Intelligence in India's Sri Lanka War

"The failure of the State police machinery to share intelligence relevant to the IPKF represented the dissonance in our national security perceptions. The failure of the Tamil Nadu Home Department to act in the interest of national security for political reasons had kept up the morale of LTTE fighting with our forces in Sri Lanka. This has been well documented in the Jain Commission report. The precedent set by Tamil Nadu Government during the IPKF operations on this count taking roots now in the political culture cannot be ruled out. "


(This article is based on a presentation made at the seminar "Indian Experience in Force Projection" organised by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) at New Delhi on September 15 and 16, 2008).

Introduction

(October 15, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) A review of India's military intervention in Sri Lanka (1987-90) now after two decades has the benefit of hindsight. During those two decades a number of global developments have enlarged the concept of strategic security. As a result, Military Intelligence (MI) has undergone changes in form, content and expectations.

When Indian forces operated in Sri Lanka, the Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was at its peak after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The US-Pakistan relations were perhaps at the closest, making India's Pakistan-centric security focus more acute. Only two months before signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) in July 1987, Operation Brass Tacks, in which the two countries almost went to war, had concluded. Indian army suffered from this Pakistan-centric preoccupation and Indian army had to pay a price for it in Sri Lanka.

Viewed in the overall context of India-Sri Lanka relations, India's war in Sri Lanka might be termed as Indian state's reactive military response to a largely internal political situation in Sri Lanka that affected India's interests also. Unfortunately, at that time the nation did not have a structural frame work to plan, conduct and monitor such overseas response. There was no integrated body with accountability to take informed decisions on national security issues. Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) was the only forum to carry out this task. During the Sri Lanka operations, a Core Group was formed to look after the day to day issues. This empowered group functioned under the Chairmanship of the Minister of State, External Affairs.

Sri Lanka operation was India's first -ever overseas force projection. Before that Indian troops had operated overseas only as part of United Nations forces. For the first time all the three services were involved in an overseas joint operation. Perhaps it was also the first time Indian army was drawn into a counter insurgency operation for which it had either planned or prepared in advance. To cap it all, the counter insurgency conflict involved operating in urban as well as jungle settings.

Communication technology was just making its early breakthroughs. The battlefield competencies of armed forces were yet to benefit from them. The MI did not enjoy the advantages imparted by information technology and its applications. It was essentially a HUMINT and COMBATINT operation.

MI had limited organic HUMINT capability and what little was there was focused on Pakistan. By modern standards, the then available ELINT and SIGINT resources would be considered primitive. However, over the years the MI had gained certain amount of expertise in HUMINT operations and interrogation in counter insurgency setting. The divisional intelligence units deployed in insurgency affected regions were the main sources of this expertise.

When the Sri Lanka army's crackdown on Tamil militants reached a critical stage in Jaffna Peninsula around April 1987, Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) moved a small MI team to Chennai to cover Sri Lanka. It had very limited capability. Thus till Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was inducted into Sri Lanka, this MI team was DGMI's sole organic source of intelligence. Of course, it had access to some of the inputs of the external intelligence agency Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) and the counter intelligence service Intelligence Bureau (IB). The IB had been keeping a watchful eye on the activities of thousands of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees present in Tamil Nadu. It also had very good knowledge of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s activities in Tamil Nadu. However, the DGMI had no access to the Tamil Nadu State Police (Q Branch) which was yet another rich source of intelligence on Sri Lanka Tamil militancy.

Intelligence before the outbreak of war

Southern Command based in Pune established the Operational Force Commander's Headquarters (OFC HQ) at Chennai to for the task of overseeing the operation when India decided to send troops to Sri Lanka to help implementation of the ISLA. As soon as the ISLA was signed on July 29, 1987, opposition to the Agreement snowballed in Sri Lanka threatening the stability of the regime of President JR Jayawardane. 54 Infantry Division (less most of the support arms) was hastily despatched to Sri Lanka in the first week of August 1987 as a show of support to the President and the Tamils. The Southern Army Commander as the OFC had an ambiguous mandate on Sri Lanka. As a corollary 54 Infantry Division also was not given a clear role at that stage.

The DGMI attached a dozen Tamil speaking Intelligence Corps officers and NCOs to the OFC HQ at Chennai to assist the OFC. The attachment of the MI team was fire fighting measure as it had neither exposure to Sri Lanka nor had a briefing on its task. The team moved to Jaffna (Palali) in the first week of August, a few days after 54 Infantry Division arrived there. The OFC HQ assigned no specific task to the MI team except to 'keep an eye' on the happenings there. The team was provided no functional resources

The MI team tasked itself to study and understand the environment in north-eastern Sri Lanka. It familiarized itself with the terrain, and important personalities and decision makers among militant groups notably the LTTE. The team forwarded its reports directly to DGMI under whose command it operated. There was very little intelligence input from either DGMI or from civil intelligence agencies to either OFC HQ and as a result 54 Infantry Division had only marginal information.

From September 1987 onwards the LTTE showed marked reluctance in implementing the ISLA refusing to surrender of the arms it held. As the IPKF task looked a long haul, DGMI moved 57 Mtn Div Int & FS Company to Palali to augment MI resources in the island. Tamil speaking officers and NCOs were posted to man the unit.

The Divisional Headquarters in Palali perhaps due to the confusing command and control structure of the MI team did not use it. In fact the Divisional Headquarters kept the MI team out of all its interactions and political parleys with the LTTE. The Division Headquarters also did not project specific intelligence requirements of any kind to the MI team. For reasons not very clear, the services of the MI team were never used during the Division's operational planning process prior to the Jaffna operations. (According to the RAW, the Army Headquarters also did not take the RAW into confidence or sought its advice prior to the Jaffna operations). Thus the Division launched the Jaffna operation on its own steam.

Intelligence during the operations

Only after the Jaffna operation commenced and troops were rapidly inducted from mainland, the Division asked the Officer Commanding, 57 Div Int & FS Coy to brief the troops prior to their induction into the war zone! Similarly, as the operation progressed, the intelligence unit was tasked to interrogate suspected civilians and prisoners.

There was no advance planning at either the OFC HQ, or the Divisional HQ for screening of civilian population or holding prisoners. This was in direct contrast to 1971 operational experience in eastern theatre when we had meticulously planned in advance the handling and interrogation of prisoners. Short duration training was also imparted to NCOs from infantry units on combat interrogation. This resulted in the failure to gain tactical information through interrogation in the early stages of operation.

However, by the time Jaffna operations ended, the force level of IPKF was increased with the induction of two more divisions. The command and control structure of the Advance Headquarters of the OFC at Chennai was also streamlined. In addition to the 57 Int and FS Coy, another intelligence unit was specifically raised for the IPKF operations and inducted. The unit had both intelligence acquisition and interrogation capabilities. The unit had its headquarters in Chennai; one team and an interrogation centre each from this unit were deployed in Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. 57 Int and FS Coy provided the intelligence cover for 54 Div sector including Kilinochchi. Both the units served under the command of Col GS (Int) of the Advance HQ OFC.

Communication intelligence was provided by the SIGINT detachments and EWCP. Though they were under Army Headquarters, they worked closely with forward troops and provided accurate real time information.

The RAW after its initial false start, improved its linkages with the Advance HQ OFC, after the Jafffna operations commenced. From then onwards, the Chennai RAW unit maintained close touch with the Advance HQ OFC, and provided valuable inputs particularly on political developments in Sri Lanka. Though RAW provided up to date information on overall developments, it could not provide specific information on the LTTE's military capabilities or cogent assessments on their likely course of action.

Despite the MI officers enjoying excellent rapport at the senior level, both the Q Branch of the Tamil Nadu State Police and the IB at Chennai provided no information to the IPKF throughout the period of operation. Their information resources on the LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu could have helped the IPKF in planning and conduct of its operations. Thanks to the vehement opposition of the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party to the IPKF operations, the Tamil Nadu government issued no formal orders to the Q Branch on sharing of information relevant to the IPKF. The IB fared no better. It usually fobbed off our requests saying that they had no military information, though political information had a lot of relevance to IPKF operations.

MI performance: Army Headquarters level

There was practically no intelligence sharing between the three services intelligence wings at the functional level in Sri Lanka. Perhaps the confusion in the overall command and control equation among the three services was the reason for this aberration. The DGMI also probably did not identify and articulate its needs to the other two services.

The DGMI had built no intelligence assets on Sri Lanka before the ISLA. It is surprising that this requirement was not visualised, despite India's close political involvements there since 1983. This was only symptomatic of the lack of mission clarity that had marked Indian army's foray into Sri Lanka. Thus DGMI could not provide timely information to the forces in Sri Lanka either during the political parleys with the LTTE or before Jaffna operations. However, once the role of the IPKF was crystallised, the DGMI rose to the occasion. It made available maximum possible intelligence resources within the first few months. It also assisted in recruiting Sinhala knowing Tamils migrants from Sri Lanka to help MI and SIGINT units.

But the biggest failure of the Army HQ and the DGMI was in their inability to change the Tamil Nadu government's negative attitude not only on information sharing but also in taking follow up actions requested by the IPKF on specific LTTE activity in the state. During the entire period of operations, the LTTE had an unprecedented freedom to operate with impunity in Tamil Nadu despite being at war with Indian state. This not only exposed the troops traversing the state to potential LTTE threat but reflected the callousness with which the whole operation was treated. This created a great feeling of insecurity among Tamil sources, who felt the MI did not have enough "influence" to ensure their security even at home. This lack of confidence affected MI's performance.

The DGMI's also showed its inability to provide down assessments to the IPKF, even though it received regular inputs from RAW, IB and other agencies at the Army HQ. Similarly the HQ Southern Command GS (Int) also failed to provide useful assessments or inputs, presumably because it had no operational responsibility. The absence of such top down assessments handicapped the MI planning and collection process at the Advance HQ OFC. The DGMI could have helped the IPKF to assess the situation better with appropriate and timely inputs on developments at home that had impacted MI's intelligence operations in Sri Lanka.

MI performance: OFC MI

At the field level, OFC MI had set itself the task of keeping abreast of three strategic developments that could destabilise the IPKF operations. These were: the acquisition of MANPADS by the LTTE, contacts between the LTTE and the Marxist Sinhala militant group Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) operating in other parts of Sri Lanka, and collaboration between the LTTE and elements of the Government of Sri Lanka. In all the three aspects, the OFC MI all along kept abreast of the developments. Despite the initial glitches of command and control and limited resources, the MI units in Sri Lanka made some positive contributions. Their assessments were generally more accurate than any other national intelligence agency.

OFC MI had used the period of troubled peace from August to October 1987, to create useful assets both within the LTTE and among influential pro-LTTE elements in Jaffna and Trincomalee. These assets came in handy when the operations started. They provided valuable inputs on political and strategic moves of the LTTE as well as Sri Lanka government. During the IPKF's consolidation phase, after Jaffna was cleared, the OFC MI's was able to provide useful information on movement of LTTE pistol groups within Jaffna and in eastern Sri Lanka. It also provided clinching evidence of collusion between elements of the Sri Lankan government and army, and the LTTE. These helped us to understand the changing operational environment and assess the depth of the emerging equation between the Sri Lanka President and the LTTE.

Generally frontline troops had high expectation of tactical intelligence from OFC MI units. To certain extent these were met wherever close coordination existed between the MI elements and troops, notably in Jaffna, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa sectors. Unfortunately this could not be achieved fully in Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts where the jungle terrain made HUMINT operations difficult. Troops in those areas had to depend upon their own combat intelligence. However, the front line infantry units lacked adequate intelligence awareness to successfully carry out combat intelligence tasks. On the other hand, Para Commando units showed excellent response and added some 'muscle' to MI operations conducted with their help. And naturally their operational performance was far superior to regular infantry units.

The OFC MI established useful links with Sri Lanka's National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). Though some of the NIB information was misleading, it helped in understanding the official line of Sri Lanka. The OFC MI had to maintain constant vigilance against NIB efforts to thwart its operations, particularly in the year 1988-89.

Communication and electronic intelligence produced valuable inputs. However, such information was not validated adequately due to paucity of intelligence staff. In future operations of force projection such inputs are likely to increase enormously. In order to get the overall picture, intelligence staff at the formation level would require better training to evolve realistic assessments combining HUMINT, ELINT and SIGINT inputs.

There was practically no input from Air and Naval Intelligence sources. Presumably MI failed to seek specific information from them. Navy could have been useful particularly in gaining information on the LTTE's supplies from Tamil Nadu across the Palk Strait. MI did not fully tap the Tamil media both in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka that were rich open sources of information.

Coordination with civil intelligence agencies

Coordination between the MI as the user and the RAW as the provider had always been one sided. The RAW usually did not meet DGMI's military intelligence requirements in a usable form. Presumably RAW's own priorities were different from those of the armed forces. Ideally when the IPKF was inducted, the RAW had the capability to produce a comprehensive handbook on Sri Lanka containing all the information forces required. Probably the DGMI did not project such a requirement nor did the RAW anticipate it. This speaks for the limited coordination that had existed between the Army and the RAW. However, after initial hiccups on this count in Sri Lanka, the RAW – Army cooperation improved once the Advance HQ OFC was created.

Though over a period of time, some form of top level agency coordination emerged in New Delhi it never percolated down to formation level in Sri Lanka. At present interaction between the Army and RAW counterparts is based only on personal equation established between the two in the absence of standard operating procedures for information sharing. Thus officers on both sides grow up in a culture of denial rather than sharing. Perhaps we can take a leaf out of the Japanese industrial management practice of forming Small Group Activity for the user and producer to understand the user's problems to evolve workable solutions.

As far as the IB was concerned, internal political intelligence appeared to be their focus. Functionally in critical internal situations in India the IB representatives had been forthcoming in sharing information of military interest. However, this does not apply to IB's political intelligence sharing with the army even in counter insurgency situation in India. However, in the case of counter insurgency operations in Sri Lanka, the fine line dividing political and operational intelligence got blurred. Perhaps the IB was not able to appreciate this need for forces operating in alien environment. That would explain its reluctance to share information of any kind relating to Sri Lanka with the IPKF.

The failure of the State police machinery to share intelligence relevant to the IPKF represented the dissonance in our national security perceptions. The failure of the Tamil Nadu Home Department to act in the interest of national security for political reasons had kept up the morale of LTTE fighting with our forces in Sri Lanka. This has been well documented in the Jain Commission report. The precedent set by Tamil Nadu Government during the IPKF operations on this count taking roots now in the political culture cannot be ruled out. To avoid a similar contingency arising in our future overseas operations, it would be prudent for the armed forces to handle with more alacrity by demanding clear mandates in advance with clear guidelines and responsibilities.

Intelligence in overseas operations of the future

The IPKF operations in the early stages were hastily conceived, inadequately planned and executed because there was a lack of role clarity. This was mainly due to the absence of an empowered national decision making body on national security at the government level. Similarly there was an inadequate framework for conducting combined operations overseas at the joint services level. Remedial action has been taken since then to address these limitations, though they might not be wholly satisfactory as the Kargil war had demonstrated. However, it is likely to improve as the nation gradually gains more experience in handling strategic security issues on a global perspective.

Intelligence on a real time basis will be the catalyst of success of armed forces in future overseas operations. MI will be required to meticulously plan and be ready to meet the intelligence requirements in overseas operations before and after the induction of troops. As sources of information have enlarged in scope and width, MI should be in a position to provide reasonable assessments in real time to forces operating in battle fields dominated by larger force levels, great mobility and high fire power. This would require a greater degree of intelligence integration of MI with its counterparts in other services as well as civil intelligence agencies. Thus there is an urgent need to integrate this need in perspective planning of operations for such contingencies.

To achieve such readiness, MI will require clear policy formulations applicable to the three services as well as civil intelligence agencies, better integration and coordination of inputs and assessments through a structured mechanism. It will also require coordinated advance planning by all the intelligence stakeholders at various levels.

Over the long term, MI will also have to build its own expertise in areas of potential operational interest. Ideally, a defence university will be the appropriate forum to create such knowledge banks. In the absence of such an institution, repositories of knowledge can be created in selected academies of excellence like university departments of defence studies so that there is continuity of effort. Intelligence Corps officers should be encouraged to specialise in regions or countries of national interest. Unless MI plans and evolves such an integrated intelligence matrix, success in future overseas operations will come only at great cost of men and material.

Military intelligence is a specialised job that requires the application of military knowledge to understand the information needs of the battle field and provide useful assessments to the fighting forces. In future operational environments, MI staff will be required to make real time assessments to assist operational decision making. No doubt the quantum jump in communication and information technology provides useful tools for the MI to meet this requirement. However, much of its success would depend upon the training imparted to intelligence staff to be technologically savvy in keeping with the dynamics of the emerging battle field needs.

With the nation poised to emerge as a regional power in the near future, MI has to transform itself into a technology driven organisation to meld TECHINT, ELINT, SIGINT and HUMINT inputs to meet the requirements of force projection overseas. Focus on intelligence management rather than mere information management has become the order of the day. That will remove the aberrations of intelligence acquisition and coordination at all levels and contribute meaningfully to operational planning and execution.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com) - Sri Lanka Guardian