Democratisation & Demilitarisation

by N Sathiya Moorthy

(December 15, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The declaration by Eastern Province Chief Minister Sivanasethurai Chandrakanthan alias Pillaiyan that his ruling TMVP cadres would be laying down arms before long is welcome. Even more welcome would be proof that the promise is being kept – as more than a promise. It reflects the evolving situation on the ground, and at the same time provides pointers to the possibilities for the North, where again the raging 'ethnic war' is interspersed with weak calls for a political solution and weaker intentions for a negotiated settlement.

The immediate question is about an early ceasefire before reviving the negotiations process. The Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa is right in pointing out that no ceasefire involving the LTTE had held in the past. Colombo has no reason to believe that one would hold now too. Going by experience, the argument is that the LTTE would use up the ceasefire to recruit, re-train, regroup and rearm itself before finding newer excuses to go back to war with the Sri Lankan State.

The Government's suspicions are not without validity even in these changed military circumstances, in which the LTTE is at the receiving-end. LTTE supremo Veupillai Prabhakaran's annual "Heroes' Day" speech did not inspire confidence. The more recent call by his Political Wing chief, B Nadesan, for the civilians of the Vanni area to fight alongside has lent credibility to charges that the LTTE was using the civilian population as 'human shields'.

However, this does not alter another situation. Ever since the end of war in the Eastern Province, the Sri Lankan Government has been claiming that demilitarization of the Province had preceded democratization. The reference has been to the end of war and thus the defeat of the LTTE -- and also to the subsequent conduct of democratic elections in the Eastern Province, however relative that democracy be.

Chief Minister Chandrakanthan's promise now to ensure that his cadres would lay down all arms before long is thus a confession that the goal has not been achieved already. This does not make his emergence and elevation as Chief Minister any less relevant or historic. Nor does it wish away the political role that former militants like Chandrakanthan and Vinayagamurthy Muralitharan alias 'Col Karuna', have come to don with ease and comfort, as part of the mainstreaming process.

Instead, it holds out some promise for the Northern Province, where the LTTE too could be helped to enter the democratic process even while retaining their arms – without using them, until such time mutual confidence had been built. A mainstreaming course of the kind would also ensure that there is no 'residual militancy' left for the Sri Lankan State or other nations to worry about, in the event of a militarist neutralisation of the LTTE – either in the form of direct actions, support bases or new-generation Diaspora initiatives.

Therein is the hitch, yet. As the Government is not tired of reiterating, the 'trust deficiency' in the case of the LTTE has been too high that even neutral observers from the international community are not over-awed by any LTTE offer of ceasefire in the recent past. Now that Nadesan has spoken for the LTTE, the Tamil polity cannot escape the responsibility of having to speak for the Tamil civilians in their numbers who are trapped in the 'LTTE-controlled areas'.

With their Tamil Nadu brethren arguing their case with the Government of India, and New Delhi having dispatched food and medicines, among others, the duty now is for the Tamil polity in the region to obtain freedom for the trapped civilians. The LTTE and the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) could continue with the war, if they so desired, after ensuring that unwilling civilians are not caught in the crossfire, and literally so.

It is here that statements by the Sri Lankan Army chief, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka, among others, fail to inspire confidence in the Tamil civilian population. Leave aside his calling certain Tamil Nadu politicians 'jokers', for which his Government had to express regrets to the Indian counterpart. Gen Fonseka's earlier declaration that "Sri Lanka belongs to the Sinhalas" and the "minorities cannot make undue demands" was as self-defeating as it was provocative.

Statements like this often have proved counter-productive in the past, and cannot serve a different purpose now. Yet, the embattled and embittered Tamils in the North can take their cue from the East, where there have not been any complaints since about motivated victimisation of their brethren at the hands of the armed forces. The residual bloodshed in the East owes mostly to 'familial exchanges' between the TMVP factions, and also the LTTE.

It is in this context, President Rajapaksa's Inauguration offer of 2005, for a face-to-face with Prabhakaran needs a re-look. LTTE sympathisers, Diaspora groups and representatives have seldom reflected Prabhakaran's minds at negotiations in the past. With the result, Prabhakaran had either felt peeved at the decisions made, or had gone back on them – either after an irretrievable stage had been reached in the negotiations or an agreement, reached. A face-to-face instead would be more than a face-saver for all. It could produce the real solution.

Such talks could be held on neutral ground, where aides are reassured that Prabhakaran would come to no harm. Their men can still fight, if that is what it has to be – but then the pressure on the former would be to produce results on the political front just as there would be pressure on the latter, on the military front.
---------
The writer is Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF-C), the Indian policy think-tank, headquartered in New Delhi.The article originally published by the Daily Mirror, Colombo based daily news paper. - Sri Lanka Guardian