Plan for a quick election means Catch 22 situations in Battle field

"For this campaign five things are important: Objective (Execute the forces and coordinate the attack), Intelligence (Take full details of the military operation plan and their strength), Time (Take sufficient time to prepare for the battle plan), Concealment (defensive positioning and counter attack), Absorb attack (Key for the final phase of the counter attack), Realism (time for regroup)."

by Arush from Wales for Sri Lanka Guardian

(November 19, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) “I am confident the Sri Lankan military has very best intentions in the world. Surely, they would like to have greater capability and capacity, but the progress they are making is commendable,” “We are assured and gratified by the progress that the Sri Lankan military is making, and I think, the Sri Lankan military would be the first to admit that there is work to be done.” Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of US Pacific Joint Command, told foreign correspondents in New York on beginning of this month.

This statement clearly revelled that the US position in the Sri Lankan ethnic war. It is not difficult to understand their policies against Tamils and supporting war rather than the peace. Its new allies India also very active against Tamils and peace. Most of the Tamils believed that the Congress led Indian central government was the key player to destroy the ill fated ceasefire agreement, which was effective from 2002 and now it is playing an important role in the war against LTTE. But thousands of Tamils lost their lives and more that half a million people displaced.

By getting valuable support from India, USA and other countries, the Sri Lankan armed forces intensifying their operation in Vanni, where nearly 300,000 civilians living without any proper humanitarian aid. The daily raids of SLAF and shelling hamper them more and more.

According to the present military movement, Sri Lankan government and its allies firmly believe that the LTTE are actually much weaker than they were when they signed the ceasefire agreement in 2002. Therefore they catogarilly denied to bound with a cease fire with LTTE, which was offered by the LTTE on beginning of this month in response of the Indian communist party issue.

Therefore the dominant impulse driving the Sri Lankan government's priorities in present is inevitably to maintain this military advantage. This in turn would inexorably dampen the Sri Lankan state's will to come to any sort of accommodation with the Tamils, including the political solution. This atmosphere was created by India and USA led collision, it is well understandable.
Response to this government war strategy, the officials of Liberation Tigers in Vanni say that the army wants to draw them widely into battles and thereby destroy their power of resistance by opening several fronts simultaneously in the ongoing 21 months long Vanni operation. But LTTE strategy is different, their future counter offensive against this operation, which will destroyed the Sri Lankan military fighting ability in future, they further said. It appears from what they say that they want to destroy the army rather than retreat.

Is it possible to them?

Achieving this means that the battle will be relatively divided into two phases: the defensive one, starting from the March 2007 up to the now, and the offensive one, beginning in near future.
For this campaign five things are important: Objective (Execute the forces and coordinate the attack), Intelligence (Take full details of the military operation plan and their strength), Time (Take sufficient time to prepare for the battle plan), Concealment (defensive positioning and counter attack), Absorb attack (Key for the final phase of the counter attack), Realism (time for regroup).

During these five natures, their military strength will be intact (preserving all their military assets) and need to improve their recruitment levels. Finally they have to allow the mass army into a vast territory with weak supply line and then pinned down them completely.

Now let us see how they can fare in each.

No doubt as to their intention preserving their military assets intact as they did during Riviresa and Jeyasikurui. At the Riviresa time they had the Vanni completely to themselves into which they could withdraw with all their military resources. At the Jeyasikurui time they moved into northeast and northwest of the Vanni.

Now, most of their heavy weapons may be transferred to the eastern part of the Vanni regions. Although the army says they want to secure both eastern and western hinterlands of the Vavuniya - Kilinochchi road (A-9), the concentration of forces is apparently on the west of it. Even if Jayasikurui succeeds in its final phase, the western sector of the Vanni was remained largely in the hands of the LTTE. Now eastern sector is in their hand. And also dominating all the dense jungles of eastern Mullaithivu is an impossible task-the IPKF discovered this in late eighties. This trap is a Catch 22 situation for the Army as long as the LTTE keeps all its military assets secure.

The LTTE can keep up its current recruitment level and even improve it as long as forming civil defence forces, which system is currently intact in many countries like Israel and Singapore so on. It also has ample area to train and maintain a large number of troops in the eastern part of the Vanni. According to the Vanni sources, recently LTTE was created two full divisions there, such as Brig. Balraj Division and Brig. Thamilselvan Division, each consist nearly 10,000 carders.
In the eastern province, the Liberation Tigers have increased their activities, within couple of months paramilitary group TMVP lost more than 20 cadres and Srilankan forces also suffering a lot but they did not revealed it because it will severally affect the government political agenda and recruitment drive, which is directly related to the ongoing military operation in the Vanni. Some sources said that the recruitment level also going up in east now.

Accordingly, the army’s operational strategy would be as such:

Task Force 1 (Div.58) was moved to Pooneriy now and trying to move to Paranthan junction, which is 9 km from the current FDL. The 57 Division is trying to penetrate into the South of Kilinochchi and the aim is by passing the Kilinochchi town, to link up with the Div. 58. In the meantime, Task Force 2 (Div.62) and Task Force 3 (Div.63) will link up form killinochchi to Mankulam.

These four Divisions are trying to advance a 50- 60 km long flank west of the A 9 road. However, the LTTE is trying its best to prevent the army from taking areas in the east of A-9 highway. The position of the LTTE and the troops of Div. 57 are at very close range at Akkarayankulam.

Heavy fighting has continued in the Mankulam area south of Kilinochchi and the Muhamalai front line in the last three days with hundreds of casualties reported as LTTE put up stiff resistance against troops advancing into the Vanni. Defence Watch meanwhile said that at least 200 soldiers had been killed and over 300 injured in the fighting in the last three days and hundreds had been admitted to hospitals in south.

It is believed that LTTE have heavily fortified this area, at the same time the LTTE is thwarting attempts by Div.59 from spreading itself towards the eastern sector of Mullaithivu. The LTTE’s objective in doing this is to draw the army in large numbers into the western part of the Vanni jungles and then pin it down by preventing it from clinching its strategic goals-link up to Killinochchi through Elephantpass.

The army’s strength in Vanni operation has been heavily beefed up by the addition of new divisions. There are now five full strength (56, 57, 58, 59 and 63) and two semi strength (61 and 62) divisions in the Vanni theatre. The new unit is Div.63. It is an infantry division which was raised last month.

Div.63, which began operations this month under the command of Brigadier Sathyapriya Liyanage from the North West of Mankulam. Troops launched their operations form Panikkankulam area and were heading towards Mankulam in order to take control of the A-9 road Kokavil to Mankulam. Defence Ministry of Sri Lanka said their troops of the task Force-3 flanked west of the A-9 main road at Vannivilankulam have entered the Mankulam area, following hours of heavy fighting with LTTE on Monday (17).

Sri Lanka Army (SLA) launched another offensive push for the third consecutive day from Jaffna on Monday (17) morning. But the three frontal (Mukamaalai, Ka'ndal and Ki'laai) attacks of Div.53 and 55 were thwarting after the stiff resistance by LTTE. Meanwhile, the SLA which claimed its Div.59 troops entered Kumizhamunai near Naayaa'ru lagoon south of A'lampil in Mullaiththeevu district.

It is obvious, the army put multi front pressure to LTTE, but if we consider the geographical size of the area in which Div.57, Div. 58, Div. 59 and Div.63 are concentrated it will be clear that unless the army secures either Killinochchi or A-9 highway, the LTTE can easily achieve its objective of catching the army in its own trap. Because the Sri Lankan army full divisions that are deployed in the war zone have only about seven to nine thousand troops each (normally an army division on the average consists of fifteen thousand soldiers) and semi divisions are 3,500 – 5,000 troops each.

There have been several direct attacks and ambushes as well in the region where these divisions are concentrated now. Harassing and wearing down a significant portion of the army’s will and strength within a manageably sized theatre of operations in the Vanni is the primary concern of the LTTE now. Keeping the Army spread into a vast theatre of operation is clearly the LTTE’s motive in the Vanni war.

According to the LTTE officials, the counter battle against the Vanni operation will be another Stalingrad Battle, which was the most important part of the World War II. The Stalingrad Battle lasted 200 days and nights and relatively divided into two periods: the defensive one, starting from the July up to the November, 1942, and the offensive one, beginning from the November, 1942 up to the February, 1943.

In this battle German lost its finest collection of divisions (Sixth Army—at 17 divisions and Fourth Panzer Army) in an army. The reasons for the scale of the defeat included the Germans' lack of preparation for the harshness of the Russian winter, the overextension of their supply lines across their newly-captured areas, and Hitler's unwillingness to consider retreat.

Russians celebrate victory

Most of the military analyst estimates that the Axis armies—including the satellite forces—lost more than half a million troops between August and the final surrender at Stalingrad. The loss of equipment was on an equally catastrophic scale. It was destroyed the fighting ability of the German army.

No matter how well a campaign is planned, no matter how finely equipped and trained and battle-hardened an army is for a campaign, the moral qualities of the leadership remain of the highest importance.

The German soldier at all levels was superior to his Russian counterpart— his morale was higher as well—and in any case, the High Command was convinced in the summer of 1942 that the Russians had no strategic reserves left. According to a capabilities-based approach to war, the Germans were right to proceed as they did and would probably have defeated the Russians at Stalingrad—just as the Russians would have crushed the Germans in the opening weeks of Operation Barbarossa.

We can understand the similar strategy for the current Vanni operation. If the LTTE was trying to keep the eastern province, they would be lost significant amount of its military asserts. If they would have crushed the Sri Lankan army in the initial stage of the Vanni operation, they could be lost significant military assert in terms of man and materials. But they strategically avoid all of these situations. Pullout means that military asserts are being pushed from one battle field to another without any significant damage for what is needed.

Now the Sri Lankan state realise the real catastrophic situation ahead for them, the battle field will change at any time, that’s why the allies of Sri Lanka's government planed to call for a quick election now. But the LTTE counter offensive, it will not be a military achievement alone, it will have some political value as well. - Sri Lanka Guardian