The Last Battle And Nationalism

by Jehan Perera

(September 09, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) There is a growing opinion that the last battle is being fought in the north. It was the LTTE that popularized this usage of language. This was in 2004, well before the present phase of war. At that time the Ceasefire Agreement was in existence. But it was coming under increasing stress. The government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe which had signed the agreement had been sacked by President Chandrika Kumaratunga and defeated in the general election that followed. Around this time the LTTE began a massive fund raising campaign internationally and recruitment drive locally. Their argument was that the ceasefire had brought no benefit to the Tamil people, and therefore they would fight the last battle to obtain independence.

The 2002 Ceasefire Agreement had given the LTTE the space to plan for war in conventional terms. The LTTE used that time to further transform its military structures, including a massive recruitment campaign. The CFA also ensured forward defence lines and demarcation of borders that separated government and LTTE controlled territory, and the legitimacy awarded by the peace process was used to build state-like structures with the support of expatriate and donor funds. Simultaneously this development reduced its flexibility to fight a guerrilla war. Further, the split in the LTTE with its Eastern Command, led by Colonel Karuna, weakened the organisation’s conventional strength.

The Asian tsunami of December 2004 led to a postponement of the last battle. The election of President Mahinda Rajapaksa in November 2005 on an anti-ceasefire platform, was facilitated by the LTTE by its imposed boycott of Tamil voters. With the new President in office, the open and visible preparation for the last battle commenced anew. The LTTE repeatedly provoked the new government within a month of President Rajapaksa’s election by ambushing government troops.

Ironically, it appears that the LTTE miscalculated its strength in relation to resolve of the government and the strength of the Sri Lankan state. The government forces have proved to be more capable in conventional warfare than the LTTE, with significantly more advanced firepower and much larger numbers. With no independent journalists in the field, the only sources of information are the media releases of the government and LTTE. But the weight of evidence is that the government has the upper hand. According to maps produced nearly one half of previously LTTE controlled territory in the north is now under government control.Every kilometre lost by the LTTE also brings the firepower of government artillery closer to key LTTE targets.

Government Advantages

The government forces have two major advantages over the LTTE for the control over territory. The first is that the LTTE is being forced to fight like a conventional army in its defence of territory including military bases, towns and buildings. The government forces are superior in numbers and firepower to fight a conventional war. The second advantage that the government has is that it is being backed by international powers, both in terms of military equipment and surveillance, whereas the LTTE is finding its members on the run internationally leaving it to rely largely on its internal resources.

In the face of these major disadvantages to itself, the only way that the LTTE can hold the government at bay would be by unconventional means. Over the decades the LTTE has shown itself capable of springing surprises.

Terrorist and suicide attacks in which the LTTE has specialized are meant for surprise. The development of an air wing is another example of a development that caught the world by surprise, although this has had only limited effectiveness as a military tool. In addition the LTTE is also using the civilian population as part of their defence strategy.

In recent weeks international humanitarian organizations have been reporting that the LTTE is not permitting civilians to leave the LTTE controlled areas. Even the family members of the local staff of international humanitarian organizations are being denied permission to leave. Instead, the entire population is being compelled to withdraw along with the LTTE ever deeper into the LTTE controlled territory. People are forced to live in temporary shelters or under trees. Repeated appeals by the UN and international humanitarian organisations to let the civilians leave the LTTE controlled areas, and to seek shelter in government controlled areas have been turned down or not responded to by the LTTE.

The appalling conditions of living of the civilian population are made much worse by the fact that the LTTE is compelling the people to join the combat. There are reports of brothers or sisters of wounded cadres now having to succeed them in the LTTE’s ranks. Civilians, including women and older people, are being given self-defence training and more members of each family are being pressed into semi-military service. If the government forces choose to attack LTTE targets with their long range artillery and air power, they risk making collateral attacks on the civilians.

Civil Society

The very term Last Battle suggests a fight to the finish regardless of the human costs. As the government and LTTE are in complete control of their respective war machines, there is little that either the international humanitarian community or local civil society can do to thwart them. Neither the government nor LTTE appear to believe in a political solution with the other. Civil society pleas for negotiations have gone unheeded, as each of the protagonists places its faith in its armed forces. But at the conclusion of the very costly battles for the north there will not be peace, even if more territory passes from one side to the other. This can be seen even today in the east. Peace is not only the absence of war, it is about creating the conditions for human rights and economic growth.

The government was able to militarily defeat the LTTE and retake the entirety of the territory in the east that the LTTE once controlled. The government has even held provincial elections in the east. However, any visitor to the east would not see any normalcy there, but a highly militarized environment in which there are soldiers all over. Periodically there are killings of soldiers, LTTE cadre and civilians. Tension is rife amongst the people and security forces.

Even if the government succeeds in capturing the entirety of the north, and driving the remnants of the LTTE into the jungles, the instability and tension will continue.

The fact is that eradicating a symptom cannot end the cause of the problem. Even if the government were to defeat the LTTE it will not be able to eradicate Tamil nationalism. The desire of Tamil people to enjoy equal rights and to have real decision making power in Sri Lanka is not limited to the LTTE-controlled Wanni. It exists in the same measure in other parts of the north and east, in Colombo and elsewhere in the country.

In addition, there is a reservoir of Tamil nationalism in the Tamil expatriate community that lives abroad, that no amount of military solutions in Sri Lanka can ever hope to subdue. There is only one answer to Tamil nationalism and that is a just political solution.

The danger also exists that military victory will be seen in ethnic terms that will be alienating and not unifying. When Jaffna was retaken from the LTTE in 1995, it was seen as a crushing defeat for the LTTE from which they would not recover. At that time Jaffna was the administrative capital of the LTTE.

The manner in which President Chandrika Kumaratunga formally received a scroll in Parliament from Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte informing her of the capture of Jaffna was like a replay of ancient history when the Sinhalese kings fought battles. This mistake must not be repeated. The symbols and agenda of the Sri Lankan state need to be multi ethnic and not mono ethnic if peace is to be the lasting outcome.
- Sri Lanka Guardian