“The 2005 UNP election manifesto was a backward movement from Ranil’s 1999 stand. In 1999 he actually promised an interim administration to the LTTE although he refused to talk about it in April 2003! The 2005 manifesto was rather similar to Chandrika’s 1999 manifesto which was wholly rejected by the LTTE and the large majority of Tamil people. As a result there was no choice for the Tamil people, especially those living in the North and the East.”
_______________________
by Thomas Johnpulle
(July 25, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The November 2005 Presidential Election may be the most talked about of its kind. Tamil voters held the trump card and they played it. The question to ask is what the options available to Tamil people were, not why they didn’t vote in large numbers as they did at the 2001 General Election. In every Presidential Election after 1988, voters’ turnout was very low in the North and in Tamil areas in the East. Unlike General Elections, Presidential Elections do not field one’s kith and kin and the contestants are far too unfamiliar. Due to this, Presidential Elections in 1994, 1999 and 2005 had almost similar voters’ turnout when Tamil areas in the North and the East are combined. Therefore if anyone claims that the 2005 Presidential Election had a drop, large enough to alter the outcome, in voters’ turnout compared to the two previous Presidential Elections, it is not true.
By 2005, Sri Lanka had passed through an important time span where the longest ceasefire held amidst all odds. All credit for the CFA must go to Ranil and Pirapaharan. However, what Pirapaharan wanted was not a ceasefire; he wanted Tamil Elam. Although the CFA brought about an atmosphere of relative peace, there was nothing concrete. Peace talks collapsed in 2003 when Ranil refused to continue talks within the framework of ISGA (Interim Self Governing Authority) proposals. Interestingly no proposals came from the government delegation and discussing the only available set of proposals was the only option the government should have pursued. Unfortunately it didn’t. That was a fatal mistake of the then UNF government. CFA without peace talks became an empty husk and dashed all hope Tamils pinned on the UNF government. What is worse was that the government showed no interest whatsoever in finding a political solution. No proposal came from the UNF government which was rather strange as all recent governments including the present one have come up with some sort of proposals. Pirapaharan realized that Ranil was unable to deliver more and he has come to the end of the road.
The 2005 UNP election manifesto was a backward movement from Ranil’s 1999 stand. In 1999 he actually promised an interim administration to the LTTE although he refused to talk about it in April 2003! The 2005 manifesto was rather similar to Chandrika’s 1999 manifesto which was wholly rejected by the LTTE and the large majority of Tamil people. As a result there was no choice for the Tamil people, especially those living in the North and the East. What would happen if Ranil won and implemented Chandrika’s proposals? That would have made LTTE look like a bunch of impossible terrorists in the eyes of the international community and it might have frustrated the struggle to some extent. On the other hand what if he goes back on his word and doesn’t offer anything as he did in 2001-2004?
Therefore, either way Ranil offered nothing for the Tamil people in the North and the East. This became the basis for the request made by the LTTE to the Tamil people in the North and the East to refrain from voting at the Sinhala-Only election.
However, Tamils in Colombo had a different view of things. Peace that came with the CFA was a huge blessing for them and they wholeheartedly voted for Ranil in 2005. The plight of Tamils in the North and the East had little or no improvement as the parties to the conflict failed to arrive at a lasting solution. While the TRO undertook all rehabilitation work in the areas under LTTE control, the government failed to allocate enough funds for the TRO. As a result development work came to a grinding halt. The scant amount of work performed under the purview of the GA previously also stopped. People in Tamil areas in the North and the East saw no hope in the fragile peace process that failed to deliver anything concrete and Ranil’s 2005 promises fell well short of providing any more hope either.
People in Jaffna had other concerns too. After 1995, economy of the Jaffna people took an upward move. Ridiculously high cost of living became a thing of the past and businesses flourished than before. People knew, however, that this prosperity would last only until law and order stays. In other words, this relative prosperity would collapse anytime if LTTE takes over Jaffna. Among the two candidates, Ranil was seen as the least favorite to hold Jaffna and people feared going back to the pre-1995 era of no electricity, very high “taxes”, no functioning banks, etc. This further distanced them from voting for Ranil. Although the EPDP and the TULF were supporting the other candidate to different degrees, people feared voting for him who was in alliance with the JHU and the JVP. Although Mahinda had the support of these parties, he lacked the support of ardent Chandrika followers who were made organizers in vital districts and electorates. On top of that Mahinda’s election promises were not accommodated in the budget that was out just a few weeks before the election. That stopped him from offering election sweeteners which was customary in Sri Lankan Presidential Elections. These internal fallouts ensured lower than potential votes for him although he managed to record an unconvincing win. ‘Election organizers’ is still a hot topic between Chandrika and Mahinda!
Ranil in 2005 had a credibility issue than his previous appearance. He had failed the Tamil people. His lieutenants were boasting about military victories the government scored against the LTTE during the UNF regime and previous regimes when Ranil was the Prime Minister. While this jabbering attracted a section of the Sinhala voters, it further distanced Tamil voters in the North and the East. There was nothing to suggest that Ranil would not have followed a military approach after getting elected. This fear was real and was well founded even then. Today, retired General Janaka Perera is a UNP high-flyer. His advent to politics was not accidental. He had considered contesting the 2005 Presidential Election in support of the UNP although he dropped that idea later. Ranil’s desire to appoint General Perera to the post of Defence Secretary was made public in 2007 March, just 16 months after the election. Would it have been different had he won the election? Very unlikely.
Abstinence from voting was voluntary in most areas. Interestingly Jaffna and Batticaloa (both under government control) showed the largest drop in voters’ turnout compared to the 1999 Presidential Election. Unlike all previous Presidential Elections in 1982, 1988, 1994 and 1999, the 2005 election was relatively peaceful. It was in this context the Tamil people in the North and the East made a clear choice. Looking back from today it may sound better to have voted for Ranil, but what was the guarantee that it would not be a worse decision?
( The Writer can be reached at trjohnpulle@yahoo.co.uk )
- Sri Lanka Guardian
_______________________
by Thomas Johnpulle
(July 25, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The November 2005 Presidential Election may be the most talked about of its kind. Tamil voters held the trump card and they played it. The question to ask is what the options available to Tamil people were, not why they didn’t vote in large numbers as they did at the 2001 General Election. In every Presidential Election after 1988, voters’ turnout was very low in the North and in Tamil areas in the East. Unlike General Elections, Presidential Elections do not field one’s kith and kin and the contestants are far too unfamiliar. Due to this, Presidential Elections in 1994, 1999 and 2005 had almost similar voters’ turnout when Tamil areas in the North and the East are combined. Therefore if anyone claims that the 2005 Presidential Election had a drop, large enough to alter the outcome, in voters’ turnout compared to the two previous Presidential Elections, it is not true.
By 2005, Sri Lanka had passed through an important time span where the longest ceasefire held amidst all odds. All credit for the CFA must go to Ranil and Pirapaharan. However, what Pirapaharan wanted was not a ceasefire; he wanted Tamil Elam. Although the CFA brought about an atmosphere of relative peace, there was nothing concrete. Peace talks collapsed in 2003 when Ranil refused to continue talks within the framework of ISGA (Interim Self Governing Authority) proposals. Interestingly no proposals came from the government delegation and discussing the only available set of proposals was the only option the government should have pursued. Unfortunately it didn’t. That was a fatal mistake of the then UNF government. CFA without peace talks became an empty husk and dashed all hope Tamils pinned on the UNF government. What is worse was that the government showed no interest whatsoever in finding a political solution. No proposal came from the UNF government which was rather strange as all recent governments including the present one have come up with some sort of proposals. Pirapaharan realized that Ranil was unable to deliver more and he has come to the end of the road.
The 2005 UNP election manifesto was a backward movement from Ranil’s 1999 stand. In 1999 he actually promised an interim administration to the LTTE although he refused to talk about it in April 2003! The 2005 manifesto was rather similar to Chandrika’s 1999 manifesto which was wholly rejected by the LTTE and the large majority of Tamil people. As a result there was no choice for the Tamil people, especially those living in the North and the East. What would happen if Ranil won and implemented Chandrika’s proposals? That would have made LTTE look like a bunch of impossible terrorists in the eyes of the international community and it might have frustrated the struggle to some extent. On the other hand what if he goes back on his word and doesn’t offer anything as he did in 2001-2004?
Therefore, either way Ranil offered nothing for the Tamil people in the North and the East. This became the basis for the request made by the LTTE to the Tamil people in the North and the East to refrain from voting at the Sinhala-Only election.
However, Tamils in Colombo had a different view of things. Peace that came with the CFA was a huge blessing for them and they wholeheartedly voted for Ranil in 2005. The plight of Tamils in the North and the East had little or no improvement as the parties to the conflict failed to arrive at a lasting solution. While the TRO undertook all rehabilitation work in the areas under LTTE control, the government failed to allocate enough funds for the TRO. As a result development work came to a grinding halt. The scant amount of work performed under the purview of the GA previously also stopped. People in Tamil areas in the North and the East saw no hope in the fragile peace process that failed to deliver anything concrete and Ranil’s 2005 promises fell well short of providing any more hope either.
People in Jaffna had other concerns too. After 1995, economy of the Jaffna people took an upward move. Ridiculously high cost of living became a thing of the past and businesses flourished than before. People knew, however, that this prosperity would last only until law and order stays. In other words, this relative prosperity would collapse anytime if LTTE takes over Jaffna. Among the two candidates, Ranil was seen as the least favorite to hold Jaffna and people feared going back to the pre-1995 era of no electricity, very high “taxes”, no functioning banks, etc. This further distanced them from voting for Ranil. Although the EPDP and the TULF were supporting the other candidate to different degrees, people feared voting for him who was in alliance with the JHU and the JVP. Although Mahinda had the support of these parties, he lacked the support of ardent Chandrika followers who were made organizers in vital districts and electorates. On top of that Mahinda’s election promises were not accommodated in the budget that was out just a few weeks before the election. That stopped him from offering election sweeteners which was customary in Sri Lankan Presidential Elections. These internal fallouts ensured lower than potential votes for him although he managed to record an unconvincing win. ‘Election organizers’ is still a hot topic between Chandrika and Mahinda!
Ranil in 2005 had a credibility issue than his previous appearance. He had failed the Tamil people. His lieutenants were boasting about military victories the government scored against the LTTE during the UNF regime and previous regimes when Ranil was the Prime Minister. While this jabbering attracted a section of the Sinhala voters, it further distanced Tamil voters in the North and the East. There was nothing to suggest that Ranil would not have followed a military approach after getting elected. This fear was real and was well founded even then. Today, retired General Janaka Perera is a UNP high-flyer. His advent to politics was not accidental. He had considered contesting the 2005 Presidential Election in support of the UNP although he dropped that idea later. Ranil’s desire to appoint General Perera to the post of Defence Secretary was made public in 2007 March, just 16 months after the election. Would it have been different had he won the election? Very unlikely.
Abstinence from voting was voluntary in most areas. Interestingly Jaffna and Batticaloa (both under government control) showed the largest drop in voters’ turnout compared to the 1999 Presidential Election. Unlike all previous Presidential Elections in 1982, 1988, 1994 and 1999, the 2005 election was relatively peaceful. It was in this context the Tamil people in the North and the East made a clear choice. Looking back from today it may sound better to have voted for Ranil, but what was the guarantee that it would not be a worse decision?
( The Writer can be reached at trjohnpulle@yahoo.co.uk )
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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