(June 11, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) Only a handful of nations — France, Spain, Russia, and a consortium from Germany-Italy-Sweden — build and export ocean-going blue water-capable conventional submarines. Pakistan and Australia have either built, or are in the process of building, such submarines under licensed production. Only the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China can make nuclear-propelled submarines of the "tactical deterrence at sea" (SSN) and "second strategic deterrence" (SSBN) variety. Iran, Italy and North Korea have built midget submarines of about 100 tonnes for "special saboteur operations." Going by this rather limited expanse of submarine production, it is apt to ask why is submarine construction so difficult, especially as these "sharks of steel" have been widely used since 1914 during World War I?
Submarines today dive deeper at higher speeds and have greater submerged endurance and can fire weapons from all depths. It has to be ensured that they retain the advantage of surprise over constantly improving anti-submarine capabilities. The challenge today is to build a platform that can operate in the unforgiving environment below the waves, where a depth increase of every 10 metres increases pressure by an incredible 1 kg per sq cm. Add to this the need to sustain life in cramped conditions for a crew of 30 to 60 men for periods ranging from 45 to 70 days, along with dealing with complex weapons, sensors, stealth measures and basic issues of surviving things like underwater explosions, and you end up with a hugely complex system. This interconnected system is powered by highly competent people who boast extensive technological expertise in metallurgy, electronics, microclimate and shore infrastructure. Any modern conventional submarine is a sum of separate groups, which require close involvement of local industry. Like the space programme, this provides useful spinoffs to the nation in diverse fields of metallurgy, electronics, computers, sensors and automation, among others. To begin with, there is the pressure hull with pipelines; valves and high-quality rubber components which can sustain operations at varying depths; propulsion which comprises a propeller shaft, complex "Permasyn" type electric propulsion motors, high-capacity batteries with total weights between 300 and 400 tonnes, and diesel generators to charge batteries at submerged depths of nine to 10 metres through a snorkel pipe. Then come a complex power-generation and distribution system; a hydraulic system to operate weapons and sensors on command from a centralised remote control panel; communications systems and expensive stealth systems; Air Independent Propulsion Systems for totally silent submerged propulsion ranging from 10 to 30 days; masts of the penetrating and non-penetrating types for periscopes and electronic warfare systems. Systems like ring laser gyros and inertial navigation systems, fire-control circuitry, weapons, individual escape systems, a life-support system to provide oxygen at the correct concentration and remove carbon dioxide and other toxic gases add up to the load. When you add to this the need for almost 100 per cent "mission reliability," you get extremely congested machinery, which must be correctly operated by the crew in very cramped conditions.
So to build a submarine of 1,500 to 2,500 tonnes, India needs trained manpower, material and machines to bend the sheet metal and metal frames into a near perfect "circular cylinder." Any discrepancies in this "circularity" can result in catastrophic failure under water with the pressure hull being crushed. The next stage is "fitting out," where the machinery and the rest of the systems are installed after being checked out on a test bench ashore. When the "fitting out" is almost 100 per cent complete, the submarine is launched or floated for the next five stages, which include setting to work some equipment, harbour trials, sea trials, weapons trials and induction. History has recorded incidents of submarines sinking in the harbour due to flooding or fire or human error.
To prevent accidents or sabotage, highly-trained personnel are required on board the submarine not only just prior to launch, but subsequently thereafter to prevent accidental sinking due to inadvertent operation of the diving system, or explosion due to hydrogen not being "ventilated to the atmosphere regularly." This requirement of trained crew becomes even more critical for a submarine, which is the first of its class. Any shortcuts or variations to the above time-tested international procedure can prove disastrous.
The Russians completed the entire process of building and delivering operational kilo-class submarines to navies worldwide in just 30 months. The Germans took 56 months to build and deliver the first two SSK submarines (1,620 tonnes each) in 1986. In comparison, MDL (Mumbai) took 96 and 108 months to deliver the first two SSK submarines in 1992 and 1994.
In 1982, India sent numerous officers and MDL workers to Germany for training in the construction of SSK submarines for periods ranging from one to five years at great expense. Sadly, after the TOT and construction of two subs in MDL, this expertise was lost due to the HDW scam, and we are now "relearning" the art and science of submarine-building at great cost, with the Scorpene project signed in 2005.
It has been reported that RFPs for the second production line comprising six subs have been issued and the 30-year indigenous submarine building plan may finally fructify in a few years, provided we persevere. Next door, the Pakistanis have built three Agosta-class submarines (AIPS has been introduced) and are continuing to improve upon their skills. They too had a scam, with the Pakistan CNS and six others being convicted and imprisoned. But the project continued, and building skills were consolidated. The Chinese are also far ahead with largescale construction of three different classes of conventional subs.
When we talk of building a modern conventional submarine, costing over $350 million apiece, and comprising over 100,000 different parts and kilometres of electrical cabling and metal pipes and thousands of valves, we need to look at the complexities involved, the high level of vertical specialisation and unwavering political support-cum-funding that such a project demands. With respect to nuclear submarines, which are much larger at upwards of 6,000 tonnes (SSN) and over 9,000 tonnes (SSBN), the complexity greatly increases due to mission endurance of over 90 days and the need of sustain human life in close proximity to a miniaturised reactor, which must be robust, reliable and simple to operate, at varying depths and different angles of "roll and pitch."
In addition, the complexities and cost of making this large, steam turbine propelled platform "silent and stealthy" pose a high level of technological challenge. To give a simple example, the second generation of nuclear submarines of 1960s vintage made noise underwater which was roughly equal to a hundred rail steam engines together. However, the third generation nuclear submarines are almost totally silent, and today the US and Russia have fourth-generation super silent "nukes" prowling the seas. To produce nuclear-tipped 10-metre ICBMs, capable of "safe onboard stowage and reliable underwater launch," and with a range of over 5,000 km, is extremely complex and challenging.
To put things in perspective, we need to keep in mind the ongoing 30-year-old history of the 58-tonne Arjun MBT, where the DRDO is still trying to convince the Indian Army that the tank meets their requirements. However, notwithstanding the technological challenges and past history, India and its Navy have no option but to introduce accountability, persevere and build submarines of all types without frittering away highly-trained manpower. In the fields of "second strategic deterrence" (SSBN), "tactical deterrence at sea" (SSN) and "sea denial" (conventional submarines), there is no room for error or "bluff". Only genuine capability, and not "technology demonstrators", built and operated by highly-skilled personnel, will deliver results, and be worth the taxpayers’ money invested in this field of national security.
(Vice-Admiral Arun Kumar Singh, a nuclear submariner, retired from the Indian Navy as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam)
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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