Indo-Pak war, if irrational thinking prevails as it often does, in South Asia.

In 1985, Tiger terrorists, well armed and trained, in uniforms resembling that of the Sri Lanka army came in a bus and shot dead over 200 pilgrims worshipping at the sacred Bo tree in the sacred city of Anuradhapura. Having committed their despicable foul deed, the killers escaped into the jungles of the Wilpattu Wild Life Sanctuary in a hijacked vehicle. On the way out, they attacked a police post, captured some policemen and then entertained themselves by taking turns in stabbing the bound policemen to death. On entering the sanctuary, they killed several unarmed Wilpattu park wardens. The massacre was exulted in the Indian media as an attack on the ‘heartland’ of Sri Lanka.

The main difference with Bombay in 2008 was that the Anuradhapura attack was over in a very short time, before even the military could mount a proper response. There was no media local or international to cover it as it happened. This actually saved Sri Lanka much embarrassment as the Sri Lankan forces then were taken completely by surprise, woefully equipped, poorly organized and ill prepared. The Tigers however videoed the attack and sent copies round to the Tamil Diaspora to satiate their cravings and encourage them to increase their funding for more such murders. Gloating over their barbaric skills and the terror it caused, the LTTE repeated such attacks in Kathankundy in the east, mowing down nearly 100 Muslims praying in the mosque, in Arantalawa novice Buddhist priests were gunned down.

They also amongst others, attacked the Dalada Maligawa (Temple of the Holy Tooth Relic) in Kandy and another mosque (40 killed) in the east, not forgetting the attacks in the Pettah bus stand (190 killed), Central Bank (120 dead), Meenabakum airport Madras, India (50 killed) Fort and Dehiwala railway stations (total of over 150 killed altogether) and killed 600 policemen in the east while a ceasefire was on.

In Sri Lanka, there was shock and dismay as the events in Bombay unfolded on TV for over three days and great sorrow and sympathy was expressed for the people who died and were wounded. This was to be expected from a country and a neighbour that has suffered terrorism for over 25 years.

Sri Lanka must hope that India, which for an emerging superpower performed woefully in the Bombay mayhem, will get things right soon if it is to counter terrorism. The behaviour of its politicians, other than those ministers and advisors who resigned as is the tradition there, was atrocious, especially the opposition led by Advani. It was no different from their Sri Lankan colleagues. No Indian MP could have been ignorant of the deficiencies of the national security apparatus, but being involved in selfish and lesser issues, did and said nothing until November 26.

The political response however, appears now to be plain jingoist belligerence with the general public, the opposition and the media joining in.

The Bombay attack was another abysmal Indian intelligence failure despite the known reach of al Quida, the Taliban and international Jihadists peering over the Hindu Kush into Kashmir. There was only a perfunctory response to intelligence warnings. Additional ‘security’ (policemen armed with .303 rifles) was posted at the Taj hotel. Unsurprisingly, they proved to be useless against the terrorists AK47s. Warning messages in the media like the ‘Deccan Herald’ a few months before and an explicit radio intercept a few days before as well as a warning of exactly such an attack by the USA were apparently lost in bureaucratic tangles amongst the various Indian intelligence agencies. The situation was compounded by the undue delay to respond effectively when the attack took place.

Amazingly, on the first day, despite the ferocity of the merciless attack, there were no helicopters to be seen. Perhaps no contingency plan existed. Only the Bombay police were immediately available. Their limitations were quickly, exposed especially after the head of the police and others wearing woefully inadequate body armour and helmets were killed in their vehicle on the way to the scene. The fire brigade appeared listless while their inability to get through to the floors on fire showed the severe inadequacies of their equipment. Only the odd ambulance coasting along could be seen, instead of a fleet of them as the casualties were mounting by the score. The unfolding drama however appeared to whip up the pirouetting, ebullient and frenzied local electronic media, acutely conscious of its global reach. It provided entertainment, not information. Caught up in this global spotlight the local military high command and later the fleshy commander of the Commandos gave inappropriate interviews even before the siege was over, harping on their troops dedication and the sacrifices even though results were long in coming. The TV coverage which was beamed around the world must have been picked up by the terrorists too and could have been made use of if it had been better. Fortunately for the security forces, Indian TV was aimless, not knowing what to report but hailing any minor thing that caught its fancy, while smoke billowed and firemen stood idly by. The police (one with his hand in his pocket), lacking any plan, concentrated more on pushing onlookers back rather than isolating the conflict area or seriously confronting the attackers. They were no match for the terrorists and 16 died. It must have looked surreal to both the victims and the onlooker’s alike, if not the terrorist, for nearly three days – like a Bollywood film.

The first troops to arrive did not look competent and were seen moving around virtually aimlessly. However, a few South African Commandos who luckily happened to be in the Taj Hotel to provide protection to their country cricketers who had come for the league cricket, armed only with knives, went into action and took over 120 people to safety, a super achievement. The only terrorist caught had brazenly tried to escape (in a police car?) in the melee. This type of attempt was bound to occur with thousands of onlookers milling around and panic stricken escapees streaming out.

The arrival of the Indian commandos, more than 24 hours after the violence had erupted, intriguingly named ‘Black Cats’, wearing black overalls but with incongruously speckled green body armour, quickened expectations. They had to come from Delhi by air, having waited seven hours to get a flight. On arrival in Bombay, they took a further few more hours to arrive at the scene from the airport!

They appeared to have few helicopters at their service and rappelling from them, which is the best way to approach high rise buildings in like situations, appeared to be inadequately resorted to. Why were they not sent to Bombay immediately, on receiving the warning from the USA which specifically mentioned the Taj Hotel, instead of waiting in Delhi/Agra without a plan even for induction? However, simply having dedicated aircraft or distributing commandos in packets all over India is not a panacea either for poor pro-active action.

There must have been many who compared the efforts of the Indian commandos with the Iran-gate effort of the British SAS in 1980. This is not unfair despite the much greater area of operation in Bombay as the terrorist force was nearly the same. The techniques, skills and tactics for getting into and fighting in buildings where hostages are being held are too well known. There were six terrorists in the Iranian Embassy building with 26 hostages. When the SAS went into action, it was all over in just 11 minutes!

Of the two hostages who died, one was an Iranian Press officer who had been killed before the SAS operation began. The SAS had practiced for just such an assault for seven years. It will be good if the Indians even now pocket their not inconsiderable pride, arrogance and condescending attitude and look outwards to world class organizations like the SAS to help them. Sri Lanka should have thought to offer its commandos to help, even if the response of the Indians would have been predictable. Sri Lanka’s Commandos’ experience and skills in urban guerilla warfare have been honed by continuous and hard fighting for over 25 years, a feat which probably has no equal in the world, even if not acknowledged by some. They were initially trained by the SAS. However, the Indian intention to prevent casualties amongst the hostages and their rescue of some must be commended although the time taken (three days) to subdue, at the most 10 terrorists, while nearly 200 died will be an unenviable record the Indians will not be happy to remember.

Predictably, a chastened India has turned its ‘missiles’ on Pakistan which just as predictably has denied any involvement in the attack. Whatever the antecedents of the attackers were, there can be no reasonable belief that the Government of Pakistan now civilian, prone to terrorist attack themselves and hoping for economic recovery, could have instigated or been in any way involved. No longer is Pakistan seeking military glory like under its former president General Musharaff (of Kargill fame – Pakistan’s Pearl Harbour and strategic blunder which resulted in the Subramanium report that unfortunately India did not act upon).

It is plain to any unbiased observer that the steadily improving good relations between the two countries were a severe threat to the outlawed ‘Jihadists’, some of whom are Indian, who though based in Pakistan are on the run and have caused greater mayhem there. Any attempt by India to go for a military response will surely cause unprecedented turmoil in the sub continent, not the least of which would impact on its own Muslim population of 150 million, a good number from Bombay which alumni include Ali Jinnah, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan and Musharaff himself. The idea of Indian nationhood would be jolted, if not fractured.

Karunanidhi on the other hand, must be on his knees worshipping every known Hindu god pleading that the Hindu dominated Indian army be reserved for his use in Sri Lanka to save Prabakaran. Ironically, while Tamil Nadu (TN) blackmails the central government with its own separatist threats of a Dravidian empire, that must surely be a nightmare Karunanidhi must hope will never materialise, especially now that India boasts it is about to be a world power with all that it promises for TN’s future.

The bogey of a Bombay like attack by the LTTE on Colombo’s hotels became an instant pundit oriented project of those who seek thrills here. Let there be no question about it. The LTTE are unlikely to attack Colombo’s hotels as the LTTE scrupulously avoids casualties to foreigners, whose goodwill they crave. There is therefore no need to offer even one of these luxury premises state protection to save the hotels the expense, obviously for favours, for Colombo’s elite which have disengaged from the national effort, to enjoy the ‘season’ guarded by the very military it criticizes. The LTTE however, selectively targets the poor, other than VIPs, buses and trains and people at worship and slash and burn villages of the desperately poor Sinhalese in the Wanni and Ampara. They are the ones whose sons and daughters protect Sri Lanka and need to be protected, always.

Can anything good come out of this attack? Yes, it already has. It was a revelation to see how the Muslims of India rallied round the tri-colour and Indians everywhere kept vigil for the dead, strengthening their bonds of nationhood in the face of grief and sorrow, a lesson for us. The keepers of the Muslim burial grounds prohibited the burial of the terrorist dead in their cemeteries, an unprecedented decision. There was also a universal condemnation of all politicians. Hopefully, Modi’s IPL may not be able to seduce our ungrateful cricketers whose patriotism was of the scoundrel’s variety and whose missing ‘Cancer Hospital’ project for which public funds were collected, now stands exposed.

As alarming tension grows in the Punjab, it is now up to the main two sub continental states to get together and pool their resources, including information, skills training and operations to prevent such outrages, rather than throw accusations at each other which could boil over. It maybe time that this cooperation in expanded to become a combined South Asian anti-terrorist operational HQs which can be activated whenever a threat manifests itself. They can later combine and form a SATO on the lines of similar international organisations. Or, is the sub-continent to continue, mired in the thinking of the 1950s of big, bigger and small and smallest/insignificant separate states with some being regional bullies? With the global reach of terrorism, no longer will any of the states of the ‘Indian’ sub-continent have the luxury of private sanctuaries from which others are excluded, so that they can practice individual methods of tackling terrorism. This is a borderless if not global exercise where all in the region must cooperate and coordinate their responses from Baluchistan to Kashmir to the Wanni and not limit it to Bombay. However, if any country unilaterally instead attempts to reserve the right to cross border intervention, the sub-continent could explode with two nuclear armed powers caressing the nuke button, one chanting mantras and the other reciting verses with millions of tickets to Nirvana or Paradise.

On a slightly lighter note, it was heartening especially for the National Patriotic Front one must presume, to hear the Pakistani High Commissioner in London responding when asked whether he denies the attackers were Pakistani. "You know the North Indians are fair skinned. The faces of the terrorists I saw on Indian TV were dark. Could they have been Tamil Tigers from Sri Lanka?"

Bravo your Excellency, even if you were possibly wrong. They might even have been from Tamil Nadu!

This article first appeared on the 'The Island', daily news paper based in Colombo- Sri Lanka Guardian