by Tisaranee Gunasekara
"….the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good".- Camus (The Plague)
(October 05, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The country is redolent with it, the smell of an old disease making a come back. Even as government propagandists triumphantly proclaim the imminent end of Eelam War, the power-wielders within the regime and the state are busying themselves with sowing seeds of future ethno-religious conflicts.
Neanderthal utterances about the need to ensure Sinhala supremacy in Sri Lanka would hardly occasion a remark when made by Southern extremists on the fringe of polity and society. But when such sentiments are expressed by the Army Commander (and repeatedly), they have to be taken with utmost seriousness: "I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people… We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country….. They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things" (National Post - 23.9.2008).
General Sarath Fonseka is not just the Army Commander; he is known to be close to the Rajapakse brothers and a member of the ruling cabal. And here he is, speaking his mind, publicly articulating his vision for a post-War Sri Lanka. This, after all, is not the first time he has made such remarks. For instance in another recent interview he said, "The Sinhala nation has to sacrifice if you want to protect the country and survive….. In any democratic country the majority should rule the country. This country will be ruled by the Sinhalese community which is the majority representing 74 percent of the population" (The Daily News – 19.7.2008). What emerges is a clearly thought out politico-ideological position about the nature of peace that will follow a Lankan victory over the LTTE and the shape of the new Sri Lanka that will emerge from it. According to General Fonseka it will be a Sinhala peace and a Sinhala state – in other words a return to the era between Sinhala Only and the Indo-Lanka Accord.
The JHU has announced a plan to reintroduce a slightly amended version of its act against religious conversions. Given the close relationship between Mahinda Rajapakse and the JHU it is hard to believe that the saffron party will do something as momentous as this without Presidential consent. The Foreign Minister in an interview with an Indian magazine has denied the very existence of an ethnic problem in Sri Lanka: "No longer would the international community recognise there is an ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. We have a terrorist problem, a fascist movement, in the LTTE…." (Frontline – Sep 27th - Oct. 10th). Since Mr. Bogollagama does not posses the reputation of a hardliner, his sudden conversion to hawkish thinking would have been occasioned by a need to curry favour with the Rajapakse brothers (his job, after all, depends on that). Juxtapose these twin developments with the Army Commander’s remarks and the composite picture that emerges is of a regime driven by the belief that Sri Lanka is a Sinhala country and committed to an agenda of re-imposing majority dominance on Lankan state, polity and society.
Political Follies
So we return to the past. As Sri Lanka gains the upper hand over the LTTE on the battlefield, her rulers are planning to remake old mistakes which paved the way for that war. The politico-ideological-psychological foundation of this error is a fallacy I term ‘the hosts and guests’ concept of Sri Lanka. According to this way of thinking Sri Lanka belongs to the Sinhalese and they are her sole owners and hosts. The minorities (irrespective of how long they have been here) are not co-owners of Sri Lanka but mere guests, who live here on sufferance. They can never belong, but if they ‘behave’ they will be treated graciously and permitted to live and prosper; if they do not ‘behave’ (and we, as the majority, will decide what constitutes good behaviour and what doesn’t) they will be deemed enemy aliens and treated accordingly. According to this outlook ‘nation’ and ‘desheeya’ are coterminous with Sinhala (actually Sinhala-Buddhist). That was how a project aimed at de-colonising Lanka became a project aimed at ‘restoring’ Sinhala dominance, with the slogan of Sinhala Only as its battle-cry.
Having ‘abolished’ the ethnic problem, the regime is touting ‘empowerment’, arguing that democracy will do the trick, by bringing development to the minorities and the peripheries (particularly the North and the East). We know that devolution without democracy cannot bring about either peace or development. This was a primary lesson of the (Ranil Wickremesinghe inspired) long ceasefire which preceded the Fourth Eelam War. Can democracy and development work without devolution? Not really, if the post-1948 history of this country is anything to go by. If democracy, in the absence of devolution, can work, we would not be here today, embroiled in a 25 year war.
After Independence, Ceylon/Sri Lanka was ruled by democratically elected governments. It was these democratically elected governments which enacted Sinhala Only and district and media-wise standardisation. Both these anti-minority steps were enacted constitutionally. This is why Ceylon/Sri Lanka constitutes a text book case of dangers inherent in democracy sans devolution, in an ethnically pluralist setting. If there is a lesson for posterity in the still ongoing Lankan tragedy, it is that a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society needs both democracy and devolution, in adequate degrees and moving in tandem, if there is to be lasting peace and development.
The Rajapakse administration is said to be committed to the 13th Amendment and the provincial council system. But 13th Amendment will become meaningless if it is being ‘implemented’ by a government that does not believe in the existence of an ethnic problem and therefore does not see any need for political devolution. Under such a regime, the provincial councils in the North and the East will be turned into a tool to reward allies belonging to minority communities who are willing to succumb to the majoritarian supremacist agenda of Colombo.
So what will happen if the war is won and we return to a system consisting of democracy (and some decentralisation)? Before long the majority will feel (again) that the Tamils have too much of this, the Muslims have too much of that and the Christians have too much of something else. Since under the incompetent guidance of the Rajapakses the economy will not prosper, the need to search for scapegoats will become even more acute and intense. This search will be facilitated by the Rajapakse brand of populism which is ethno-religious rather than economic (and shows a tendency to subscribe most economic woes to machinations by Tamil and Muslim mudalalis who prey on poor, honest Sinhala masses). Vocal demands to protect the patrimony of the Sinhalese by tipping the playing field in their favour will follow. There will be demands for more admissions into state schools, more places in universities, more jobs, more housing, more loans, more contracts, more opportunities, more patronage in every sphere to counter either the Tamilnadu factor or the Middle Eastern factor or the Western factor or some other factor which is always working to undermine Sinhala-Buddhists and promote minorities! Equality is thus ‘unfair’ because the dice is permanently ‘loaded’ against the Sinhala Buddhists (Perhaps Norman Mailer’s comments in ‘The Castle in the Forest’ about the fear harboured by most gentile Germans towards Jews is applicable to Sinhalese as well: "They feel that the Jews are capable of bringing more concentration to a task ….the Jews do know how to study-which is why so many of them have been grossly successful…in the end they will win everything by working harder").
The results of the 2005 Presidential election indicate that if Tamils are prevented from voting freely (and the main opposition party fields an obviously unpopular candidate with a proven capacity for losing) a Sinhala supremacist candidate can win the Presidency, albeit with a thin margin. Consequently, when extremists within the majority community demand special treatment for the majority race, the Rajapakse administration is unlikely to turn a deaf ear. This was how history happened, and it is this history the regime risks repeating if it goes ahead with its majoritarian supremacist agenda.
Tamilnadu
According to media reports the Indian Prime Minister avoided meeting President Rajapakse when they both attended the UN General Assembly sessions in New York. It is a clear signal that for Delhi the Rajapakse administration is becoming radioactive. As the general election draws near, the need to win over Tamilnadu voters will become paramount for both the Congress Party and the BJP. And in Tamilnadu anti-Lankan feelings are gaining ground at an alarming rate. "The political parties in Tamil Nadu are vying with each other to oppose the Sri Lankan Army’s latest offensive against the LTTE and to express solidarity and support to Sri Lankan Tamils. The ruling DMK today announced that it would be organising a public meeting here on October 6 to express solidarity with the "suffering Sri Lankan Tamils". Chief Minister M Karunanidhi would address the meeting. The move, apparently, was to counter the CPI’s plan to observe a fast here on the issue on October 2. Volunteers of the AIADMK and the DMDK would participate in the fast, to be headed by CPI National Secretary D Raja" (Zee news – 30.9.2008).
The situation would not have been helped by the attack at sea near Rameswaram on a group of Tamilnadu fishermen, supposedly by the Lankan Navy (according to two eye witness accounts). Sri Lanka has denied the charge but that by itself will not do, since our denials and claims do not possess much credibility except in our own eyes. Given what is at stake, it would make sense to investigate the incident urgently and impartially and punish the wrongdoers if the Lankan Navy is indeed the culprit (it would not hurt to compensate the dead fisherman’s family either). A Congress Administration, even in an election year, may hesitate to lend a helping hand, directly, to the killers of Rajiv Gandhi. But such a consideration would not be operative in taking decisive steps to protect Indian fishermen, supposedly under attack by the Lankan Navy, particularly since in the present international context such actions by regional or global powers are quite the fashion. Delhi does have several options, including occupying Katchchativu temporarily and using the Indian coastguard/Navy to attack the attackers of Indian fishermen. Since it would be the height of stupidity on our part to take on India militarily (this is the kind of folly the LTTE would like us to commit) it makes sense to act fast to pacify Chennai and Delhi.
Noam Chomsky defines Cartesian commonsense as the normal analytical skills and knowledge needed to "take apart the system of illusions and deception which functions to prevent understanding of contemporary reality" (The Chomsky Reader). When it comes to dealing with the minorities, the international community and the economy, the Rajapakse administration displays a remarkable paucity of this Cartesian commonsense. After all it should not be hard to understand that trying to treat the minorities as second class citizens will bring about not peace and development but conflict and chaos; or that it does not make sense to push Delhi into a path of confrontation, while we are still fighting the Tigers. Or that repeating obvious historical errors is not patriotism but rank, unforgivable stupidity. - Sri Lanka Guardian
"….the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good".- Camus (The Plague)
(October 05, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The country is redolent with it, the smell of an old disease making a come back. Even as government propagandists triumphantly proclaim the imminent end of Eelam War, the power-wielders within the regime and the state are busying themselves with sowing seeds of future ethno-religious conflicts.
Neanderthal utterances about the need to ensure Sinhala supremacy in Sri Lanka would hardly occasion a remark when made by Southern extremists on the fringe of polity and society. But when such sentiments are expressed by the Army Commander (and repeatedly), they have to be taken with utmost seriousness: "I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people… We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country….. They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things" (National Post - 23.9.2008).
General Sarath Fonseka is not just the Army Commander; he is known to be close to the Rajapakse brothers and a member of the ruling cabal. And here he is, speaking his mind, publicly articulating his vision for a post-War Sri Lanka. This, after all, is not the first time he has made such remarks. For instance in another recent interview he said, "The Sinhala nation has to sacrifice if you want to protect the country and survive….. In any democratic country the majority should rule the country. This country will be ruled by the Sinhalese community which is the majority representing 74 percent of the population" (The Daily News – 19.7.2008). What emerges is a clearly thought out politico-ideological position about the nature of peace that will follow a Lankan victory over the LTTE and the shape of the new Sri Lanka that will emerge from it. According to General Fonseka it will be a Sinhala peace and a Sinhala state – in other words a return to the era between Sinhala Only and the Indo-Lanka Accord.
The JHU has announced a plan to reintroduce a slightly amended version of its act against religious conversions. Given the close relationship between Mahinda Rajapakse and the JHU it is hard to believe that the saffron party will do something as momentous as this without Presidential consent. The Foreign Minister in an interview with an Indian magazine has denied the very existence of an ethnic problem in Sri Lanka: "No longer would the international community recognise there is an ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. We have a terrorist problem, a fascist movement, in the LTTE…." (Frontline – Sep 27th - Oct. 10th). Since Mr. Bogollagama does not posses the reputation of a hardliner, his sudden conversion to hawkish thinking would have been occasioned by a need to curry favour with the Rajapakse brothers (his job, after all, depends on that). Juxtapose these twin developments with the Army Commander’s remarks and the composite picture that emerges is of a regime driven by the belief that Sri Lanka is a Sinhala country and committed to an agenda of re-imposing majority dominance on Lankan state, polity and society.
Political Follies
So we return to the past. As Sri Lanka gains the upper hand over the LTTE on the battlefield, her rulers are planning to remake old mistakes which paved the way for that war. The politico-ideological-psychological foundation of this error is a fallacy I term ‘the hosts and guests’ concept of Sri Lanka. According to this way of thinking Sri Lanka belongs to the Sinhalese and they are her sole owners and hosts. The minorities (irrespective of how long they have been here) are not co-owners of Sri Lanka but mere guests, who live here on sufferance. They can never belong, but if they ‘behave’ they will be treated graciously and permitted to live and prosper; if they do not ‘behave’ (and we, as the majority, will decide what constitutes good behaviour and what doesn’t) they will be deemed enemy aliens and treated accordingly. According to this outlook ‘nation’ and ‘desheeya’ are coterminous with Sinhala (actually Sinhala-Buddhist). That was how a project aimed at de-colonising Lanka became a project aimed at ‘restoring’ Sinhala dominance, with the slogan of Sinhala Only as its battle-cry.
Having ‘abolished’ the ethnic problem, the regime is touting ‘empowerment’, arguing that democracy will do the trick, by bringing development to the minorities and the peripheries (particularly the North and the East). We know that devolution without democracy cannot bring about either peace or development. This was a primary lesson of the (Ranil Wickremesinghe inspired) long ceasefire which preceded the Fourth Eelam War. Can democracy and development work without devolution? Not really, if the post-1948 history of this country is anything to go by. If democracy, in the absence of devolution, can work, we would not be here today, embroiled in a 25 year war.
After Independence, Ceylon/Sri Lanka was ruled by democratically elected governments. It was these democratically elected governments which enacted Sinhala Only and district and media-wise standardisation. Both these anti-minority steps were enacted constitutionally. This is why Ceylon/Sri Lanka constitutes a text book case of dangers inherent in democracy sans devolution, in an ethnically pluralist setting. If there is a lesson for posterity in the still ongoing Lankan tragedy, it is that a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society needs both democracy and devolution, in adequate degrees and moving in tandem, if there is to be lasting peace and development.
The Rajapakse administration is said to be committed to the 13th Amendment and the provincial council system. But 13th Amendment will become meaningless if it is being ‘implemented’ by a government that does not believe in the existence of an ethnic problem and therefore does not see any need for political devolution. Under such a regime, the provincial councils in the North and the East will be turned into a tool to reward allies belonging to minority communities who are willing to succumb to the majoritarian supremacist agenda of Colombo.
So what will happen if the war is won and we return to a system consisting of democracy (and some decentralisation)? Before long the majority will feel (again) that the Tamils have too much of this, the Muslims have too much of that and the Christians have too much of something else. Since under the incompetent guidance of the Rajapakses the economy will not prosper, the need to search for scapegoats will become even more acute and intense. This search will be facilitated by the Rajapakse brand of populism which is ethno-religious rather than economic (and shows a tendency to subscribe most economic woes to machinations by Tamil and Muslim mudalalis who prey on poor, honest Sinhala masses). Vocal demands to protect the patrimony of the Sinhalese by tipping the playing field in their favour will follow. There will be demands for more admissions into state schools, more places in universities, more jobs, more housing, more loans, more contracts, more opportunities, more patronage in every sphere to counter either the Tamilnadu factor or the Middle Eastern factor or the Western factor or some other factor which is always working to undermine Sinhala-Buddhists and promote minorities! Equality is thus ‘unfair’ because the dice is permanently ‘loaded’ against the Sinhala Buddhists (Perhaps Norman Mailer’s comments in ‘The Castle in the Forest’ about the fear harboured by most gentile Germans towards Jews is applicable to Sinhalese as well: "They feel that the Jews are capable of bringing more concentration to a task ….the Jews do know how to study-which is why so many of them have been grossly successful…in the end they will win everything by working harder").
The results of the 2005 Presidential election indicate that if Tamils are prevented from voting freely (and the main opposition party fields an obviously unpopular candidate with a proven capacity for losing) a Sinhala supremacist candidate can win the Presidency, albeit with a thin margin. Consequently, when extremists within the majority community demand special treatment for the majority race, the Rajapakse administration is unlikely to turn a deaf ear. This was how history happened, and it is this history the regime risks repeating if it goes ahead with its majoritarian supremacist agenda.
Tamilnadu
According to media reports the Indian Prime Minister avoided meeting President Rajapakse when they both attended the UN General Assembly sessions in New York. It is a clear signal that for Delhi the Rajapakse administration is becoming radioactive. As the general election draws near, the need to win over Tamilnadu voters will become paramount for both the Congress Party and the BJP. And in Tamilnadu anti-Lankan feelings are gaining ground at an alarming rate. "The political parties in Tamil Nadu are vying with each other to oppose the Sri Lankan Army’s latest offensive against the LTTE and to express solidarity and support to Sri Lankan Tamils. The ruling DMK today announced that it would be organising a public meeting here on October 6 to express solidarity with the "suffering Sri Lankan Tamils". Chief Minister M Karunanidhi would address the meeting. The move, apparently, was to counter the CPI’s plan to observe a fast here on the issue on October 2. Volunteers of the AIADMK and the DMDK would participate in the fast, to be headed by CPI National Secretary D Raja" (Zee news – 30.9.2008).
The situation would not have been helped by the attack at sea near Rameswaram on a group of Tamilnadu fishermen, supposedly by the Lankan Navy (according to two eye witness accounts). Sri Lanka has denied the charge but that by itself will not do, since our denials and claims do not possess much credibility except in our own eyes. Given what is at stake, it would make sense to investigate the incident urgently and impartially and punish the wrongdoers if the Lankan Navy is indeed the culprit (it would not hurt to compensate the dead fisherman’s family either). A Congress Administration, even in an election year, may hesitate to lend a helping hand, directly, to the killers of Rajiv Gandhi. But such a consideration would not be operative in taking decisive steps to protect Indian fishermen, supposedly under attack by the Lankan Navy, particularly since in the present international context such actions by regional or global powers are quite the fashion. Delhi does have several options, including occupying Katchchativu temporarily and using the Indian coastguard/Navy to attack the attackers of Indian fishermen. Since it would be the height of stupidity on our part to take on India militarily (this is the kind of folly the LTTE would like us to commit) it makes sense to act fast to pacify Chennai and Delhi.
Noam Chomsky defines Cartesian commonsense as the normal analytical skills and knowledge needed to "take apart the system of illusions and deception which functions to prevent understanding of contemporary reality" (The Chomsky Reader). When it comes to dealing with the minorities, the international community and the economy, the Rajapakse administration displays a remarkable paucity of this Cartesian commonsense. After all it should not be hard to understand that trying to treat the minorities as second class citizens will bring about not peace and development but conflict and chaos; or that it does not make sense to push Delhi into a path of confrontation, while we are still fighting the Tigers. Or that repeating obvious historical errors is not patriotism but rank, unforgivable stupidity. - Sri Lanka Guardian
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