“It has to be mentioned, at the outset, that the above epistemology though may sound similar to theories on social construction of knowledge in what is known as Sociology of Knowledge, is much wider in its base. In theories on what are called social construction of knowledge it is readily accepted that knowledge is created or constructed in a given society. The social constructionists emphasise that knowledge is created in societies but they do not attempt to explain how knowledge is constructed in these societies.”
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by Nalin de Silva
(July 08, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) I am not a historian if one were to go by the degrees I have obtained, but by paraphrasing as somebody what has been said on war it can be stated that history is too serious a subject to be left in the hands of the historians. In the recent past Michael Roberts a historian produced by the University by the river, and turned Anthropologist by history and Shainie who is comfortable in his/her anonymity have commented on history and referred to me as I also write on history. Roberts has referred to me as a Mathematician but at the outset I must say that I am not such a creature as my contribution to Mathematics is zero, though I sell some Applied Mathematics and Mathematical Physics, the others have created, for a living.
History like any other corpus of knowledge is relative and is relative to the period of writing as well as the period of reading, not to mention the writer and the reader. History of period A, written in period B, and read in period C will "reveal" the conditions in periods B and C, as well as the characters of the writer relative to the reader. There is no objective history as such, which could be found only in the minds of the "objective historians". Before I write on history let me say something on Philosophy and here again I must emphasise that I am neither a Philosopher, though I delve into Philosophy.
I believe in the philosophy of relativity not only in western or any other Physics but with respect to knowledge in general. To me knowledge, whether in Physics or History, is created by people relative to their sense organs, culture and mind. This takes place in a Chinthanaya which itself is part of culture. However, though Chinthanaya is part of the culture it is also the thread that runs through all aspects of the latter. Thus I am not reducing knowledge to either culture or Chinthanaya.
The above statements on knowledge too are relative to a culture and not absolute. In this case the statements of this particular epistemology have been created in Sinhala Theravada Buddhist culture, and if somebody were to question as to whether the knowledge of a relativistic epistemology is absolute we would not reply in the affirmative, and all that we would say is that this particular epistemology which we call constructionist relativism (Nirmanathmaka Sapekshathavadaya) is at least internally consistent to a very high degree, unlike many other epistemologies. For example an epistemology that assumes an objective reality independent of the man has an uphill task in attempting to show objectively that an objective reality exists. One would say that it is an ontological problem and not something that belongs to epistemology. However the way one "acquires" a knowledge of the existence of an objective reality is in the realm of epistemology. It has to be emphasised that though western philosophy has an epistemology separated from an ontology, it is not possible to do so even relative to western philosophy.
It has to be mentioned, at the outset, that the above epistemology though may sound similar to theories on social construction of knowledge in what is known as Sociology of Knowledge, is much wider in its base. In theories on what are called social construction of knowledge it is readily accepted that knowledge is created or constructed in a given society. The social constructionists emphasise that knowledge is created in societies but they do not attempt to explain how knowledge is constructed in these societies. Thus creation of knowledge is left unexplained. In other words there is no theory to explain how theories are created though it is said that theories are constructed by people living in societies.
In "Nirmanathmaka Sapekshathavadaya" the relative knowledge, one speaks of is not the relative knowledge of something that absolutely exists. In the normal relativity theories, including those of the postmodernists, one has to deal with the way certain phenomena appear with respect to different observers. It is assumed that certain things exist "absolutely" and they appear differently to different observers. Even in the so called theory of relativity in Physics, there exists an absolute space-time which is observed by different observers in a manner relative to them. The so-called space-time interval of two events remains the same for different observers whether in the special theory or in the general theory of relativity. "Nirmanathmaka Sapekshathavadaya" differs from all the other relativistic epistemologies and theories, as there it is the observer who constructs knowledge as if out of nothing (sunya), due to the "avidya" of the observer. Even the observer who is "absolute" in the western theories, is relative to himself/herself in "Nirmanathmaka Sapekshathavadaya". As there is no "soul" in Sinhala Theravada Buddhism, in "Nirmanathmaka Sapekshathavadaya" it has been shown how the mind creates itself without referring to any "other entity".
It was Prof. Thomas Kuhn who introduced the concept of paradigm with respect to creating knowledge. He showed that in Physics, what is referred to as Newtonian Physics is based on a set of certain axioms, assumptions etc., which he called a paradigm. He opposed the views of Prof. Karl Popper who had said that in (western) science, the scientists advance knowledge by trying to falsify the existing theories. Kuhnian view was that in (western) science there are what are known as normal periods and revolutionary periods. During the normal periods the scientists carry out normal work and they only work to show that the existing theories are correct. However according to Kuhn there are revolutionary periods in science during which the existing paradigm is replaced by a new paradigm. The Einsteinian revolution that took place more than hundred years ago in 1905 changed the Newtonian paradigm and introduced new axioms and assumptions with respect to space and time.
In the Kuhnian scheme theories in (western) science are created in a given paradigm and one may say that theories are relative to a paradigm. With paradigm shifts not only theories but meanings associated with concepts change. (In Sri Lanka in the seminar circuit the term paradigm shift is used in a very mundane way and sometimes even a change of drinking habits from coca cola to pepsi cola is called a paradigm shift.) For example the space and time of a Newtonian observer is not the same as the space-time of an Einsteinian observer. Though the same words space and time are used the hyphen in the Einsteinian paradigm gives them a different meaning altogether. In the paradigm of Quantum Physics a "particle" does not mean the same thing as a particle in Newtonian Physics. This change of meaning does not have to wait for a paradigm shift to take place. Even within a paradigm meanings change as most of us are familiar with. The meanings of the words change with time (this is a tautology as there is no time without change) and one does not have to be a postmodernist to observe this phenomenon. Also words have specific meanings only in a given context and the same word could be used to denote different things in different contexts. Here again there was no need for the world to wait for a Saussure to recognise this simple phenomenon.
However something more difficult to recognise was pointed by Prof. Feyerabend who elaborated the concept of incommensurability. What he said essentially was that the objects that fell to the ground in Galilean Physics were not the same as those that fell under Newtonian gravitation attraction. Needless to say that the objects that move around in the space-time of the Theory of General Relativity are different from those in either Galilean Physics or Newtonian Physics. The objects as far as an ordinary observer is concerned do not change. To an ordinary observer the objects that were dropped from the leaning tower of Pisa in Italy were not different from the apples and other objects that fell to the ground in the seventeenth century England. Neither were they different from the bombs that were dropped in Germany as well as by Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. What is said to be different is the way the western Physicists look at these various droppings.
In Galilean Physics the objects fell near the earth with the same constant acceleration and there was no gravitational force or gravitational field that made these objects to fall in Italy in the early seventeenth century. The objects fell with the same constant acceleration and those dropped from equal heights simultaneously reached the ground simultaneously. In Newtonian Physics it was different. The apples in England in the late seventeenth century did not fall with a constant acceleration though different apples had the same acceleration at equal heights from the ground. For any one apple the acceleration varied with the height and moreover the apples now had a gravitational force, that later became a gravitational field under the influence of another Cambridge Theoretical Physicist Dr. Maxwell, to respond to. In Feyerabendian scheme these two views are incommensurable. To further complicate matters the bombs in Germany in the twentieth century did not have a gravitational field in which they could fall. Einsteinian Physics had exorcised the gravitational field. The bombs themselves, together with the other objects created the space-time, made it curved, and moved in the curved space-time. In Newtonian England apples responded to the space and time, but the space and time did not reciprocate to respond to the apples. However, in Einsteinian Germany things were different. Not only the bombs responded to the space-time but the space-time very kindly returned the compliment by responding to the bombs.
(To be continued)
- Sri Lanka Guardian
_______________
by Nalin de Silva
(July 08, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) I am not a historian if one were to go by the degrees I have obtained, but by paraphrasing as somebody what has been said on war it can be stated that history is too serious a subject to be left in the hands of the historians. In the recent past Michael Roberts a historian produced by the University by the river, and turned Anthropologist by history and Shainie who is comfortable in his/her anonymity have commented on history and referred to me as I also write on history. Roberts has referred to me as a Mathematician but at the outset I must say that I am not such a creature as my contribution to Mathematics is zero, though I sell some Applied Mathematics and Mathematical Physics, the others have created, for a living.
History like any other corpus of knowledge is relative and is relative to the period of writing as well as the period of reading, not to mention the writer and the reader. History of period A, written in period B, and read in period C will "reveal" the conditions in periods B and C, as well as the characters of the writer relative to the reader. There is no objective history as such, which could be found only in the minds of the "objective historians". Before I write on history let me say something on Philosophy and here again I must emphasise that I am neither a Philosopher, though I delve into Philosophy.
I believe in the philosophy of relativity not only in western or any other Physics but with respect to knowledge in general. To me knowledge, whether in Physics or History, is created by people relative to their sense organs, culture and mind. This takes place in a Chinthanaya which itself is part of culture. However, though Chinthanaya is part of the culture it is also the thread that runs through all aspects of the latter. Thus I am not reducing knowledge to either culture or Chinthanaya.
The above statements on knowledge too are relative to a culture and not absolute. In this case the statements of this particular epistemology have been created in Sinhala Theravada Buddhist culture, and if somebody were to question as to whether the knowledge of a relativistic epistemology is absolute we would not reply in the affirmative, and all that we would say is that this particular epistemology which we call constructionist relativism (Nirmanathmaka Sapekshathavadaya) is at least internally consistent to a very high degree, unlike many other epistemologies. For example an epistemology that assumes an objective reality independent of the man has an uphill task in attempting to show objectively that an objective reality exists. One would say that it is an ontological problem and not something that belongs to epistemology. However the way one "acquires" a knowledge of the existence of an objective reality is in the realm of epistemology. It has to be emphasised that though western philosophy has an epistemology separated from an ontology, it is not possible to do so even relative to western philosophy.
It has to be mentioned, at the outset, that the above epistemology though may sound similar to theories on social construction of knowledge in what is known as Sociology of Knowledge, is much wider in its base. In theories on what are called social construction of knowledge it is readily accepted that knowledge is created or constructed in a given society. The social constructionists emphasise that knowledge is created in societies but they do not attempt to explain how knowledge is constructed in these societies. Thus creation of knowledge is left unexplained. In other words there is no theory to explain how theories are created though it is said that theories are constructed by people living in societies.
In "Nirmanathmaka Sapekshathavadaya" the relative knowledge, one speaks of is not the relative knowledge of something that absolutely exists. In the normal relativity theories, including those of the postmodernists, one has to deal with the way certain phenomena appear with respect to different observers. It is assumed that certain things exist "absolutely" and they appear differently to different observers. Even in the so called theory of relativity in Physics, there exists an absolute space-time which is observed by different observers in a manner relative to them. The so-called space-time interval of two events remains the same for different observers whether in the special theory or in the general theory of relativity. "Nirmanathmaka Sapekshathavadaya" differs from all the other relativistic epistemologies and theories, as there it is the observer who constructs knowledge as if out of nothing (sunya), due to the "avidya" of the observer. Even the observer who is "absolute" in the western theories, is relative to himself/herself in "Nirmanathmaka Sapekshathavadaya". As there is no "soul" in Sinhala Theravada Buddhism, in "Nirmanathmaka Sapekshathavadaya" it has been shown how the mind creates itself without referring to any "other entity".
It was Prof. Thomas Kuhn who introduced the concept of paradigm with respect to creating knowledge. He showed that in Physics, what is referred to as Newtonian Physics is based on a set of certain axioms, assumptions etc., which he called a paradigm. He opposed the views of Prof. Karl Popper who had said that in (western) science, the scientists advance knowledge by trying to falsify the existing theories. Kuhnian view was that in (western) science there are what are known as normal periods and revolutionary periods. During the normal periods the scientists carry out normal work and they only work to show that the existing theories are correct. However according to Kuhn there are revolutionary periods in science during which the existing paradigm is replaced by a new paradigm. The Einsteinian revolution that took place more than hundred years ago in 1905 changed the Newtonian paradigm and introduced new axioms and assumptions with respect to space and time.
In the Kuhnian scheme theories in (western) science are created in a given paradigm and one may say that theories are relative to a paradigm. With paradigm shifts not only theories but meanings associated with concepts change. (In Sri Lanka in the seminar circuit the term paradigm shift is used in a very mundane way and sometimes even a change of drinking habits from coca cola to pepsi cola is called a paradigm shift.) For example the space and time of a Newtonian observer is not the same as the space-time of an Einsteinian observer. Though the same words space and time are used the hyphen in the Einsteinian paradigm gives them a different meaning altogether. In the paradigm of Quantum Physics a "particle" does not mean the same thing as a particle in Newtonian Physics. This change of meaning does not have to wait for a paradigm shift to take place. Even within a paradigm meanings change as most of us are familiar with. The meanings of the words change with time (this is a tautology as there is no time without change) and one does not have to be a postmodernist to observe this phenomenon. Also words have specific meanings only in a given context and the same word could be used to denote different things in different contexts. Here again there was no need for the world to wait for a Saussure to recognise this simple phenomenon.
However something more difficult to recognise was pointed by Prof. Feyerabend who elaborated the concept of incommensurability. What he said essentially was that the objects that fell to the ground in Galilean Physics were not the same as those that fell under Newtonian gravitation attraction. Needless to say that the objects that move around in the space-time of the Theory of General Relativity are different from those in either Galilean Physics or Newtonian Physics. The objects as far as an ordinary observer is concerned do not change. To an ordinary observer the objects that were dropped from the leaning tower of Pisa in Italy were not different from the apples and other objects that fell to the ground in the seventeenth century England. Neither were they different from the bombs that were dropped in Germany as well as by Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. What is said to be different is the way the western Physicists look at these various droppings.
In Galilean Physics the objects fell near the earth with the same constant acceleration and there was no gravitational force or gravitational field that made these objects to fall in Italy in the early seventeenth century. The objects fell with the same constant acceleration and those dropped from equal heights simultaneously reached the ground simultaneously. In Newtonian Physics it was different. The apples in England in the late seventeenth century did not fall with a constant acceleration though different apples had the same acceleration at equal heights from the ground. For any one apple the acceleration varied with the height and moreover the apples now had a gravitational force, that later became a gravitational field under the influence of another Cambridge Theoretical Physicist Dr. Maxwell, to respond to. In Feyerabendian scheme these two views are incommensurable. To further complicate matters the bombs in Germany in the twentieth century did not have a gravitational field in which they could fall. Einsteinian Physics had exorcised the gravitational field. The bombs themselves, together with the other objects created the space-time, made it curved, and moved in the curved space-time. In Newtonian England apples responded to the space and time, but the space and time did not reciprocate to respond to the apples. However, in Einsteinian Germany things were different. Not only the bombs responded to the space-time but the space-time very kindly returned the compliment by responding to the bombs.
(To be continued)
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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