The beginning of the end?

by Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu

(September 10, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The decision by the government to ask the INGOs and UN to leave the Wanni, ostensibly on the grounds that it cannot ensure their security and wants to prevent a Muttur type atrocity, heightens expectations that the final battle for the Wanni is nigh and that the war will soon be over.

The UN it is reported, will be allowed in with supplies. The LTTE according to some reports has joined battle in earnest and the betting of pundits is that whilst casualties will be high, the end result is a foregone conclusion. The security forces will win and the LTTE will either be vanquished in toto or remnants of it will scupper off into the jungles to attempt guerilla resistance and terrorist attacks into the future.

Whilst all of this goes on, there is the burgeoning crisis of displacement. The LTTE stands accused of preventing the movement of people and of using them as a civilian shield; the government on the other hand, wants to empty the Wanni of civilians so that it can wreak havoc on LTTE military infrastructure and capability. The civilians of course are caught in the middle – fleeing from and further into the LTTE controlled area to escape the fighting.

Thousands involved

Tens of thousands are involved. There has been talk of civilian corridors to let people out and criticism that the people will have to languish in what are effectively "detention centres" once they come out. And since it is likely that most of them would have undergone some training by the LTTE in civil defence, there is concern that they could be considered suspect, with all the unpleasant consequences that could entail.

It would be prudent of the regime to recognise that it is in such situations that the seeds of future conflict are sown and likewise, in such situations that the first and firm steps of reconciliation can and must be taken.

The acid test of the regime’s professed commitment to civilian welfare and of its understanding of Tamil sensitivities – shortcomings in respect of which the Defence Secretary himself has conceded – will be on the ground in the Wanni and not in the corridors of power and diplomacy in Geneva or New York. It will of course also be in the deliberations of the APRC, the regime’s chosen forum for political issues, and the proposals the regime will endorse, if any, at all, for a political settlement of the conflict.

All of this holds even if victory though certain, persists in being imminent. There is every likelihood that the LTTE will do its damnest to inflict as much damage militarily, before it is, itself destroyed.

That it was able to launch an air and ground attack on the security forces and police in Vavuniya – the first such attack in government held territory in the current phase of fighting which has been reported as one in which the LTTE has lost or ceded large chunks of territory to the security forces, indicates that it has not lost its capacity for daring and for damage. Whilst some may contend that this was a flash in the pan or a desperado raid by a desperate foe, this is not a conclusion that can be taken for granted.

Objective

Yet, it is a question as to what the LTTE hopes to be able to achieve at this juncture in the hostilities. Is its strategic objective a hurting stalemate, which will force another round of talks or is it some notion of international intervention to force negotiations and a political deal?

The latter, were it to be at all a possibility, will depend on the political winds prevalent across the Palk Strait as India moves toward a general election. The chances are higher though that intervention will be avoided rather than embarked upon, leaving the LTTE with the ‘hurting stalemate’ as its best and only option.

The last time it achieved this was in 2000/2001 in different circumstances in which they held the upper hand. They were able to hit the airport and port and move around with greater ease than they are at present. They also faced a regime that was ideologically committed to a political settlement, with them if there was no alternative, but preferably without them.

If there is to be another time around for them, the balance of power will be different. It will revolve around their ability to exact leverage from their demonstrable destructive potential as opposed to their control over territory and the pretension of a state in the state of becoming. Defiance and the confidence that all states have regarding their access to resources, will stiffen the resistance of the Rajapakse regime to try yet again to defeat the LTTE, as they firmly believe they can and must and will.

It looks like military victory will be delayed, perhaps temporarily, but conflict resolution, perhaps indefinitely.

[Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu received his Ph.D and first degree from the London School of Economics (LSE), University of London in 1986 and 1979 respectively. He is currently Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) an independent and non-partisan public policy institute focusing on issues of democratic governance and peace through programmes of research and advocacy. ]
- Sri Lanka Guardian