“Prabhakaran’s separatist ideology and terror methodology will continue to haunt India. Prabhakaran casts a long shadow over India. Looking back, particularly in the light of India’s IPKF adventure, it is most prudent and pragmatic for India to let Sri Lanka resolve the issue without any external interference. Sri Lanka is well on its way to do so. To do otherwise is to adopt a dog-in-the-manger policy which would defeat both India and Sri Lanka.”
(October 16, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) The political demands of Tamil Nadu challenging the centre in Delhi have placed the Indian government in a dilemma. Tamil Nadu parties are demanding (1) “New Delhi should withdraw military assistance to the Government of Sri Lankan government (GOSL); (2) demand that GOSL should announce a ceasefire to enable civilians to receive humanitarian assistance and (3) take measures to ensure that there is no war in Sri Lanka for peace to prevail in Tamil homeland”, according to TamilNet. All demands are aimed at stopping the war and saving Prabhakaran.
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Kalaignar Karunanidhi, who chaired the meeting, had also informed Delhi that they would give two weeks to implement their demands, after which they would withdraw the 39 Tamil Nadu MPs who are propping up the minority government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
Manmohan Singh’s government now has on its hand a tall order. In other words, Tamil Nadu is holding a gun at the head of Delhi and saying: do it or else you are dead! If Tamil Nadu prevails India will be forced to save the man who killed its prime minister and nearly 1700 Indian soldiers. On the other hand, India has its moral and political obligations to save Sri Lanka not only from the man who hates India (see quotes from Prabhakaran’s “Red Book” below) and Sri Lanka but also in its own overarching self-interests. Delhi seems to be doomed domestically if they don’t fulfill the order coming from Tamil Nadu and it is also doomed regionally and internationally if Delhi goes all out to implement the demands. So will Delhi take the 180-degree turn, abandoning its hand-off policy ever since Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated on Prabhakaran’s orders? Or will Delhi go for the expedient politics of survival?
The Tamil Nadu demands have thrown Sri Lanka back into the same old triangle of Colombo-Delhi-Chennai. The demands have also placed Manmohan Singh’s government in the unenviable position of trying to manage, as deftly as possible, any serious fallout at all three ends. But one positive factor is that Indian public opinion is swinging strongly against Tamil Nadu. Even in Tamil Nadu the voice of The Hindu has come out decisively against the interventionist policy advocated by the Tamil Nadu parties. Malini Parathasarathy, the keen Sri Lanka-watcher, has spoken out loudly and clearly, that India should not give another lease of life to Prabhakaran. The Times of India and the Indian Express too have thrown their weight behind Sri Lanka, arguing that Sri Lanka has a right to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national sovereignty. By and large, they represent the thinking of the Indian establishment.
Besides, India has nothing to gain by saving Prabhakaran. It has been their problem too from the time they mothered him in the bosom of India. Now he is hanging like an albatross round India’s neck. The sooner he is removed from the political equation the better it is for India, Sri Lanka and the region as a whole. India has the willingness to do this but whether it has the will is another matter.
This is probably the worst time for India to be trapped inside the “triangle”. It has a come at a time when India is stepping out to be the equal of other super-powers. Any intervention just at the time when there is a shaft of light breaking out at the end of the tunnel in Sri Lanka will be an incalculable misstep that will plunge India and the region into a hell that no one wants any more. It is a time where India needs less trouble, both at home and abroad. It is also a time where India cannot lose to its rivals competing for dominance in the Indian Ocean. India needs friends abroad, not enemies. All the nuclear power in its armoury cannot safeguard Indian interests if it fails to bond and balance its domestic pressures with its external imperatives. India is at the decisive moment where it has to choose between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. Losing Tamil Nadu temporarily is unarguably the better option (though it may not come to that) than losing Sri Lanka in the long term. Keeping Sri Lanka on the boil is to risk India’s security in its southern flank in the foreseeable future. India’s hand-off policy has been a recognition of this hard reality. Now is not the time for India to abandon Sri Lanka.
It is true that the Tamil Nadu demands pose a serious threat to the Congress which barely managed to survive the crisis caused by the nuclear deal with America. Fortunately, the nuclear deal did not involve any issues of interference in the affairs of another sovereign state. But the demands put forward by Tamil Nadu are a direct threat to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Tamil Nadu, in short, is bluntly demanding that India intervenes to stop the war and save Prabhakaran. The unforeseen repercussions of such a gamble are not likely to restore peace to Sri Lanka or stabilize the region. Each step that Manmohan’s government takes to deal with Tamil Nadu’s demands is going to be very slippery. Delhi will have to do what it thinks is best to appease Tamil Nadu but whatever that “best” is it should not be to save Prabhakaran.
Any move in the direction of trying to halt the advance of the Security Forces would be, as stated earlier, an unacceptable and unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Furthermore, it would be illegal, counter-productive and unrealistic. It would be like Sri Lanka insisting on the withdrawal of Indian forces from Kashmir. After all, GOSL is on the mission of finishing the job begun by the IPKF forces. Since the Sri Lankan forces are on the verge of completing the job that IPKF began India should graciously go out of its way to lend a helping hand.
The ultimate test is whether India can live up to its image as a good neighbour, the protective big brother of SAARC (and not the one who wields a stick), protector of its own large and growing investments in Sri Lanka and a respecter of international law. All this is not a big ask because it is the moral, political and legal duty of India to fulfill these roles if it is genuinely intent on gaining respectability as a key actor in the global theatre.
Clearly, going down the Tamil Nadu track will more damaging to India than sticking to its hands-off policy on Sri Lanka in more than one way. The parochial politics of Tamil Nadu also resonates with irredentist tendencies of its own – a tendency dreaded by the centre. Tamil Nadu demands reflect some of these irredentist tendencies. It would be naive to ignore the mutual admiration society linking Tamil Nadu with the Tamils across the 23-mile Palk Strait. They echo each others “aspirations”. For instance, at the height of Veerappan’s exploits Sri Lankan Tamils had trumpeted their sympathies with his divisive politics. D. B. S. Jeyaraj, a Sri Lankan Tamil journalist, wrote openly declaring him to be virtually the first (political) cousin of Prabhakaran. Going back further into the 19th century, Arumuka Navalar anti-Christian Hindu revivalism also echoed right across Madras. Also S. J. V. Chelvanayakam’s frequent flying destination was Madras to drum up support for a broader front of Tamils.
The shared political sympathies for each others separatist tendencies should not be underestimated. What is good the Tamils of Sri Lanka is also good for the Tamils of Tamil Nadu is the underlying theme. Prabhakaran too expressed the identical political aspiration when he wrote: “The Tamil ethnic community in the world should organize itself into a strong international force and raise their voice for (Tamil) rights for the dawn of our (Tamil) people.” ( p – 41, Reflections of the Leader, Uppsala University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Theology, Translated by Peter Schalk and Alvapillai Velupillai, Second Edition, 2005). This hidden trend has been floating around since independence, from Annamalai to Veerappan who was hailed as the Tamil Nadu successor to Prabhakaran.
That apart, defying the centre and challenging its authority are calculated acts of dictating India’s foreign policy – a subject allocated entirely to the centre in Delhi in the Indian constitution. It is not a function of the states. So will the centre surrender its power to the periphery purely to survive a few more months until the time is up for the next general elections? Or will the centre boldly bargain for compromises to save its international image and also its domestic compulsions.
In better days when the centre was in overall command it had the option of dismissing the states and imposing its authority. But that may be a risky gamble for the Congress right now. However, the real issue is not the survival of Congress but the future of India. Can India make any move to save Prabhakaran, a terrorist wanted by the international community as listed in the Interpol calendar of wanted criminals? India certainly will not step in like the last time to drop “parippu” (lentils) on the pretext of rendering humanitarian services. Nor can it intervene to halt the advance. For one thing the offensive against Prabhakaran has gone too far and it is most unlikely that GOSL will yield to pressures of stopping the most successful war waged against any known group of terrorists. Besides, saving Prabhakaran does not guarantee an end to the problem facing India and Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran is not a problem of Sri Lanka alone. It is also the problem of India. Neither of them can benefit by saving Prabhakaran.
In any case, Prabhakaran is the avowed enemy of both. His attitude towards India is shaped by the fact that he considers India to be his greatest obstacle. Despite Tiger confessions and contrite statement made for tactical reasons, mainly to keep India in their good books, the evidence of his documented statements makes it crystal clear that Prabhakaran is the unforgiving enemy of India. The documentation is found in the book edited by Prof. Peter Schalk of Uppsala University. Reflections of the Leader, Uppsala University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Theology, translated by Peter Schalk and Alvapillai Velupillai, Second Edition, 2005). Here some of Prabhakaran’s reflections on India:
The day when the Indian army set its feet on the soil of our motherland I will consider as the darkest day of our war. The intervention of the Indian army in our war can be defined as he dark chapter in our war history. (p12 : 3)
(October 16, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) The political demands of Tamil Nadu challenging the centre in Delhi have placed the Indian government in a dilemma. Tamil Nadu parties are demanding (1) “New Delhi should withdraw military assistance to the Government of Sri Lankan government (GOSL); (2) demand that GOSL should announce a ceasefire to enable civilians to receive humanitarian assistance and (3) take measures to ensure that there is no war in Sri Lanka for peace to prevail in Tamil homeland”, according to TamilNet. All demands are aimed at stopping the war and saving Prabhakaran.
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Kalaignar Karunanidhi, who chaired the meeting, had also informed Delhi that they would give two weeks to implement their demands, after which they would withdraw the 39 Tamil Nadu MPs who are propping up the minority government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
Manmohan Singh’s government now has on its hand a tall order. In other words, Tamil Nadu is holding a gun at the head of Delhi and saying: do it or else you are dead! If Tamil Nadu prevails India will be forced to save the man who killed its prime minister and nearly 1700 Indian soldiers. On the other hand, India has its moral and political obligations to save Sri Lanka not only from the man who hates India (see quotes from Prabhakaran’s “Red Book” below) and Sri Lanka but also in its own overarching self-interests. Delhi seems to be doomed domestically if they don’t fulfill the order coming from Tamil Nadu and it is also doomed regionally and internationally if Delhi goes all out to implement the demands. So will Delhi take the 180-degree turn, abandoning its hand-off policy ever since Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated on Prabhakaran’s orders? Or will Delhi go for the expedient politics of survival?
The Tamil Nadu demands have thrown Sri Lanka back into the same old triangle of Colombo-Delhi-Chennai. The demands have also placed Manmohan Singh’s government in the unenviable position of trying to manage, as deftly as possible, any serious fallout at all three ends. But one positive factor is that Indian public opinion is swinging strongly against Tamil Nadu. Even in Tamil Nadu the voice of The Hindu has come out decisively against the interventionist policy advocated by the Tamil Nadu parties. Malini Parathasarathy, the keen Sri Lanka-watcher, has spoken out loudly and clearly, that India should not give another lease of life to Prabhakaran. The Times of India and the Indian Express too have thrown their weight behind Sri Lanka, arguing that Sri Lanka has a right to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national sovereignty. By and large, they represent the thinking of the Indian establishment.
Besides, India has nothing to gain by saving Prabhakaran. It has been their problem too from the time they mothered him in the bosom of India. Now he is hanging like an albatross round India’s neck. The sooner he is removed from the political equation the better it is for India, Sri Lanka and the region as a whole. India has the willingness to do this but whether it has the will is another matter.
This is probably the worst time for India to be trapped inside the “triangle”. It has a come at a time when India is stepping out to be the equal of other super-powers. Any intervention just at the time when there is a shaft of light breaking out at the end of the tunnel in Sri Lanka will be an incalculable misstep that will plunge India and the region into a hell that no one wants any more. It is a time where India needs less trouble, both at home and abroad. It is also a time where India cannot lose to its rivals competing for dominance in the Indian Ocean. India needs friends abroad, not enemies. All the nuclear power in its armoury cannot safeguard Indian interests if it fails to bond and balance its domestic pressures with its external imperatives. India is at the decisive moment where it has to choose between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. Losing Tamil Nadu temporarily is unarguably the better option (though it may not come to that) than losing Sri Lanka in the long term. Keeping Sri Lanka on the boil is to risk India’s security in its southern flank in the foreseeable future. India’s hand-off policy has been a recognition of this hard reality. Now is not the time for India to abandon Sri Lanka.
It is true that the Tamil Nadu demands pose a serious threat to the Congress which barely managed to survive the crisis caused by the nuclear deal with America. Fortunately, the nuclear deal did not involve any issues of interference in the affairs of another sovereign state. But the demands put forward by Tamil Nadu are a direct threat to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Tamil Nadu, in short, is bluntly demanding that India intervenes to stop the war and save Prabhakaran. The unforeseen repercussions of such a gamble are not likely to restore peace to Sri Lanka or stabilize the region. Each step that Manmohan’s government takes to deal with Tamil Nadu’s demands is going to be very slippery. Delhi will have to do what it thinks is best to appease Tamil Nadu but whatever that “best” is it should not be to save Prabhakaran.
Any move in the direction of trying to halt the advance of the Security Forces would be, as stated earlier, an unacceptable and unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Furthermore, it would be illegal, counter-productive and unrealistic. It would be like Sri Lanka insisting on the withdrawal of Indian forces from Kashmir. After all, GOSL is on the mission of finishing the job begun by the IPKF forces. Since the Sri Lankan forces are on the verge of completing the job that IPKF began India should graciously go out of its way to lend a helping hand.
The ultimate test is whether India can live up to its image as a good neighbour, the protective big brother of SAARC (and not the one who wields a stick), protector of its own large and growing investments in Sri Lanka and a respecter of international law. All this is not a big ask because it is the moral, political and legal duty of India to fulfill these roles if it is genuinely intent on gaining respectability as a key actor in the global theatre.
Clearly, going down the Tamil Nadu track will more damaging to India than sticking to its hands-off policy on Sri Lanka in more than one way. The parochial politics of Tamil Nadu also resonates with irredentist tendencies of its own – a tendency dreaded by the centre. Tamil Nadu demands reflect some of these irredentist tendencies. It would be naive to ignore the mutual admiration society linking Tamil Nadu with the Tamils across the 23-mile Palk Strait. They echo each others “aspirations”. For instance, at the height of Veerappan’s exploits Sri Lankan Tamils had trumpeted their sympathies with his divisive politics. D. B. S. Jeyaraj, a Sri Lankan Tamil journalist, wrote openly declaring him to be virtually the first (political) cousin of Prabhakaran. Going back further into the 19th century, Arumuka Navalar anti-Christian Hindu revivalism also echoed right across Madras. Also S. J. V. Chelvanayakam’s frequent flying destination was Madras to drum up support for a broader front of Tamils.
The shared political sympathies for each others separatist tendencies should not be underestimated. What is good the Tamils of Sri Lanka is also good for the Tamils of Tamil Nadu is the underlying theme. Prabhakaran too expressed the identical political aspiration when he wrote: “The Tamil ethnic community in the world should organize itself into a strong international force and raise their voice for (Tamil) rights for the dawn of our (Tamil) people.” ( p – 41, Reflections of the Leader, Uppsala University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Theology, Translated by Peter Schalk and Alvapillai Velupillai, Second Edition, 2005). This hidden trend has been floating around since independence, from Annamalai to Veerappan who was hailed as the Tamil Nadu successor to Prabhakaran.
That apart, defying the centre and challenging its authority are calculated acts of dictating India’s foreign policy – a subject allocated entirely to the centre in Delhi in the Indian constitution. It is not a function of the states. So will the centre surrender its power to the periphery purely to survive a few more months until the time is up for the next general elections? Or will the centre boldly bargain for compromises to save its international image and also its domestic compulsions.
In better days when the centre was in overall command it had the option of dismissing the states and imposing its authority. But that may be a risky gamble for the Congress right now. However, the real issue is not the survival of Congress but the future of India. Can India make any move to save Prabhakaran, a terrorist wanted by the international community as listed in the Interpol calendar of wanted criminals? India certainly will not step in like the last time to drop “parippu” (lentils) on the pretext of rendering humanitarian services. Nor can it intervene to halt the advance. For one thing the offensive against Prabhakaran has gone too far and it is most unlikely that GOSL will yield to pressures of stopping the most successful war waged against any known group of terrorists. Besides, saving Prabhakaran does not guarantee an end to the problem facing India and Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran is not a problem of Sri Lanka alone. It is also the problem of India. Neither of them can benefit by saving Prabhakaran.
In any case, Prabhakaran is the avowed enemy of both. His attitude towards India is shaped by the fact that he considers India to be his greatest obstacle. Despite Tiger confessions and contrite statement made for tactical reasons, mainly to keep India in their good books, the evidence of his documented statements makes it crystal clear that Prabhakaran is the unforgiving enemy of India. The documentation is found in the book edited by Prof. Peter Schalk of Uppsala University. Reflections of the Leader, Uppsala University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Theology, translated by Peter Schalk and Alvapillai Velupillai, Second Edition, 2005). Here some of Prabhakaran’s reflections on India:
The day when the Indian army set its feet on the soil of our motherland I will consider as the darkest day of our war. The intervention of the Indian army in our war can be defined as he dark chapter in our war history. (p12 : 3)
The Indo-Lankan Accord between India and Sri Lanka is a military agreement. The aim of this military accord is to annihilate the Tamil independence movement and its armed frontline leader, the Liberation Tigers. (p.16: 1).
Standing alone we opposed the Indian intervention; standing alone we resisted a very big army in the world; standing alone we fought so that our fire of national independence not goes out. At the end we were victorious. The reason for our victory was our untiring determination in our mind, our heroism that did not fear death and out trust in truth and justice. (p. 28: 4)
The intervention of the Indian army and the following mass destruction has been a real lesson for the people in Tamil Ilam.
Finding the Indian Big Power intervention is a magnificent win for our liberation struggle ( p. 44 : 5)
India’s statement that the Indian army fought with one hand ties to its back is ridiculous. If the Indian army fought with one hand tied to its back committed these cruelties on our poepole (my) heart trembles to imagine how much horrors they could have committed with both their hands ( p.45: 4)
India’s military intervention, expansionist policy and threats cause trouble to peace and stability of small and weak countries of South Asia (p 46 : 4)
India might have learnt through this war (India-Tigers) the lesson that however strong the military power might be, it could not forcefully impose anything agasint the wish of of a people’s ethnic community.
These quotes, published in Mao-style “Red Book”, do not reflect a love-hate relationship with India. These quotes simply drip with unadulterated hate. Is this the man that India needs to save? Incidentally, both Prabhakaran and Peter Schalk have been declared persona non grata in India. Moreover, these publicized thoughts open up like a window to his private thoughts. There are no prizes for guessing how vitriolic the private thoughts can be.
Prabhakaran also harbours grandiose dreams of building a Greater Tami Nadu with him as its founding father. In blowing up his image Schalk tries to make out that Prabhakaran is greater than what he is: “a pathological killer,” as defined by James Jupp of Australian National University or “the latest Pol Pot”, as stated by James Burns of the New York Times.
Schalk labours, somewhat comically, to cast his hero in an aura of divinity. He says: “He is a wonderful human. He is a rare human. He is miraculous being full of many surprising natures, qualities, characteristics and traits. An extra-ordinary leader who magnetizes the entire country through his handsome personality distinguished by overwhelming abilities.”
In p. 36:5 Prabhakaran is quoted as saying: “To be courageous to annihilate oneself for the happy living of others is godly asceticism. The godly births (beings) are the Black Tigers indeed.” Using this quote, Prabhakaran’s cult of death is eulogized as “Godly Asceticism” by Schalk. This kind of hagiography questions the ethics and the morals of the Department of Theology of Uppsala University. Deifying a criminal wanted in India and Sri Lanka and lifting him to the status of a demi-god brings the Uppsala University into disrepute. Deifying Prabhakaran’s cult of death is equally reprehensible. Talking of Prabhakaran’s “miraculous” powers, with a touch of infallibility thrown in for good measure, may have been credible when everything was going his way in the 1995 – the date of its first edition. But to put out a second edition in 2007, where he has lost everything, makes Peter Schalk sound as if he had lost his marbles more than his morals.
It is undeniable that from the 80s’ the Prabhakaran factor has dominated Indo-Sri Lanka relations and it will continue to dominate if India fails to help in removing the monster it created. As long as Prabhakaran is in the picture India will be in a permanent state of conflict with him and Tamil Nadu manipulated by him. Prabhakaran’s separatist ideology and terror methodology will continue to haunt India. Prabhakaran casts a long shadow over India. Looking back, particularly in the light of India’s IPKF adventure, it is most prudent and pragmatic for India to let Sri Lanka resolve the issue without any external interference. Sri Lanka is well on its way to do so. To do otherwise is to adopt a dog-in-the-manger policy which would defeat both India and Sri Lanka.
India must also consider the new realities emerging in the region as a whole and in particular in Sri Lanka. Any attempt at this stage to halt the advance of the Security Forces will produce not just a backlash but a political tsunami in Sri Lanka. If India thinks of substituting Mahinda Rajapakse with a pliant Ranil Wickremesinghe India will have to think again. It will be like pouring petrol into the fires of Sri Lanka. Wickremesinghe has never been able to manage his party, let alone the nation. Any move to cut deals with Wickremesinghe will unite the nation not only against India but against Wickremesinghe as well.
In summary, the ultimate solution is to let Sri Lanka solve its own domestic affairs just as much as Delhi’s task is to find its own solutions for its problems without interference from external sources, including its meddlesome states. Delhi has not been given much time by Tamil Nadu. But when Delhi puts its foot down (which is inevitable sooner or later) it must take all precautions to let it fall only as far as the southern tip of India and not one fraction of an inch beyond it.
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