That familiar southside pain

Overcoming the Tamil quagmire is a challenge for any coalition regime in Delhi. But now, external issues have deepened the crisis.

by Anjali Sharma

(October 25, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Since 1948 when Sri Lanka became independent, Tamil issue continues to be a focal point defining the contours of India-Sri Lanka bilateral relations. In south India, where the political parties of all hues are going overboard against the Sri Lankan forces' attacks on the LTTE in their northern stronghold, the issue has a three-dimensional framework encompassing socio-economic and political realities. The ethnic linkages between the native Tamils on either side of the border ensure that the discrimination and suffering in one part have a profound impact on the psyche of the other. Besides social ties, livelihood concerns hinges on inextricable trade relations made the neighbourly bonds quite strong. The vagaries of domestic politics sometimes exploit these existing realities to measure the limits of its electoral horizons.

The attitude of Indian Tamils towards their ethnic brothers in Sri Lanka is determined by this pattern. Their sentiments are entwined in a way that they to boil whenever there is an escalation in fighting in Sri Lanka and the resultant refugee influx in the states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Though the intensity has been somewhat subdued since the Rajiv Gandhi assassination, on certain occasions the heat reaches as far as New Delhi. That is the reason behind India's guarded responses towards the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka.

Though not much change has taken place over time in the official Indian stand favouring a politically negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society within the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka, some new ingredients have always been added to it depending upon the political exigencies of the time in India, and Sri Lanka as well. The present Indian strictures against Mahinda Rajapaksa's overtly extremist overtures to flush out Tamil rebels stand as a testimony to this fact.

If the Indian government is being criticised for bowing to pressure from its coalition partners (the DMK is the third-largest constituent of the UPA), the same applies to the government of Sri Lanka which frequently buckles under the ultra-nationalist approach of the king makers, Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the pro-Sinhalese, Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). Therefore, policy initiatives adopted by different political regimes in India and Sri Lanka vis-à-vis LTTE turns pro and anti according to the political equations existing between the partners in power.

As for the threat of withdrawal issued by the major coalition partner to the ruling UPA regime, it is worthy to note that the DMK is itself in a dire need of numbers to sustain its minority government in a 234-member Tamil Nadu assembly which it has formed with Congress support. Any misadventure carried out at the Centre on October 29, which is the deadline given to the Manmohan Singh government to dictate terms to the present Sri Lankan regime, would certainly backfire. Political watchers have also considered the recent DMK move as an attempt to ward off the anti-incumbency factor against itself ahead of the general election, which is only months away.

Much ahead of petty political calculations lie the national interest which is of utmost importance in an inter-dependent world. India and Sri Lanka must realise this before forming any concrete conception about each other. The concerns and the worries expressed at the domestic level are acceptable to the point beyond which they should not be allowed to intervene in the internal matters of any sovereign country, especially when the humanitarian record on both sides in dealing with the terrorist menace is as bad.

From India's viewpoint, it makes no sense supporting a dying organisation whose evil designs on India has been thoroughly investigated and proved and which, by no standard, may be considered as a representative of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The intelligence agencies have already proved the nexus between Pakistan's ISI and the LTTE.

Any attempt on the part of India to side with the LTTE would further push the island nation towards Pakistan and China. Both have, of late, emerged as Sri Lanka's partners of Sri Lanka in defence and development. The recent decision of President Rajapaksa to send his two brothers to India and Pakistan simultaneously, to address the concerns of the former and to enhance defence ties with the latter, is a calculative move and must be taken as such by India. Besides, India's maritime trade interests will also get affected if India's overtures continue to be rigid. President Rajapaksa is a nationalist leader who won elections chiefly for his hard line approach against the Tamil Tigers. India must understand that any attempt to undermine him would be counter-productive. But New Delhi's decision to send relief supplies through international relief agencies like the Red Cross with SriLanka's concurrence is a welcome step.

Similarly, Sri Lanka did a wonderful job when it declared that it understood the domestic political compulsions of India and thus, would neither interfere nor react to make matters worse for the ruling UPA. Sri Lanka must realise the inevitability of India's role in the region and so cannot adopt a complete hands-off policy towards a problem that has pan-region ramifications. At the same time, it is highly unlikely that India would directly intervene in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka.

The fall of the LTTE, which now seems imminent, calls for caution on the part of both countries to prevent its regrouping. This is possible, given the widespread support and backing from the influential groups of South India. Sri Lanka must now make efforts to resolve the grievances of its ethnic people, the prospects of which does not seem to be too high if utterances of some senior authoritiesreferring Tamils as "outsiders" and "visitors from India" is any indication.

In future, it is possible that LTTE might revert to its guerilla tactics and start bombing the major cities of Sri Lanka. Being a next-door neighbour, India would then become the first country to feel the vibrations. Already, the arrests of LTTE agents in India have led to the discovery of maps from them on nuclear and defence installations in Bangalore along with those of several IT companies.

A joint check, in the form of an active naval cooperation on the seas, is needed to ward off the evil designs of forces hostile to the two nations. The recent episode has not exactly harmed bilateral relationships in a big way, though it succeeded in creating ripples. However, recent pledge to heighten political and economic cooperation made by the Indian Premier to his Sri Lankan counterpart rekindle the hope of a continuity in bilateral relations based on mutual trust and understanding.

-- The writer is an Associate Fellow with Observer Research Foundation - Sri Lanka Guardian