Facts & Fallacies Of Black July

“That was when an SP came to me and told me that there was a radio message from the PM asking me to contact him urgently. When I called Mr. Premadasa he too was extremely upset and worried. He told me about the new decision to bring the bodies to Colombo that evening and asked me to make the necessary arrangements. He told me that the President is planning to attend the cremations and he too was expected to be there.”
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by Kumar Rupesinghe

(July 24, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) A Sinhala newspaper in August 1983 published articles by a number of Sinhala merchants, for instance: Our merchants rarely had an opportunity to import essential commodities. Up till now trade in these commodities in Pettah has continued to be a monopoly in the hands of people who are not citizens by descent. Our people had no room in the paper market, which covers an area of one square mile.

"Duty Free Shopping" in the Economic Review, November 1985

The President of the Sri Lanka Small Industrial Association who was interviewed by the same newspaper said: "As a society which allocates first place to commerce evolved, commercial power got alienated from the majority Sinhala and went to the minority national groups. It is also important to note that a senior Cabinet Minister of that government had been a consistent and articulate champion of the Sinhalese trading community, a most vocal protagonist of Sinhalese trading interests and a severe critic of minority business interests."

Some of his views were published in popular pamphlets and books as early as 1970 and have been widely distributed since 1983. In these publications, he complains that foreign and minority owned business ventures had retarded the development of Sinhala business and calls for measures against alien traders. Some of his writings, excerpts of which have been translated, show a clear coincidence of interest between the different factions of the Sinhala merchant community. His views are given some prominence here because during his interlude as minister, he became both a symbol and an expression of these Sinhalese merchants' interest. As far back as in 1970 a publication gave proof of the anti-minority views:

"If this is a genuine national government, it should appoint a commission to look into the unfortunate situation of the Sinhala traders as a result of the influence of the Indians and take remedial measures. Also, in order to save the Sinhalese from the dangers created by foreigners and Indians controlling trade and large plantations in this country, they should be driven out forthwith."

Another article states thus: "In the central market in Colombo, in the Pettah, the local Sinhalese traders today do not control even 5% of the trade. Power is almost entirely in the hands of Indians, Borahs and Sindhis. The export-import trade is completely in the hands of foreigners. A person who travels from Colombo Fort to Wellawatte could see how many Sindhi shops there are on either side of the Galle Road. Every single one of these trading establishments was started after an independent government was set up in Sri Lanka in 1948.

A fact that should be especially mentioned here is that the wholesale and retail trade which about 68 years ago was in the hands of the Sinhalese in Colombo, as well as in the Uva, Sabaragamuwa and the central regions, is now completely in the hands of Indian Tamil nationals. This has not happened spontaneously. It is the result of an organised move by Indian Trade Unions and other organisations to supply Indians with cash and other necessities to purchase Sinhalese-owned business enterprises and buildings. Because of this far-sighted and organised plan of the Indians, the number of Sinhalese traders has become reduced by about 90% and they have been replaced by a similar number of Indian traders."

Findings of the Government Task Force

Eye witness reports provide a vivid and terrible picture of the unfolding violence which continued to escalate for more than ten days in Sri Lanka in July 1983. What was clear from the pattern of violence which unfolded was its planned and pre-meditated nature, particularly the systematic attempt to undermine the material existence of the Tamil community living in the South. A government appointed task force was set up to assess the extent of damage. Its report covered only 116 industrial operations within a 20 mile radius of Colombo.

The study assessed losses in terms of production exports and employment and estimated the physical damage done to factories and the loss of working capital. Losses were heaviest in the garment industry which had grown spectacularly during the period of import substitution industrialisation and in the coconut milling industry which had compelled the government to impose an export ban following the damage to nine of the country's top mills. The task force estimated the physical damage to be in the region of Rs. 500 million (US $20 million). The cost or damage to buildings, plant machinery and equipment is greater than the damage to operating capital, the report stated. The loss of raw materials and finished products was particularly high due to fire and looting. Such losses accounted for 46% of the total loss to capital. The replacement value for machinery, plant and equipment alone could be about Rs. 1.75 billion. The task force report puts the total work force in damaged industries at nearly 15,000. 32 industries in the export sector, their total value of exports in 1982 estimated at Rs. 650 million and where their export orders for the next 12 months were worth about Rs. 800 million. These industries include garments, coconut oil, fruit canning, desiccated coconut, rubber and leather products.

It should be noted that the industries damaged were entirely Tamil owned business houses, some of which had benefited from the import substitution policies of previous regimes.

The above extracts from newspapers and government surveys indicate only the extent of the damage to industries and factories within a 30-mile radius of Colombo. These reports do not analyse the damage to the numerous small and medium scale shops which were destroyed not only in the outskirts of Colombo, but also in numerous smaller towns in the Central Province, particularly in Kandy, Badulla, Nuwara Eliya, Banderawela Nawalapitiya and Matale. Neither do these reports analyse the wholesale damages to people's homes, private property and savings.

The President and the Handling of the Ethnic Conflict

Another incident narrated by a close associate of the President stated thus: "The day we heard about the killing of the 13 soldiers in Jaffna I went to see Mr. Premadasa. He was on the phone to the President. There was a lot of tension in the country and we were extremely worried about the way things were moving. Mr. Premadasa turned to me and informed me that the President is planning to bring the bodies of the dead soldiers to Colombo, to be cremated at Kanatte. Mr. Premadasa had been trying to get the President to change his mind when I walked in. When he saw me, he put me on. The President told me: "These people want to bring these bodies to Colombo and cremate them at Kanatte. What do you think?" I said: "Sir, why do you want to bring these bodies to Colombo? These are not people from Colombo. If you bring the bodies here, there will be problems." This was precisely what Mr. Premadasa had been telling the President before I walked in. Afterwards Mr. Premadasa told me that they had decided against bringing the bodies to Colombo; we were both extremely relieved.

That was when an SP came to me and told me that there was a radio message from the PM asking me to contact him urgently. When I called Mr. Premadasa he too was extremely upset and worried. He told me about the new decision to bring the bodies to Colombo that evening and asked me to make the necessary arrangements. He told me that the President is planning to attend the cremations and he too was expected to be there.

He knew full well there would be problems but he had no choice in the matter. The decisions were made elsewhere and he was just informed of them. If the President listened to Mr. Premadasa, the '83 July riots could have been avoided and the history of this country would have been different. And as Mr. Premadasa and I predicted, rioting started immediately afterwards. I later heard that the army wanted the bodies to be brought to Kanatte and that the President succumbed to their pressure. It was a terrible time and the worst part was that we were almost powerless. We could do nothing to stop the killing, the destruction".
- Sri Lanka Guardian