HISTORY OF EELAM WAR
by Adele Balasingham
(October 22, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The year 1992 marked a new turning point in the Eelam War 2 with far-reaching consequences to the Government's grand design to wrest control of the North and East. The new strategy and tactics advanced by the LTTE m its offensive and defensive campaigns dealt a serious blow to the Sri Lankan military machine. A series of meticulously planned assaults on the army's defence lines, sentry positions and daring raids and ambushes by the LTTE fighters took a heavy toll of casualties unprecedented in the history of the armed conflict. Apart from the huge scale casualties in the land forces, the Navy and Air-force suffered serious set-backs with the destruction of naval vessels and aircrafts. In addition to these military debacles the sudden and unexpected killings of senior military commanders, who masterminded the Eelam War 2, in the LTTE's landmine explosion was a monumental disaster. The cumulative effects of these military mishaps generated a serious crisis within the armed forces and undermined the morale of the Sinhala soldiers. Large scale defections in the military and the reluctance of the Sinhala youth to join the army further contributed to the worsening of the crisis.
With the lessons of the battle of Elephant Pass, where the Tigers were compelled to confront the Sri Lankan forces in a conventional mode of warfare in a terrain disadvantageous for long drawn out confrontations, the LTTE military high command drew up a new strategy to radically change the military situation in its favour. The crucial element to gain the military balance, the LTTE realised, was to take the initiative in its hands and to launch a series of offensive assaults. Such a strategy would throw the enemy forces into utter confusion and deprive them of the temporal space to prepare for major military operations. Furthermore, the LTTE also realised the risks involved in confronting the army in open battles, in open spaces, without adequate conventional weapon systems.
From the Beginning of the year the LTTE forces put their war plan into action and carried out a series of operations with great success. While the LTTE fighters in the North launched a number of commando raids in relentless succession on the military defence posts and sentry positions, the Tiger guerrilla units in the East carried out a series of ambush attacks on army patrols and convoys. The LTTE's unabated assaults, resulting in a double figure casualty rate on the military in almost every attack, had a devastating impact. The army had to abandon its offensive strategies and was compelled to switch onto a defensive footing to protect its encampments.
This persistent offensive campaign of the Tigers seriously affected the logistic capability of the ground forces and severely undermined the morale of the troops in the forward positions. Thus, Pirabakaran' s new strategy during this year led to a grinding halt of the Sri Lankan military machine which was geared for a major invasion of the Jaffna Peninsula.
For the Sri Lankan armed forces 1992 was tragic year of military disasters. The army had to pay a heavy price for the miscalculations about the LTTE's military potential, its morale and its remarkable ability to re-organise and strike. Furthermore, the military planners in Colombo made a serious mistake in their strategy of territorial expansion and occupation of the Tamil areas whereby large contingents of troops have to be permanently deployed to hold onto the "conquered" territory which became vulnerable targets for the LTTE raids. Holding onto these no-man lands became extremely costly, risky and had to be paid for in blood. Several kilometres long "military fences" and defence sentry posts which were built by the army to reinforce the blockade of Jaffna Peninsula, were constantly subjected to commando raids with heavy toll of casualties on the troops.
In the year 1992 there has been innumerable incidents of raids and ambushes by the LTTE in the entire theatre of war encompassing the North and East in-which women fighters, have also participated. Here we wish to document two daring raid operations that took place at Kaddaikadu and on the eastern perimeters of Palali where women combatants played a major role.
A Daring Raid at Kaddaikadu
Both the Kaddaikadu and Palali operations constituted a new dimension in the guerrilla warfare in which the LTTE deployed a large force ofmale and female commandos in swift and daring raids on the security circle of the perimeters of the camps that were regarded by the security forces as impenetrable. The Sri Lankan army had built up massive security cordon to protect their installations. At Kaddaikadu near Vettilaikerni on the eastern coast of Vadamarachi, the armed forces bulldozed the sand into a two metre high wall for the entire twelve kilometre stretch from the coast to Elephant Pass army camp.
The "wall" or "military fence" was the first ring of the security measures at kaddaikadu army camp. In front of the bund, a short distance apart were two large fences of barbed wire. A minefield in front of the fences completed the security set up. Dotted within the bund were dozens of small sentry boxes housing four to six army men in each. Behind this extensive wall of defence the army men lapsed into a false sense of security never imaging that the LTTE would have the audacity to attack such a well fortified camp. The LTTE military high command, however, was not deterred by such measures, and planned a meticulously detailed operation.
The women combatants formed part of the fighting force deployed along the southern perimeters of the bund. Their objective was to penetrate through and breach the extensive network of security and attack and wipe out the sentry points. The operation was to be carried out with surgical precision 10 as to reduce the possibility of escalating the attack should the thousands of, troops from nearby Elephant Pass and Vettilaikerni army camps launch ail counter attack.
The operation got underway at midnight on the 1st October 1992. women cadres slithered across the white sand, under the cover of dark and their weapons on the ready. They passed over the minefield without set off a single explosion to alert the unsuspecting troops. With great resolve and fortitude they advanced closer towards the camp, cutting their w through the barbed-wire barricades, systematically penetrating deeper the security network. As they drew to within a few metres of the sentry points the women cadres, maintaining absolute silence and working cording to plan, prepared to confront the last phase of the security network the bund. Hundreds of women cadres scaled the bund and descended the troops opening fire as they launched their attack. Suddenly confronted and overcome by the LTTE cadres the shocked and confused troops fled utter panic with the LTTE cadres in hot pursuit. The troops ran for pro tion in the main camp at Vettilaikemi. The Kaddaikadu camp was coma pletely overrun by the LTTE cadres.
From Vettilaikerni main camp the troops opened fire with a barrage of mortar shells on the LTTE cadres positions. Quickly the LTTE cadres cleared the camp and appropriated the huge cache of arms and ammunition. They vacated the camp before daylight exposed them to aerial attack.
The LTTE cadres vanished with a fifty million dollar booty of arms and ammunition. Over two hundred modern rifles, light machine guns, grenades, mortar shells and a large quantity of ammunition was captured by the LTTE.
In this operation thirty Sri Lankan troops were killed. On the LTTE side three women fighters and eleven male cadres were martyred.
The Kaddaikadu operation demonstrated the ability of the LTTE to assemble a large fighting force in a short span of time and launch lightning assaults on any major military fortification and withdraw swiftly before the enemy gears itself for a counter offensive. This mode of mobile warfare constituted a strategic advance in the armed resistance campaign of the LTTE. Both women and men units have been trained and organised into mobile fighting forces capable of inflicting severe damage to military fortifications, particularly where the enemy's positions are relatively exposed. The Sri Lankan army, in its over-ambitious project of expanding further into LTTE controlled areas, ran into serious difficulties to consolidate its positions as the LTTE, taking the initiative in its hands, embarked on a series of well-planned mobile offensive assaults that brought havoc to the enemy's defence lines causing heavy casualties to the frontline troops. One such major offensive assault in the type of mobile warfare took place at Palali base.
Defence Lines Destroyed
On the 23rd November 1992, during National Heroes' Week, the LTTE forces launched a massive assault on the security perimeters of the Palali base. It was a successful military feat based on the strategy of mobile warfare.
Palali base is the largest military installation in the Jaffna Peninsula housing over five thousand security men of the combined forces - the army, navy and airforce. During the Eelam War 2, the Sri Lankan security forces have been able to occupy a vast section of the Valigamam north region and built up a massive security network to protect its airbase and naval port.
The structure of the security system is far more rigorous and extensive than that of Kaddaikadu with a complicated network of barbed wire fences, minefields, underground trenches, high walls of sand barricades, watch towers etc. Hundreds of sentry posts in close proximity occupied the entire peripheral security ring. The security system at Palali was considered to be impenetrable.
The LTTE assembled a massive force consisting of several commando units of female and male fighters and launched a swift and daring raid on the Eastern sector of the defence lines - a four kilometre section extending from Ottakapulam near Atchuveli to the coast of Thondamanaru. Within an hour of fierce encounter, the entire defence perimeter of the Eastern sector collapsed and more than one hundred and fifty posts were overrun and destroyed by the LTTE fighters. The frontline troops suffered heavy casualties and withdrew in total confusion.
The women fighting units bore the brunt of this major operation. Covering an extensive area from Iddaikadu to Sannathy, the women fighters penetrated the defence lines by clearing landmines and cutting barbed wire fences as they moved cautiously in darkness. Within thirty metres of the sentry points, hugged to the ground to avoid searchlight sweeps, a random shell from a grenade launcher exploded near the advancing women combatants. The blast shattered to pieces the right leg of one of the forward moving women fighters - Jamela. Jamela, with her grave injury, showed exceptional courage and comradeship in this instant. Well aware that silence and surprise were vital to the success of the entire operation and a low casualty rate on our side, Jamela did not utter one cry of pain or shock as a result of her badly damaged leg. After the women fighters had advanced ahead of her and the operation was well underway, slowly Jamela was removed back to base. This truly selfless woman fighter succumbed to her devastating trauma a few days later in hospital.
The women fighting units destroyed nearly ninety sentry points, killed several soldiers and successfully carried out their strategic objective thereby demonstrating their organisational ability and striking capability in this advanced mode of guerrilla warfare.
Militarily, it was a remarkable success for the LTTE. In this meticulously planned operation, the impenetrable defence structures of the Palali base were penetrated and destroyed within hours. Having inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and having captured a large quantity of sophisticated weapons, the LTTE made a swift withdrawal before dawn, before the army could mobilise its forces for a counter-offensive. In this battle more than thirty women cadres were killed.
A chapter courtesy from author's book titled "Women Fighters oF Liberation Tigers' . - Sri Lanka Guardian
 The year 1992 marked a new turning point in the Eelam W...){kind=link}
Post a Comment