I have been writing a monthly assessment of the Sri Lanka situation for 'Security Trends' a strategic security journal published from New Delhi. They reflect my ability to assess the future course of events in Sri Lanka. These are written at the end of each month and contain an assessment on future trends. They are published here with the permission of the publishers.
Sri Lanka Perspectives - July 2008
Overview
(November 04, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) During the month of July 2008 Sri Lanka appeared to have three major preoccupations in addition to the military operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) going on since January 2006. Thee were: the tightening up of the security arrangements for the 14th Conference of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) scheduled to take place from July 27 to August 3, in Sri Lanka’s capital Colombo, warding off the flack from the two major opposition parties – the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the United National Party (UNP) over the government’s conduct of the SAARC meeting, and preparing for the forthcoming provincial council elections in two provinces.
On the international front, the visit of a European Union parliamentary delegation that had come to appraise the human rights situation in Sri Lanka in the third week of July 2008 turned sour when they could not visit Trincomalee in eastern province as per their itinerary. They came down hard on the government over alleged human rights abuses being committed in the country. At the end of their visit, Robert Evans, the head of the delegation, expressed doubts about Sri Lanka qualifying for the GSP Plus trade concessions which are due for renewal by the EU in 2009.
The security forces made considerable progress in the Mannar and Welioya sectors on the west and east of A9 Kandy-Jaffna high way. With the newly raised on a defensive role in Madhu church area, 57 Division and the two task forces launched a two pronged advance in tandem with the advance of 58 Division operating east of them. By the end of the month they managed to gain control of nearly 400 sq km area. In the process they eliminated a series of LTTE strongholds in Palamadu, Vidattalthivu, Iluppakkadavai gaining control of a vital segment of A32 coastal road running from Mannar to Pooneryn. Vidattalthivu was a Sea Tiger base which in conjunction with Illuppakkavai and Nachiguda had been denying the parts of Palk Bay to the Sri Lanka Navy. This had facilitated the smuggling of vital supplies from India to keep the LTTE going in the war. Now the security forces are set to secure line Vellankulam-Tunukkai-Mallavi which will facilitate their further advance to Pooneryn/ Mankulam/ Kilinochchi.
The LTTE activity had mainly been defensive, avoiding big casualties in pitched battles against the advancing army. The LTTE had found it expedient to lie low in conducting unconventional operations for the time being as unprecedented security measures have been put in place in Colombo for the SAARC conference.
Military Operations
There were three major offensive operations during the month.
• In the Mannar Sector, Task Force-1 advancing from Adampan north of Mannar along the coast posed a threat to Vidattalthivu from the southwest, while 57 Division advancing along Palampiddi-Periyamadhu built up the offensive from east,. After 58 Division linked up with 57 Division on its eastern flank, struck at Vidattalthivu supported by army commandos and captured it on July 16. Approximately 200 LTTE cadres believed to have occupied these defences. Probably half of them managed to pull out to reinforce defence line Vellankulam-Tunukkai-Mallavi astride the road axis. However, after capturing Vidattalthivu the troops supported by commandos continued with the advance to capture Iluppakkadavai, another important stronghold of the LTTE. What is significant is that the LTTE had built a 10 km long defence bund from 2 km south of Vidattalthivu up to the east.
• 57 Division troops advancing towards Tunukkai-Mallavi east of Iluppakkadavai came under a counter attack by the LTTE after they captured Vavunikulam. The LTTE lost at least 29 cadres in this attack which was repelled.
• On the Welioya front, 59 Division managed to capture the LTTE strongholds in area west of Alampil and north of Janakpura. Now they are poised to pose a threat to Mullaitivu and to the heartland of LTTE’s Wanni defences.
These operations have clearly shown that the security forces are now capable of mounting coordinated large scale operations and integrating commandos effectively to penetrate well knitted defensive positions in a conventional offensive. They have also shown that the LTTE’s counterattack capability is lacking the bite perhaps due to shortage of trained troops and limitations of fire power. In the coming weeks the security forces should be able to secure the line Vellankulam-Tunukkai-Mallavi to build up an offensive against Pooneryn, Kilinochchi and or Mankulam..The Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has indicated that the LTTE would probably be confined to Wanni area east of A9 highway by November 2008.
LTTE
The LTTE had not been able to stem the advance of the security forces and we can expect it to shrink its defences further to beef up its depth defences as the battle progresses further. The LTTE's made a dramatic announcement on July 21 to "observe a unilateral ceasefire that is devoid of military actions” from July 26 to August 4 during the period of the SAARC conference. In a significant statement before the announcement Nadesan, the LTTE political head, told an interviewer that the LTTE was “not naïve to disturb the SAARC conference. We believe that the other countries of SAARC group will support us in our just struggle for the Tamil people.” This makes it clear the ceasefire move was probably part of overall LTTE strategy, to make a conciliatory gesture for international audience when focus is on the SAARC conference. India also might have conveyed a strong warning through R Sampanthan, the leader of the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance group in parliament, to advise the LTTE to desist from such a thought during the conference.
Though the LTTE gesture was laudable, it was unacceptable to the security forces when their offensive had made major gains and driven the LTTE from well established defences along the Mannar coast. Any ceasefire move would provide the LTTE a breathing space to recuperate and reinforce their losses to be ready to respond to the security forces offensive towards Pooneryn/Kilinochchi. So as expected, the Sri Lanka government rejected the LTTE's unilateral ceasefire announcement. In any case, the LTTE had not observed the ceasefire in the face of continuing security forces operation.
If the LTTE intention was to defend Pooneryn and Kilinochchi in order to retain its strategic control on A9 highway, it will have to stop the advance of security forces beyond line Vellankulam-Tunukkai-Mallavi and retain Mankulam. The LTTE has not exhibited military capability to launch a major counter offensive directly in this area. So it might attempt to destabilise the advancing forces by hitting at place of its choosing in the long line of communication. This might well be east of Omanthai on the A9 highway. Another large scale commando attack of the type launched on Anuradhapura air base is also possible on training assets in north central province.
Future portends
The capture of the Sea Tiger base at Vidattalthivu is likely to adversely affect the LTTE’s ability to sustain its operations as all smuggling operations from India are likely to be riskier with the navy gaining access to Palk Bay. Logically the LTTE would increase the incentives for Tamil Nadu fishermen to encourage them to take bigger risks now to keep the supply line going to Nachiguda and further north on the Mannar coast. This makes Nachiguda the next target of the security forces.
Capture of Nachiguda would enable the security forces to launch a coordinated army-navy offensive against Pooneryn. Fall of Poonery would open a second lifeline to Jaffna through A32 road reducing the importance of A9 highway.
Given the circumstances, this appears an attractive proposition for the security forces. However, if continued annihilation of the LTTE forces is the strategic intention, the offensive would shift towards Kilinochchi. The statements of both the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka and President Mahinda Rajapakse indicate this is a real possibility.
Much would depend upon the response of the LTTE to the ongoing offensive after the SAARC conference ends on August 3, though they might as well do it before that as a reaction to further advance. For immediate effect the LTTE might attempt the activation of sleeper cells in and around Colombo and in the vicinity of Polonnoruwa to carryout a number of sporadic strikes around a major attack on a choice target.
Courtesy: Security Trends
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com)
Post a Comment