Operational Developments in the Eelam War

"The morale of hardcore LTTE fighters defending the approaches to Kilinochchi is apparently still high as indicated by their ability to inflict high casualties on the troops, despite their own loss of men and territory. On the other hand, the security forces appear to be mentally prepared to press ahead with the offensive regardless of their casualties."

Operational fronts

(November 10, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The security forces put two weeks of sunny weather to good use, advancing their offensive further both along the Mannar coast and the axis Akkarayankulam-Kilinochchi, southwest of the administrative capital of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). According to the security sources Task Force-I formed out of 58 Division advancing on a broad front south east of A32 Mannar-Pooneryn axis are six km short of Pooneryn on October 10, 2008. They came under heavy LTTE resistance at Palayilkulam and Uruthirapuram on way.

The LTTE appears to be reducing its strength in Pooneryn. It is reported to have pulled out its three 130 mm How guns from Kalmunai point in the Pooneryn salient. This would indicate that the LTTE would then pull out from Pooneryn in small trickles even as it resists the advancing forces.

The LTTE have the options to infiltrate into Jaffna peninsula and the Kayts Island group, and Kilinochchi. The Kilinochchi option might not come through as the Task Force-I is moving to cut off Pooneryn - Paranthan road which joins the A9 Kandy-Jaffna highway. We can expect the navy to come into action in the last phase of Pooneryn operations both to contain and hunt down the LTTE cadres getting out through the lagoons around Pooneryn. The navy is reported to have deployed special boat squadrons to prevent such moves of LTTE.

The capture of Pooneryn would open up the A32 maintenance route to Jaffna in the coming weeks through the Sangupiddy ferry, relieving a major burden on the security forces in providing air and sea logistic support to Jaffna administration. After shifting from Kalmunai, the LTTE guns would not be able to engage Palali airfield and Jaffna forces headquarters.

57 Division advancing west of A9 captured by October 6 the well sited Akkarayankulam defence complex after three weeks of intermittent operations. It also claimed to have neutralized the long bund obstacle after fighting a few bitter battles. Its progress is slow due to strong opposition from the LTTE as well as heavy booby trapping of the route of advance. Forces of 57 Division are said to have reached Kokkavil on the A9 highway increasing the pressure on Kilinochchi. 57 Division is said to be consolidating itself 9 km southwest of Kilinochchi beyond Akkarayankulam.

In a bid to prevent any intrusion of the eastern flank of 57 Division from the LTTE, which is dominating the A9 highway from Mankulam to Kokkavil, the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka inducted the newly created Task force-III into this area. The task force, a weak division, operating parallel to the A9 highway on the west is said to have gained control of three km stretch of road from Mankulam northwards. This operation further increases the options available to Gen Fonseka to further progress the offensive.

LTTE's options

The increase in force levels of the security forces following the induction of Task Force-III has further reduced the options available to the LTTE to launch a counter offensive at a place of its choosing. After the fall of Pooneryn, the Sea Tiger operations also would be curtailed if not stopped along western coast from Mannar to Southern Jaffna coast.

So the LTTE will do what it knows best. Increase its guerrilla operations - the whole bouquet of sneak raids, suicide bombings, and killings - making them more deadly, catching the security forces on the back foot well away from the battlefield. The recent air strikes on Kelaniya power station and Thalladi military base in Mannar district are examples of such efforts. The air strikes succeeded because the air force elements in the rear areas were not mentally ready for taking on the wily LTTE intruder. For this purpose the LTTE is trying out novel methods to smuggle in material for suicide bombings and raids particularly in the eastern province and in Vavuniya district. Attacks on TMVP cadres and the STF, attributed to the LTTE have also increased in the east. However, so far the LTTE had not been able to disturb the government focus on war or trigger any major change in operational situation.

As pressure is building up on Kilinochchi defences, the LTTE could beef them up with cadres from Muhamalai front. Perhaps to prevent this possibility, 53 Division from Muhamalai had been keeping an offensive posture carrying out small but sharp attacks on the LTTE's forward defence lines. There is a strong possibility that the LTTE had already thinned out a major strength from Pooneryn along with the long range artillery moved out earlier. This would enable to strengthen the LTTE core strength in area Kilinochchi up to forward lines of Muhamalai front in the north. Thus the LTTE's sphere of operations is likely to be further constricted as more sunny days are predicted by weather watchers.

The recent 'reiteration' LTTE's readiness for ceasefire made by Nadesan, the political head of the LTTE, should be seen in this operational context. It is likely the LTTE would play its political strong suite with the Tamil Nadu card with emphasis on ceasefire as the core theme in Prabhakaran's Maveerar Day (Heroes Day) address in two weeks time. If the LTTE announces a unilateral ceasefire, the Tamil Nadu politicians' call for a ceasefire would get a new lease of life brushing aside the cynicism clouding the political moves in Tamil Nadu. That could create a lot of embarrassment for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Karunanidhi. If this is calculus is in the thoughts of Sri Lanka, we might see a large scale escalation of offensive in most of the war fronts in the coming two weeks.

Battle Casualties

According to the details given in Sri Lanka parliament, during last month the security forces suffered 171 killed and 1122 injured in operations, most of them around the Akkarayan defence complex. In comparison, during the operations in July 2008 the security forces lost 106 men and 662 were wounded. The large increase in the security forces casualties would indicate the fierce resistance put up by the LTTE. According to security sources the LTTE suffered nearly 700 killed, more than four times suffered by the security forces in the same period in October 2008.

Though these figures have not been verified by other sources, it is clear that casualties are hurting the LTTE more than the security forces as their overall strength and bank of recruits are much less. With the continuing exodus of civilians from the war affected areas, the LTTE would probably press more people of all ages into the war effort. This would further increase civilian casualties.

The morale of hardcore LTTE fighters defending the approaches to Kilinochchi is apparently still high as indicated by their ability to inflict high casualties on the troops, despite their own loss of men and territory. On the other hand, the security forces appear to be mentally prepared to press ahead with the offensive regardless of their casualties.

Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka, the Army Commander, in an interview claimed that 80 percent of the operation against the LTTE was over. Yet he estimated the LTTE strength at 12000. (In my own estimate, the LTTE strength of 12000 if accurate would probably be made up of 4000 hardcore cadres, and 2000-3000 young recruits. The rest are probably civilian auxiliaries pressed into service.) This appears to contradict the success claimed in the so called war strategy of attrition and annihilation of the LTTE. The government for the time being is probably only aiming to regain control over major parts of LTTE controlled north and open up a land based logistic route to Jaffna peninsula than carry on the war of attrition forever against the LTTE.

Veracity of information

The battle zones in the north are closed to independent media.Now international NGOs operating in the area have also vacated under the orders of the government. The only major source of information on operations is the defence spokesman and the government media. Under the new government regulatory dispensation for media, even the state TV is reported to be undergoing live censor. The LTTE, a closed organization, usually does not report the whole truth on casualties or operational details. Now the LTTE propaganda and media organs are mostly silent on the war. They are giving little additional information. So all operational assessments now suffer from a lack of verification through independent and unbiased sources of information

Despite this handicap and the asymmetry of insurgency environment, operational analysis follows inevitable military logic and reasoning on which warfare is based. By this yardstick, however much the information sources are suspect, a few home truths can be ferreted out in the present war situation in Sri Lanka. This tells us the LTTE has lost a major portion of its territory in the north and the whole of the east since January 2006. In the course of this, the LTTE has suffered heavy casualties, many times more than the security forces tally. Overall, the LTTE is now poised to lose its vital grip on the Jaffna peninsula's logistics jugular. In times to come this would reduce LTTE's influence on Tamils, provided their grievances are attended to by the government. Only time will tell whether the government would seize the opportunity, instead of talking only in terms of attrition, because so many such opportunities in the past were frittered away.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com) - Sri Lanka Guardian