“Failure to shoot down a LTTE aircraft despite timely detection by radar has amidst evidence that the TEAF has used a capability to neutralise the threat of a heat seeking missile attack. This would mess an overall of the SLAF’s strategy.”by Arush from Wales for Sri Lanka Guardian
(November 07, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Air tiger air raids hit the Sri Lankan capital again, this time not for one target they took two different targets from long distance (250km). The raids were the ninth and tenth carried out by the TEAF, since they launched their first attack in August 2006. Each raid directed at military and economic targets had involved four aircrafts, the official in Wanni said.
However, the defence sources said that two aircraft had taken off from east of Killinochchi and headed towards Mannar and Colombo. The Army’s 57th Division which operates along the front lines had detected the two aircraft and informed Colombo.
The first attack was in 10.20pm. After an hour later, they attacked in Colombo. According to military information bombs have fallen near Thalladi, Mannar where a Sri Lanka Army main base is located. At least three soldiers were injured in the attack in Mannar. Some military sources said that two low flying Zlin 143 light aircrafts that bombed Thaladi camp had been proceeding towards the President's House at Fort when they were diverted by heavy Anti-Aircraft gunfire.
Then they had flown closer to the Colombo harbour. Their direction, informed sources claimed, was towards the President's House. This area is highly fortified with AA batteries placed on all high rise buildings, including the Hilton Hotel, World Trade Centre Towers and the Bank of Ceylon building.
Meanwhile the air defence system was activated in Colombo and part of the city was placed under a blackout at around 10.45 pm. Residents living around in the City of Colombo and suburbs panicked. All guns including T-56s were directed towards the roaring sound of the aircraft. They also directed flash lights into the air. The entire sky over Colombo and suburb were illuminated with the lighting of the firing.
Normally, the most damage to low flying aircraft was sustained from anti-aircraft guns and artilleries from 7.62mm to 30mm in calibre. However, Good tactics, such as minimizing aircraft exposure time, may not give the enemy time to aim their weapon. Moving to a new position immediately after attacking a target, it will also reduce enemy engagement capabilities.
Amidst heavy firing towards the aircraft one aircraft reached the Kelanitissa power installation and dropped three bombs in that area. One bomb fell close to the gas turbine. Resulting explosion triggered a fire which caused damages to parts of the coolant system connected to it. The Air Force found that the bombs, weighing some 35 kilogram’s, contained C-4 explosives and large steel balls. Around 530 MW is produced at the Kelanitissa power plant and the damaged GT7 was producing 110 MW.
Few minutes after the plane was detected on radar, a fleet of modified F-7 jet fighters became airborne from Katunayake. They believed that the F-7s are the SLAF's counter to Zlin-143. An authoritative source said that Chinese F-7s had failed to zero-in-on the TEAF aircraft. “The aircraft missile systems failed to ‘lock on with the enemy aircraft," the source said. This was the third time the SLAF failed to protect the commercial capital of Sri Lanka from a TEAF.It is suspected that the LTTE air craft had some mechanism which prevented the missile system on the air force jets from locking onto its heat signal. For an example, Chaff is one in the family of countermeasures known as expendables. Chaff consists of amass of radar reflectors, that is launched as soon as a tracking radar locks on to a aircraft. The chaff has the effect of breaking lock which forces the radar system or its operator to re-establish lock.
Failure to shoot down a LTTE aircraft despite timely detection by radar has amidst evidence that the TEAF has used a capability to neutralise the threat of a heat seeking missile attack. This would mess an overall of the SLAF’s strategy.
For heat seeking missiles – they may have applied an infrared suppressing system, combined with infrared low reflective paint to resist detection by thermal imagery, reduces the acquisition range of heat-seeking missiles and enhances. But as some sources suggested that Zlins are emitting very small amount of heat that may drastically limit the range of IR missiles. If it is true the question is, in last September, how a heat seeking missile fired by F-7 interceptor brought down one of the two LTTE aircraft returning to their base after attacking Vavuniya air base? The SLAF has not show any solid evidence regarding down aircraft until now.
If they brought down the TEAF plane in Wanni within sort flying distance (Vavunia to Mullaithivu), the flying time was around 10 to 15 min, the SLAF got enough time to do some thing better for this time. Because TEAF had taken the two targets from long distance (more than 2 x 250 km) and longer time period (more than 180 minutes). But nothing was happened, some military analyst pointed out that during the last air raid in Vavunia, the government did some propaganda war for their own people, but now it was end.
The initial detection had been made north-east of Mannar at 10.18 p.m. by 2D radar installed by the Government of India at the SLAF base at Vavuniya then 2D radar installed at Palavi, Mannar. Thaladdi had come under attack within minutes after the detection. A Chinese JY-11 3D radar station located in the Mirigama had also detected the LTTE aircraft but SLAF failed to carry out a successful mission. 2D radar provides direction and the distance of a target whereas the Chinese radar provides even the altitude of a target.
Katunayaka radar picked it time to time. Some times they lost it due to obstacles. Which is caused by low flying tactics or a radar warning receiver which can provide immediate indication of radar, will alert the crew to help them decide what to do. Then they had changed their altitude. But these claims cannot be verified.
The TEAF came into public discussion in the late nineties. TEAF first use of air crafts was to sprinkle flowers over the cemeteries of the fallen LTTE cadres in Mulliyawalai during the annual Heroes Day celebrations in 1998. Then they flew over Palali firing rockets, attacked Katunayaka airbase, Palali again, Colombo on Cricket world cup night, Anuradhapura, Welioya, Trico Harbour, Vavuniya, and now they are back in Colombo. They have improved now, according to the military intelligence the TEAF has more than dozen deferent kinds of fixed – wing and rotary – wing aircrafts including five Czech built Zlin Z-143 four-seater light aircraft.
After the Katunayaka attack Sri lanka enhanced their anti-aircraft capability with India, Pakistan, China, Ukraine and some of the Western countries. India has already equipped air defence systems in Sri Lanka and its Air Force has trained SLAF personnel. Its neighbour Pakistan has also helped the Sri Lanka Air Force enhance its air capabilities by providing training and china had supplied six F-7s aircrafts with JY-11 3D radars. The SLAF recently upgraded fleet of MI-24s to intercept aircraft by adding radar, electronic warfare systems, FLIR, fully functional target tracking systems, and AAMs.
But TEAF take a challenge with these new technology and continuous their air attack without fear. This gave a big surprise to the Sri Lankan government regarding their night attack capability and survivability technology. Some military analyst predicted that the TFA using “stealth technology”, which is design for the military purpose of avoiding detection by radar or any other electronic system.
The Sea tigers were adapted with this technology from early part of this millennium. The attack on the Trinco harbour (Oct. 2000) was carried out by Sea Tiger Stealth Boats. The LTTE's Stealth Boat literally flew over the water at a speed of nearly 50 knots, one similar to a Sri Lankan Navy Dvora Fast Attack Craft. This indicated that the war brought both parties weaponry up to the standard known as "high technology."
The shift from a low level threat environment to higher intensities indicates the need for more advances in survivability technology. Survivability of combat aircraft is directly related to minimizing the likelihood of being detected. Direct line of sight acquisition requirements can be exploited tactically by training aircrew to fly at very low level using terrain masking techniques to minimize detection.
An air warfare expert Major Jordan D. Yankov (USMC CSC 1991) said that an aircraft has five distinct signatures by which its presence can be detected: visual, acoustic, radar, infrared, and electronic. Obviously, visual detection capabilities are degraded at night or during weather that produces marginal visibility. Low altitude flight operations afford ground clutter that can degrade a radar system's capability to track and distinguish targets. Flight profiles that off-set enemy detection capabilities often require advanced aircrew skills. Training programs that support tactical survivability concepts are essential.
Acquisition and engagement may further be reduced through the use of an integrated early warning system that is tailored to sense specific threat systems. The use of radar or infrared jammers, and chaff or decoy flares could cause sufficient threat system degradation to keep the aircraft from being engaged by enemy weapons.
Traditionally, light aircraft power and design limitations restricted available payload to fuel and mission specific equipment at the expense of ballistic hardening and survivability suites. But expanding the profiles and capabilities via modernizing light aircraft is within technological reach. Which was proved during the LTTE continues air assault now. What is required are aircrafts that are difficult to detect, difficult to hit when detected.
Some military analysts have commented that LTTE has been followed North Korean tactics. The tactics consisted of using small planes to surprise and embarrass the South Korean and American Air Forces (Korean War). But they should not be ignore one thing, even though LTTE using light slow moving aircraft they challenged with highly advanced SLAF countermeasure, which is more advance than 1950s.
It was reported that SLAF reconnaissance and fighter planes were patrolling in the air at the time of the return of the LTTE planes, but they failed to locate their landing place. Normally, LTTE aircrafts spend more time on the ground than they do in the air. Survival on the ground is possible by denying the enemy information on where the aircraft are based. Concealment and camouflage are essential to prevent enemy reconnaissance pilots and sensors from discovering hidden aircraft.
The LTTE continues air strike capability means the defence establishment will have to re-evolve counter measures to rear bases, troop movements, VIP residences and economically important targets. To a nation that is reeling under an economic crisis, such measures would be a costly burden.
Now, military sources said that plans are being drawn up by government to use the army, air force and the navy for the anti aircraft mission. The air force was also planning on using a new set of tactics to target Tiger aircraft but they could not reveal details due to security reasons.
Despite this new tactics, a top defence official said that around 3.30 am on 5th of November, Indra-II radars in Vavuniya detected an LTTE aircraft proceeding from LTTE controlled Iranamadu proximately two kilometres into cleared areas in Vavuniya. Military establishments in the area up to Mannar, Anuradhapura and Welioya were immediately alerted. However, the aircraft disappeared from the radars after it reached some two kilometres close to Vavuniya.
From these events, one thing is obvious, that not only the Sri Lankan government is gradually loosing its anti air defence strategy now but also LTTE air raid capability have improved. - Sri Lanka Guardian
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