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by N Sathiyamoorthy
(June 09, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Two statements in twice as many days from the LTTE and therein lies an irony. The first one is an appeal to the people of Tamil Nadu, in neighbouring India, for the "people to rise in solidarity with our cause". The second one is an insistence on the Sri Lankan Government facilitating Norway's revived facilitation if the LTTE has to return to the negotiations table.
The LTTE's appeal to Tamil Nadu, rather to the people of Tamil Nadu, has been made over the head of the functioning Governments in the State and at the Centre. Against this, in talks with the Sri Lankan State, which alone is he legitimate authority for solving the Sri Lankan Tamils' grievances, it wants Norwegian facilitation, instead. This is not to question the LTTE's need and preference for facilitation by Norway, or to question the latter's role. Comfort-levels do matter in such matters. The Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse, in turn, has shown a marked disinterest, possibly bordering on dislike, for involving foreign facilitators. India, the facilitator from the past with a clear understanding of the Sri Lankan situation, is no exception.
Yet, the Colombo Government has continually expressed a willingness to consider a Norwegian team's visit if it could provide a road-map of sorts, on the bench-marks it would set out for itself before setting out for Killinochchi – against which future accomplishments could be measured. The idea possibly is to test the sincerity of the LTTE rather than the usefulness of Norwegian facilitation.
It is sad that no nation or group is in any position to guarantee 'good behaviour' by the LTTE during times of cease-fire. Whether dealing with individuals like Rajiv Gandhi and Amirthalingam, or with Governments like those of India and nearer home in Sri Lanka, the LTTE has used the smoke-screen of peace-intention, tempting the other party to lower the guard, before striking hard.
Not that the Sri Lankan State had not used past ceasefires to recruit and train Army personnel and for procuring weapons, including helicopter gunship and artillery pieces. Legitimacy has lent grater credibility to the State in such matters, and the LTTE lacks both legitimacy and credibility. It is a reversal of roles when compared to human rights issues, where greater responsibility and accountability rests on the legitimate State to be able to sound credible. The touchstone for compliance is much less in the case of non-State actors on the HR front.
In all this, the messenger became as important as the message, if not more. Coming from Pulidevan, director of the LTTE Peace Secretariat, it was aimed at disproving reports that the LTTE leadership had not taken Pulidevan into custody on charges of treachery. Compare it with the LTTE's stoic silence on the fate of Mahattayya, the no two in the hierarchy after Prabhakaran when he was 'executed, and thereby hangs a tale.
Against this, the LTTE's appeal to the people of Tamil Nadu is again a reiteration of the 'policy statement' contained in Prabhakaran's "Heroes' Day" speech in end-November. This time round, it was left to LTTE political wing leader B Nadesan to exhort that the "Tamils in Tamil Nadu should not remain silent spectators as we suffer". "Eelam Tamils could record Himalayan victories if they had an upsurge in Tamil Nadu in their support, as well as the backing of the estimated 80 million Tamils living in the world," Nadesan said. His appeal also addressed the Tamils in Singapore and Malaysia.
As is known, the LTTE supporters' groups run a parallel administration within the Tamil communities of Canada and in many countries across Europe, and maybe even in the US and Australia, taking their instructions from the leadership in Kilinochchi. Apart from India, South-East Asia is seen as a source and conduit for weapons, for which some persons have been arrested and arraigned by the respective governments. In recent years at least, India has been spared of reports about 'LTTE tax-collection' in the country.
While calling upon the Tamils in Tamil Nadu to "rise in support" without stopping with giving only "voice" to such support, Nadesan also pooh-poohed the implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment on provincial autonomy, which in turn was based on the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. New Delhi had banned the LTTE in the aftermath of the 'Rajiv Gandhi assassination', and the ban was extended for yet another two-year term only days before Nadesan disowned the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord one more time.
Read together, it has dangerous implications – for India, in particular. In plain terms, it was a call by the LTTE, for the Tamils of Tamil Nadu to revolt against the Indian State and the elected governments in Tamil Nadu and at the Centre. That the call has had lukewarm response in Tamil Nadu, as more recent appeals of the kind from the LTTE sympathisers in the State has had over the past years does not mean that peripheral groups and individuals would not take the LTTE seriously. However, in most cases, it has remained a commercial transaction, where big money is involved.
It is time that the LTTE came out of the closet that Killinochchi has become. It needs to understand that the world outside has changed. Tamil Nadu has changed. The 'Rajiv Gandhi assassination' applied the guillotine to past sympathies, and GenX in Tamil Nadu is tuned near-exclusively to reforms-centric attainments and accomplishments of the individual. It has set its eyes on the distant West, and not elsewhere.
If taken seriously, the LTTE's call could jeopardise the future of a few individuals in Tamil Nadu, just as it has facilitated the political relevance, if any, of a few others. If it is serious about finding a political solution, the LTTE should be talking to the Government in Colombo, not to the people of Tamil Nadu. Before that, it should be talking to itself – and to fellow-Tamils in Sri Lanka.
It is here, the guarantees of the kind sought by the Colombo Government become even more relevant. In the current context, it could well include guarantees from the LTTE too, that stray elements would not trigger bombs in Colombo and elsewhere, as they have been doing with increasing frequency and equal lethality with every reversal in conventional war – and decreasing opportunities for guerrilla attacks!
(The writer is Director, Chennai Chapter of the Observer Research Foundation, the Indian policy think-tank, headquartered in New Delhi.)
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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