Territorial losses could thrust Tamil Tigers to sea

"While the Sri Lankan government was no longer in charge of swathes of Tamil-inhabited territory, the subsequently imposed de facto state of the LTTE ensured that law was imposed, albeit militarised and democratically illegitimate."



by John Drake

(September 04, London, Sri Lanka Guardian) Analysis of piracy trends remains focused on traditional hotbeds of maritime criminal activity such as Nigeria, Somalia and Indonesia.

However, there is a noteworthy military development taking place in the Indian Ocean, which is increasing uncertainty over the level of risk posed to the numerous shipping interests in the region.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are facing a heightened level of military pressure and the very real prospect of losing their battle with the Sri Lankan government. The conventional conflict taking place in the northern Vanni region of Sri Lanka is developing in favour of the better equipped military, and large swathes of territory have been lost by the rebels in the districts of Killinochchi, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya and Mannar in recent weeks.

By forcing the group underground, it could drive it to a new level of desperation, raising the risk of increased attacks against shipping interests. The group desperately needs funds, and although it would be keen to avoid the international repercussions, it may regard the nearby shipping lanes as an opportunity too valuable to ignore as it attempts to bolster its defensive capabilities.

Alternatively, although unlikely, the government’s military campaign could end the spectre of hostility in Sri Lanka and encourage investment, which has been so deterred in recent decades. Already an increase in investment looks likely following the discovery of oil in the Mannar Basin and ongoing proposals to open the Palk Straits to increased traffic.

Any accompanying growth would notably stimulate national shipping, which could lead to a significant shift in the cover offered to vessels passing through Sri Lankan maritime territory.

It is perhaps serendipity that the waters of Sri Lanka are no hotbed of maritime criminality. On paper at least, the causal factors would suggest that the country should be a breeding ground for piracy.

The strategic island has a marginalised coastal population, uneven imposition of state authority and it lies proximate to some of the most lucrative shipping lanes in the world.

Similar conditions are certainly considered responsible for driving groups engaged in kidnapping, hijacking and robbery elsewhere in the world, yet shipping continues to pass Sri Lanka by with little concern exceeding remarks over the possible threat of terrorist activity on the shore.

Yet it is precisely the terrorist threat posed by the LTTE that has limited the frequency of piracy incidents around the country, with attacks sharply less common than around the Indian waters a few hundred kilometers north.

From its formation in 1976, the LTTE quickly worked towards eradicating all Tamil opposition groups from the north and east of the country.

Its quest for Tamil hegemony was as fierce as its violent campaign against the Sinhala-dominated state in the south, and within a few years it had killed, strangled and consumed what had previously been a myriad of competing political and militant organisations in the region.

It had thus established itself as the sole representative of Tamil secession and as regards piracy, this effectively removed one of its causal factors: the uneven imposition of state authority.

While the Sri Lankan government was no longer in charge of swathes of Tamil-inhabited territory, the subsequently imposed de facto state of the LTTE ensured that law was imposed, albeit militarised and democratically illegitimate.

This denied impoverished sea-faring residents of the coast the opportunity to develop pirating rackets and criminal organisations, a situation likely to persist so long as authority remains imposed by the group.

However, given that the Sri Lankan military now has forces a few short miles from the LTTE headquarters in Killinochchi, the group’s maintained hegemony over the Tamil north appears highly uncertain.

As a maritime threat group, and arguably the most innovative terrorist organisation in the world, a total loss of territorial control will likely drive the LTTE underground and lead to a period of heightened uncertainty and strategic unpredictability over its intentions and forthcoming tactics.

Maritime strategy has been a key component of its island-wide insurgency campaign since the start of the third Eelam war in 1995. The tactics of this strategy have predominantly been terrorist in nature, involving amphibious assaults, suicide bombings, sabotage divers and high-seas raids by members of the Sea Tigers against targets in Galle town, Trincomalee harbour and a series of commercial vessels around the Indian Ocean.

The group has also been involved in under-reported piracy. Notoriously in 2003, 24 Chinese fishermen were killed by the group when it seized their vessel for use in smuggling and until Sri Lankan naval operations led to the destruction of its merchant fleet in 2007, the rebels commanded a series of confiscated vessels for use in smuggling weapons to the island from elsewhere in Asia.

While naval authorities recommend vessels to pass the north and eastern shores beyond a distance of 40-50 nautical miles, rebel maritime wing, the Sea Tigers, has extended its field of influence, not just around the island, but extensively into neighbouring India, and across a vast swathe of the Indian Ocean, implicating countries as far apart as the Maldives, Comoros, Indonesia and Cambodia.

If it is forced into a position of greater desperation, it may resort to utilising radical tactics against commercial assets such as the critical shipping interests drifting past the palm-fringed island, but as demonstrated above, it retains the theoretical capability of launching attacks in a far greater sphere than the Sri Lankan coastline.

When the dust settles from the present hostilities, the nature of shipping and issues of piracy and terrorism around Sri Lankan waters may be entirely altered, necessitating notable consideration for those involved in the industry.

( John Drake is a security consultant at AKE Intelligence, specialists in country risk analysis and intelligence.)
- Sri Lanka Guardian