The Assassination of ministers Kadirgamar and Fernandopulle

by B. Anton Jeyanathan

(August 14, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Of the assassination of politicians during the past years, the killings of two cabinet ministers Hon. Lakshman Kadirgamar and Jeyaraj Fernandopulle, two outstanding speakers, both clever lawyers, both valiant defenders of the policies of the Present Government, are an irreparable loss to our nation.

The intention of writing this article is not to criticise any particular individual or organisation but to high light the failure and the lapses of those entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the two ministers. Any VIP who requires protection is virtually handed over to the protective security team to ensure that the VIP is protected from assault, kidnapping and assassination. The protective security team consists of the Personal security officer . (PSO), Ring round or Close protection team, Advance security team, Spotters, counter surveillance team , back up armed squad, security teams at office and residence, sweeping team and any other additional unit necessary to ensure adequate and complete protection to the VIP, throughout the day and night.

It is not the number of personnel or the number of armed commandos that matters. Protection of a VIP is not a routine exercise, not a crowd control task, but a serious task that requires alertness, commitment, intelligence and physical fitness. The (PSO) who is selected should be chosen on suitability and should not be selected at the personal request of the VIP, as some one fitting the description of "Ape Minihek". The primary task of the (PSO) is to guard the physical body of the VIP, from any physical attack or attack by fire arm, supported by the Ring round team. Literally and in reality he has to be ready to protect the VIP risking his own life. Instances of many Personal security officers and other body guards being killed along with those whom they were protecting due to assassinations are a plenty.

Lapses

Let me recall the manner in which Mr. KADIRGAMAR was assassinated. Most of us have seen the film "Day of the Jackal". These types of films and many other documentary films are screened at training sessions for the officers engaged in protective security. Video recordings of real incidents of attacks and assassinations of VIPs, recorded by various agencies are regularly shown to educate those engaged in protective security to learn the various and innovative methods and ruses used by the assassins to get at their targets and to take counter measures that need be taken to thwart any attempts by the agents of the enemies. Did not the assassin learn from this film how to get at the target?. Why is it that the (PSO) the protective team, and the team providing security at his house at Buller’s lane fail miserably to study the possible methods that could be used to get at the minister who was used to a routine of taking a swim and thus unwittingly offering himself as a target.

An elementary and logical precaution was to keep all "High rise" buildings around the residence under constant surveillance, to observe any suspicious movements. From what was reported, the window of the upper floor of the building, opens directly towards the swimming pool, of the residence of the late Minister. The team of assassins is said to have conducted reconnaissance for a number of days, holed up in the upper floor, through this window, before they hit the target and escaped from the scene. It was an open target practice invitation even to an amateur gunman to get at the target without any hindrance. If there was intelligent foresight, this particular floor and the window area necessarily should have been the prime point of constant surveillance by the protective team. If they had been more alert, this particular floor and the window could have been used by the protective team to be an observation post had they approached the chief occupant who was a son of a retired senior Police officer, he would have willingly allowed this particular floor for the use of the protection team.

There are few more "High rise" buildings abounding the residence from where there was a clear view of the swimming pool and the garden of the residence of the Minister. Were these buildings kept under constant watch? Were the occupants of these high rise buildings spoken to obtain their assistance to keep strangers from gaining access to these buildings? Members of the staff of a foreign mission residing in a house overlooking the residence of the late Minister are said to have declared that none of them were spoken to by the local law enforcement authorities to obtain their support or assistance to ensure that no outside elements infiltrated the enclave.

It was reported in the press that some arrests were made by the Police of some youths taking photographs or video recording the vicinity of the residence of the minister few days before the day of the assassination. Did the security detail of the Minister probe in detail the background of the persons arrested, did they have a view of the photographs and the video recordings taken into custody? Intelligence was available that the Minister was on the top of the "Hit" list. The security detail should have been ever vigilant to foil or prevent any attempts on the life of the Minister. If any one of them had the wisdom to look towards the surrounding "High rise" buildings, in particular the upper floor of the building at the corner, which had an unobstructed, clear view, from the window, he would have seen suspicious movements on the other side of the window, Especially on the fateful day that particular building and the window should have been closely watched during the time the Minister was in the open It was a costly lapse which gave the killers a free hand to get at their target and flee from the scene without being apprehended.

Let me now focus on the assassination of Hon. Minister Jeyaraj Fernandopulle. Here too the assassin or the suicide bomber was able to mingle with the crowd, come behind the Minister and kill him and many others. Press reports have already appeared indicating that the accountable agencies have started passing the buck. The organisers of the marathon run, the local Police officers, the security detail of the minister, the Police department and even the Minister had been blamed, for their failures and lapses in not taking adequate precautionary security measures. Whenever a local political organiser or any organisers of sports or public functions organise meetings or functions, where a VIP has been extended an invitation to attend the function, it is mandatory that they must liaise with the local Police, before finalising the date, venue, time etc.

The Officer In Charge (OIC) of the local Police has to authorise the holding of the function, having checked the list of invitees or speakers, the, location where the meeting is to be held, the security threat the traffic control, crowd control and other relevant matters to ensure that the meeting, function and the sports event is conducted without any security and traffic snags. When it is confirmed that a politician VIP is billed to grace the occasion, the Officer In Charge (OIC) of the local Police, where the event is to be held, shall dictate the rules and conditions to the local organisers as to the location of the meeting, the security measures, and other details to ensure the protection of the VIP, and the participants. To achieve success in preventing any harm to the VIP and others and any untoward incident, a co-ordinated plan should have been prepared and implemented.

A co-ordinating committee should have been set up comprising the local Police chief, the representatives from the organisers of the event, the Ministers Security Division (MSD), and the security unit of the Minister. It need not be emphasised that the Intelligence Service Division regularly updates and co-ordinates with the (MSD), on the level of threat and the intelligence gathered on any assassin who has been assigned to target the minister. The venue should have been inspected well ahead, especially the previous night, swept and security cleared, and taken charge by placing guards at all entry points to prevent uninvited and unauthorised persons sneaking into the venue during the night. From what was observed from the video clippings and press photographs, it could be seen that the event was controlled and directed by the organisers of the marathon and not by any law enforcement officers, and that there was no apparent access and crowd control measures implemented by any agencies, but it was a free for all entry into the venue.

It has been confirmed that the Minister had arrived at the venue at the stipulated time but had gone away as the organisers were not ready to start the marathon. There had been a gap of about one to two hours before he came back. Was the place secured during this period of time, was entry to the venue restricted or were all persons physically checked before they were allowed entry into the venue? Whether it was a festive period or not, were adequate men deployed both in uniform and in mufti?. From what has been learnt from a high Police officer, there has been no co-ordination of the security arrangements between the relevant agencies and the most important Police officer, the Divisional Senior Superintendent was not adequately and properly kept informed of the details of the visit of the late Minister.

The Personal Security Officer (PSO) of the Minister should have built up complete confidence of the Minister, and earned implicit trust, where he was in a position to discuss all invitations extended to the minister, decide on the importance of accepting the invitation, based on the security of the minister, the risk, and to persuade the minister either to accept or decline the invitation. Ministers are invited by all and sundry to attend insignificant and unimportant events and functions. One cannot completely isolate the people’s representative to shun all public functions due to security reasons, however one has to strike a balance between personal security and pleasing the supporters. The (PSO) by building up personal confidence and trust can insist that the Minister not to attend this event where there was no security at all. The venue was open not enclosed, there was no access control, it was in an open arena, allowing free entry into the venue. There were no preventive measures implemented or put into operation prior to and during the event to eliminate the risk of a suicide bomber getting closer to the Minister.

Suicide bombers are the deadliest killers, against whom there are no known safeguards if they come within striking distance of the target. However, many attempts have been thwarted by alert security personnel by preventing the bomber from approaching the target. Such preventive measures have resulted in the bomber being frustrated and blowing himself or herself up without achieving the assigned task of striking the target. Officers who are trained and selected to be part of the protection team of a VIP have to be given regular "In House" training, and before they are inducted into the actual performance of duties they should be given specialised training.

Divided Responsibility

In both assassinations there had been divided responsibility, where no one particular individual or agency taking the responsibility of being the sole person in authority. Many agencies are brought in to co-ordinate the implementation of the security plan, however one agency or designated head of the security detail should have taken command and control, to provide maximum security to the VIP, at his residence, his office, and wherever he travelled. From what has been gathered from security personnel, the responsibility of providing security to the late Mr. KADIRGAMAR was divided between the Police and the Army, and there was no single officer co-ordinating the duties of the Police and the Army. Even in the case of the late Mr. Fernandopulle, many agencies were involved, in the organisation of the event and providing security at the venue. Here too it was evident, that in spite of the high security threat to the Minister, the law enforcement officers, and the protective security detail were not in control of the venue, but the organisers were observed engaging in crowd control and directing the Minister around the venue.

There has to be co-ordination between the relevant agencies, but the responsibility should not and cannot be divided. The co-ordination has to be under one head who should be responsible for the task assigned. The person entrusted with the responsibility should ensure that all other agencies involved with the security arrangement shall come under his command. Under the present security situation, all VVIPs are targets. Protecting them from assassins is an enormous task, which is risky and challenging.

It is very essential that a genuine effort is made after any such disaster to learn from the mistakes, which allowed the enemy to succeed, and to take meaningful and positive remedial steps to plug all the loopholes.
- Sri Lanka Guardian