"Victory in PC Elections"










This only underlines that winning the war against the insurgents is well beyond battle field victories and capture of territories. Though these are essential for defeating the LTTE, unless its ability to capture the minds of the population is rooted out, the victories would not be lasting. That could come only through a peace architecture that would make the LTTE's armed conflict irrelevant. The Army Commander, a veteran of the conflict, knows this home truth as much as the President, the master strategist, does.”

(August 27, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) As the results of the North Central and Sabaragamuwa Provincial Council elections streamed in, it was clear that Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa has turned his continued success in war to pay political dividends. The ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) scored resounding success capturing 20 of the 33 seats (securing 56.37% of votes) in Sabaragamuwa Province, and 25 of the 44 seats (securing 65.53% votes) in North Central Province.

The immediate reaction to the results would be to call it a vote for war, as Western Province Governor Alavi Mowlana had done. He said the people of the two provinces gave their verdict "for the Government and the Security Forces to continue military operations against the LTTE to liberate the people living in the grip of LTTE tyranny and to usher peace." Probably this statement marked only his exultation at his party's victory rather than on its implications. Because it would also imply that over 40% of the people who voted against the UPFA were against the war and for peace. Both the conclusions would be narrow, because contrary to what some leaders of UPFA declared before the election this was no referendum for war.

The voting was not solelybased on war and peace issues but also on many other grievances of the common man particularly the shooting cost of fuel, and other essential day to day needs.

President Rajapaksa saw the election victory in a broader perspective as "the new people's mandate given to the Mahinda Chinthana." Undoubtedly, the election victory though flawed by violence during the campaign period, was a clear signal of majority support for the President's way of doing things despite its weaknesses and shortcomings. It equally reflected the inability of the opposition to throw up a leader who could rally the masses to challenge President Rajapaksa.

The Morning Leader, Colombo had some interesting poll analysis. It pointed out that despite its apparently unimpressive performance the opposition United National Party (UNP) has not done badly in comparison with the 2004 PC elections. The comparative performance of the UPFA and the UNP in both the 2004 and current elections were as under:






This would indicate that the UNP's voters are in tact despite its inability to make dramatic improvement in its political performance. At the same time the voters have indicated their wish to continue with the UPFA agenda.

Some of the other useful pointers of the election results are -

• This is a green signal for the President to carry forward the military operations in the present fashion, as the peace constituency is yet to stage a 2002-style comeback.

• Though the election victories indicate a favourable environment for the UPFA to call for a general election, they also indicate there is no urgency for the President to do so. He can do this at a time of his choosing perhaps when he reduces the LTTE strength to make it a marginal player sometime next year.

• The rallying of Sinhala voters behind the President at the cost of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) represents the cutting down to size of the JVP. It had been eating into the traditional Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) pastures during the last few years. The election results also reduce the JVP's ability to pressurize the ruling coalition to toe its line. (This is remarkably similar to the sidelining of the Indian Leftists' influence in the Centre ever since they lost their showdown with Manmohan Singh government in the Indian parliament over the India-US nuclear deal).

• Similarly the election results show the declining fortunes of the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), and the Upcountry Peoples Front (UPF) among the Plantation Tamils, who have a strong presence in two constituencies of Sabaragamuwa Province. The success of the Western Peoples Front (WPF) contesting in alliance with the UNP could result in further erosion of influence of CWC within the ruling coalition.

Peace rather than war beckons

With a clear mandate in his favour, and freed of the shackles of JVP conditional support, the President has a unique opportunity to not only progress the war to its natural conclusion but also to bring lasting peace. This involves speeding up the process of the devolution of powers to the provincial councils as prescribed in the 13th amendment as a part of larger vision for ushering in peace that has to be beyond capturing Kilinochchi.

The development of the Eastern Province stands as a mute testimony to averments of the President's in the Mahinda Chintana not yet translated into action. Its promise of quitable treatment of all people regardless of their class, creed or language is still tangled in loops of politicking, vote bank politics and negative influences.

The chief minister in the east is yet to gain many of the powers promised in the 13th amendment.

The huge number of civilians fleeing the northern battlefields is now estimated at 175,000. And they are converging on Kilinochchi. They are the visible indicator of the unmapped agenda that is building up for an action plan after the guns go silent. For lasting peace, it has to go well beyond short term measures that would provide only a ace lift for the government and not the affected people. Is the government ready with such a plan? Only time will tell.

Already, there are indications that the LTTE is slowly but surely staging a comeback in the east. The ruling Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) has spoken about increasing LTTE intelligence operations in the Kanjikudichcharu area. Other sources have also confirmed the growing presence of LTTE elements there. It would be no different in the north after the LTTE is driven out from Kilinochchi to the bush at great human cost.

This only underlines that winning the war against the insurgents is well beyond battle field victories and capture of territories. Though these are essential for defeating the LTTE, unless its ability to capture the minds of the population is rooted out, the victories would not be lasting. That could come only through a peace architecture that would make the LTTE's armed conflict irrelevant. The Army Commander, a veteran of the conflict, knows this home truth as much as the President, the master strategist, does.

Overall, the electoral mandate given to the President is as much to usher in permanent peace as pursue the war. We can only hope they build a peace agenda with the same igour they did for the war.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies.
E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com)

- Sri Lanka Guardian