Cross-border support to militancy persists
by Anita Inder Singh
(June 20, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The recent antics of the Taliban have made clear that security – yes – of the conventional law and order sort – remains NATO’s top priority in Afghanistan. And they have an impeccable sense of timing. The escape of 1,000 Taliban prisoners from jail in Kandahar, and their subsequent declaration of intent to take over the city, came just as international donors had presented President Karzai with an aid package of $ 20 billion in Paris on 12 June, no doubt lulling the West into thinking they had done everything to advance the security, prosperity and human rights of Afghans.
With the Taliban threatening to capture Kandahar, what are the options before President Karzai and NATO? Apart from preparing to repulse a Taliban attack?
There is of course the many-sided ‘Pakistan option’ – or options, if your prefer.
Karzai certainly doesn’t see Pakistani as a helper against extremism. He threatened on Sunday to send soldiers into Pakistan to fight militant groups operating in the north-western Pakistan to attack Afghanistan.
The inference is that he sees the hidden and sinister hand of extremists trained Pakistani army and intelligence in the jail-break – and more generally – in perpetuating insecurity in Afghanistan. Sixty per cent of the militants who have crossed the border into Afghanistan are actually Pakistanis. So Afghanistan has a right to avenge all the harm they have done over the last three decades.
At another level, even as Yusuf Gilani’s elected government concluded a peace deal with extremists last month Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, declared that jihadist attacks on Nato and Afghanistan would continue.
Mehsud’s belligerence has its sympathisers among some Pakistani military officers, who regard Karzai as Washington’s puppet, and also most Pakistanis, who think that America’s presence in Afghanistan threaten’s their country’s interests.
The point is that militants cannot thrive without some measure of local support – whether that comes from ordinary Pakistanis or the intelligence and army.
The army, which dominates Pakistan’s politics, and which has been hailed by Gilani as the guardian of its national and ideological frontiers is not minded to help Karzai or his Nato backers.
Growing evidence – most recently from the Rand Corporation – that the Pakistani army and intelligence are fomenting extremism has been dismissed by the military as “factually incorrect” and “yet another smear campaign maligning Pakistan armed forces”.
General Ashfaq Kiyani, General Musharraf’s successor as commander-in chief, has made known that the army will not be retrained or redeployed to fight militants in the north-west. And the ongoing war of words about the killing of Pakistani soldiers and civilians by American drone aircraft last week does not augur well for Islamabad’s help against extremists.
So what can the US do? Washington could try to persuade Pakistan’s politicians and army they can’t stop militant activities against their own establishment unless they also stop training them against Afghanistan (and neighbouring India) in the name of Islam. It is of course the military, in alliance with clerics of their choice, who decide which version of Islam will be followed by Pakistan.
The extent to which Pakistan’s politicians and army have harnessed Islam to the service of the state, against democracy, and against Afghanistan and India since its creation in 1947, makes it unlikely that they will be able to perform a 180-degree turn and stop manipulating religion for domestic, political or diplomatic ends overnight.
Even if Islamabad showed a new determination to do so, how long would it take for any new, non-religious, ideology of state and society to find favour with Pakistan’s citizens and army?
Moreover, the militants have no central command; they are a loose network of groups and individuals, each one doing pretty much what they like. So, no one knows how many could be influenced by the Pakistani authorities to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate as peaceful citizens of a peaceful society. The birth of an anti-extremist establishment in Islamabad remains a pretty bleak prospect.
The US could consider sending reinforcements and deploying more troops on the Afghan-Pakistani border. That option would be difficult and it would take time to reduce cross-border raids.
But it would be better than accepting Islamabad’s argument that the border is too long and porous to be sealed -- which means that NATO should do nothing, and let extremists keep on frustrating its Afghan campaign.
Most of all, perhaps, NATO’s operations should be better coordinated. Is that really impossible? Poor coordination is the main reason why more than 50,000 NATO and 57,000 Afghan soldiers, aided by 15,000 Afghan policemen, have actually presided over – a steep rise in Taliban violence since 2005.
But opponents of extremism should remember that a mere 350-strong US Special Forces and 15,000 Afghans threw out the fundamentalist and cruel Taliban government in less than three months in 2001. Good coordination then resulted in a security mission accomplished.
Last but not least, efficient coordination of NATO operations and the deployment of reinforcements from NATO countries must be attended by respect for the human rights of Afghans. That, after all, is what ought to distinguish NATO from Taliban thugs.
Yet a concern for human rights, good governance and development should not blind anyone to the fact that the enhancement of Afghanistan’s security will entail the continued use of force against extremists in the foreseeable future.
The writer is Visiting Professor, Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, New Delhi
- Sri Lanka Guardian
(June 20, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The recent antics of the Taliban have made clear that security – yes – of the conventional law and order sort – remains NATO’s top priority in Afghanistan. And they have an impeccable sense of timing. The escape of 1,000 Taliban prisoners from jail in Kandahar, and their subsequent declaration of intent to take over the city, came just as international donors had presented President Karzai with an aid package of $ 20 billion in Paris on 12 June, no doubt lulling the West into thinking they had done everything to advance the security, prosperity and human rights of Afghans.
With the Taliban threatening to capture Kandahar, what are the options before President Karzai and NATO? Apart from preparing to repulse a Taliban attack?
There is of course the many-sided ‘Pakistan option’ – or options, if your prefer.
Karzai certainly doesn’t see Pakistani as a helper against extremism. He threatened on Sunday to send soldiers into Pakistan to fight militant groups operating in the north-western Pakistan to attack Afghanistan.
The inference is that he sees the hidden and sinister hand of extremists trained Pakistani army and intelligence in the jail-break – and more generally – in perpetuating insecurity in Afghanistan. Sixty per cent of the militants who have crossed the border into Afghanistan are actually Pakistanis. So Afghanistan has a right to avenge all the harm they have done over the last three decades.
At another level, even as Yusuf Gilani’s elected government concluded a peace deal with extremists last month Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, declared that jihadist attacks on Nato and Afghanistan would continue.
Mehsud’s belligerence has its sympathisers among some Pakistani military officers, who regard Karzai as Washington’s puppet, and also most Pakistanis, who think that America’s presence in Afghanistan threaten’s their country’s interests.
The point is that militants cannot thrive without some measure of local support – whether that comes from ordinary Pakistanis or the intelligence and army.
The army, which dominates Pakistan’s politics, and which has been hailed by Gilani as the guardian of its national and ideological frontiers is not minded to help Karzai or his Nato backers.
Growing evidence – most recently from the Rand Corporation – that the Pakistani army and intelligence are fomenting extremism has been dismissed by the military as “factually incorrect” and “yet another smear campaign maligning Pakistan armed forces”.
General Ashfaq Kiyani, General Musharraf’s successor as commander-in chief, has made known that the army will not be retrained or redeployed to fight militants in the north-west. And the ongoing war of words about the killing of Pakistani soldiers and civilians by American drone aircraft last week does not augur well for Islamabad’s help against extremists.
So what can the US do? Washington could try to persuade Pakistan’s politicians and army they can’t stop militant activities against their own establishment unless they also stop training them against Afghanistan (and neighbouring India) in the name of Islam. It is of course the military, in alliance with clerics of their choice, who decide which version of Islam will be followed by Pakistan.
The extent to which Pakistan’s politicians and army have harnessed Islam to the service of the state, against democracy, and against Afghanistan and India since its creation in 1947, makes it unlikely that they will be able to perform a 180-degree turn and stop manipulating religion for domestic, political or diplomatic ends overnight.
Even if Islamabad showed a new determination to do so, how long would it take for any new, non-religious, ideology of state and society to find favour with Pakistan’s citizens and army?
Moreover, the militants have no central command; they are a loose network of groups and individuals, each one doing pretty much what they like. So, no one knows how many could be influenced by the Pakistani authorities to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate as peaceful citizens of a peaceful society. The birth of an anti-extremist establishment in Islamabad remains a pretty bleak prospect.
The US could consider sending reinforcements and deploying more troops on the Afghan-Pakistani border. That option would be difficult and it would take time to reduce cross-border raids.
But it would be better than accepting Islamabad’s argument that the border is too long and porous to be sealed -- which means that NATO should do nothing, and let extremists keep on frustrating its Afghan campaign.
Most of all, perhaps, NATO’s operations should be better coordinated. Is that really impossible? Poor coordination is the main reason why more than 50,000 NATO and 57,000 Afghan soldiers, aided by 15,000 Afghan policemen, have actually presided over – a steep rise in Taliban violence since 2005.
But opponents of extremism should remember that a mere 350-strong US Special Forces and 15,000 Afghans threw out the fundamentalist and cruel Taliban government in less than three months in 2001. Good coordination then resulted in a security mission accomplished.
Last but not least, efficient coordination of NATO operations and the deployment of reinforcements from NATO countries must be attended by respect for the human rights of Afghans. That, after all, is what ought to distinguish NATO from Taliban thugs.
Yet a concern for human rights, good governance and development should not blind anyone to the fact that the enhancement of Afghanistan’s security will entail the continued use of force against extremists in the foreseeable future.
The writer is Visiting Professor, Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, New Delhi
- Sri Lanka Guardian
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